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A B S T R A C T
Wireless sensor networks have become a mature technology. They are increasingly
being used in different practical applications. Examples include the monitoring of
industrial environments and light adaptation in tunnels. For such applications, attacks
are a serious concern. A disrupted sensor network may not only have a financial
impact, but could also be safety-critical. Hence, the availability of a wireless sensor
network is our key protection goal in this thesis. A special challenge lies in the fact,
that sensor nodes typically are physically unprotected. Hence, insider attacks are
supposed to occur, e.g., by compromising the nodes and getting in possession of the
cryptographic keys, thereby becoming a legitimate member of the network. As a result,
mechanisms to detect attacks during operation are necessary.
Traditionally, intrusion detection systems are used to discover network anomalies.
Due to severe resource-restrictions, building such a system for wireless sensor net-
works is challenging; it has to be small in size. Therefore, it is important to reduce the
required information for intrusion detection. The majority of these systems designed
for wireless sensor networks is working decentralized, i.e., the nodes try to detect
the attacks locally, mostly by using some type of collaboration with other nodes. So
far, the real-world effects of attacks on wireless sensor networks have not yet been
studied widely. Consequently, state-of-the-art intrusion detection systems often need
to analyze a large number of metrics for attack detection. The execution frequency of
the detection algorithm is mainly periodic or constant. Another problem that needs
further research, is the possibility of reducing the detection frequency. We also investi-
gate the feasibility of performing intrusion detection without collaboration, in order
to enable the lightweight detection of denial-of-service attacks on wireless sensor
networks.
To overcome these shortcomings, in this work we conduct systematic measurements
in a real testbed in order to quantify the impact of denial-of-service attacks. This
allows us to identify those metrics, which are significantly influenced by an attack,
and thus are appropriate for attack detection. We present a fully localized intrusion
detection system, in which the nodes do not have to collaborate with each other. Based
on these results we propose two architectures, allowing the randomization of the
detection frequency. The advantage here is, that an adversary may not predict well in
advance, which node is responsible to perform intrusion detection at a certain point
in time.
The gathered data from the extensive measurements is analyzed with statistical
approaches. The presented intrusion detection systems are evaluated in simulations
and prototypical implementations.

Z U S A M M E N FA S S U N G
Drahtlose Sensornetze werden zunehmend zur Unterstützung von unterschiedlichen,
praktischen Anwendungen eingesetzt. Die Einsatzgebiete in der realen Welt, in de-
nen drahtlose Sensornetze eine wichtige Rolle spielen, umfassen beispielsweise die
Überwachung von industriellen Anlagen und die Lichtsteuerung in Tunnels. Für diese
beispielhaften Anwendungen stellen Angriffe eine große Gefahr dar. Das Ausfallen
des Sensornetzes kann neben finanziellen auch sicherheitskritische Auswirkungen
haben. Daher ist das wichtigste Schutzziel in dieser Arbeit die Verfügbarkeit des
drahtlosen Sensornetzes. Eine besondere Herausforderung beim Gewährleisten der
Sicherheit ist durch die oftmals freie Zugänglichkeit zu den Sensorknoten gegeben.
Daraus ergibt sich, dass von Insider-Angriffen ausgegangen werden muss, welche z.B.
durch Kompromittierung der Knoten im Besitz gültiger kryptographischer Schlüssel
und somit legitimer Teil des Netzes sind. Aus diesem Grunde sind Mechanismen zum
Erkennen von Angriffen auf das Sensornetz während des laufenden Betriebs nötig.
Traditionell werden Angriffserkennungssysteme zum Aufdecken von Netzwerk-
anomalien eingesetzt. Aufgrund der starken Ressourcenbeschränkungen ist der Ent-
wurf eines solchen Systems für drahtlose Sensornetze besonders herausfordernd;
der Speicherbedarf muss klein sein. Deshalb ist es wichtig, die benötigten Informa-
tionen zur Angriffserkennung zu reduzieren. Die überwiegende Mehrheit dieser
Systeme für drahtlose Sensornetze arbeitet dezentral, d.h. die Knoten versuchen die
Angriffe lokal zu erkennen, wofür meistens eine Form von Kooperation mit ande-
ren Knoten notwendig ist. Bisher wurden die realen Auswirkungen von Angriffen
auf Sensornetze unzureichend untersucht, weshalb oft eine Vielzahl an Metriken
zur Angriffserkennung herangezogen werden muss. Die Ausführungshäufigkeit des
Erkennungsalgorithmus ist vorwiegend periodisch oder konstant. Ebenso lücken-
haft erforscht ist die Möglichkeit zur Reduzierung der Ausführungshäufigkeit. Des
Weiteren untersuchen wir, ob die Angriffserkennung ohne Kooperation mit anderen
Knoten möglich ist, um Angriffe auf die Verfügbarkeit von drahtlosen Sensornetzen
leichtgewichtig zu entdecken.
Um diese Lücken zu schließen, werden in dieser Arbeit systematische Messungen
in einem realen Testbed durchgeführt, um die Auswirkungen von Angriffen auf die
Verfügbarkeit zu quantifizieren. Daraus resultieren Erkenntnisse, welche Metriken
besonders von einem Angriff beeinflusst werden und sich somit gut zur Angriffserken-
nung eignen. Wir stellen ein gänzlich lokal arbeitendes Angriffserkennungssystem vor,
das ohne Kooperation mit anderen Knoten auskommt. Aufbauend auf den erhaltenen
Ergebnissen werden zwei Architekturen vorgeschlagen, welche die Ausführungshäu-
figkeit des Angriffserkennnungsmechanismus randomisieren. Dadurch ist es für einen
Angreifer schwerer vorherzusehen, welcher Knoten zu welchem Zeitpunkt Angriffe
erkennen soll.
Die gewonnenen Daten aus den umfangreichen Messungen werden mittels statisti-
scher Verfahren untersucht. Die vorgestellten Angriffserkennungssysteme werden in
Simulationen und prototypischen Implementierungen evaluiert.
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I N T R O D U C T I O N
Well begun is half done.
Aristotle
1.1 motivation
In the early 1990’s, Mark Weiser introduced a vision called ubiquitous computing, a
vision of how we will live and interact with future computing environments [Wei91].
He believed that computers would become almost invisible in use and envisioned
the installation of hundreds of wireless computing devices per person. A clear trend
in computing is observable: a decrease in size is accompanied by an increase in the
number of devices. At the beginning of the computing era, there was one computer,
a mainframe, for many people. Later there was one computer, a so-called personal
computer, for everyone. Currently, we see that everyone uses multiple computing
devices, such as tablets, mobile phones, and notebooks. This development has been
made possible by the invention of small, lightweight, cheap, and mobile processors
that are used (1) in everyday objects (embedded computing [Wol12]), (2) on the human
body (wearable computing [Man97]), and (3) embedded in the environment (ambient
intelligence [RAS08]). We also notice a shift in networking paradigms. Recently,
smart things form networks, an example being wireless sensor networks. These
networks bridge the gap between the real and the physical world by monitoring the
environment with a variety of sensors, such as temperature, humidity, speed, etc.
Hence, they show a context-sensitive behavior and are able to remember pertinent
events since they have a memory. The single devices communicate over the wireless
channel. According to Marc Langheinrich [Lan05], one of the important drivers for
ubiquitous computing is Moore’s Law, which states that the processing speed and
storage capacity double every 18 months. However, Moore’s Law does not apply to
batteries. The capacity of a battery hardly increased over the past 30 years. Since
wireless sensor nodes are typically battery-powered, energy consumption is a critical
issue in all WSN applications.
Wireless sensor networks have become a technology, that may have a significant
business impact over the next five years [Pre14]. The sensor nodes are envisioned to
be connected in the Internet of Things [AIM10], allowing new business opportunities,
even though many future applications are still unclear. According to Gartner’s forecast
[Pre14], the number of sensors will increase dramatically to more than 26 billion units
by 2020. The year 2014 has already been labelled "The Year of the Sensor" [Pre14].
From tracking industrial operations such as leakage detection and pipe pressure
measurement [SBR10] to determining the occupancy and sleep patterns in a home
with the intention to reduce the energy consumption needed for heating, ventilation
and cooling [LSS+10], there is a wide range of real-life applications in which WSNs
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play an important role. Guaranteeing security in such prominent applications is an
issue.
Apart from attacks on the integrity and confidentiality of data, we also have to
defend against threats to the availability of the WSN, such as denial-of-service (DoS)
attacks. Wireless sensor networks are especially susceptible to denial-of-service attacks
due to the resource-constrained nature of sensor nodes. In this thesis, the availability is
our key protection goal. Most of the security solutions proposed rely on cryptography,
for instance, when securing the routing protocol and providing data confidentiality.
Cryptography helps to provide a first level of security. However, often an attacker
has physical access to a node and can obtain the key material, thereby becoming a
legitimate member of the network. As a result, a WSN must be able to detect insider
attacks, which is difficult without an intrusion detection system (IDS). Building such
a system is challenging, given the characteristics of wireless sensor nodes with low
processing power and a small amount of storage. Since an IDS must run together with
the regular application, it has to be small in size. Therefore, it is crucial to reduce the
required information for intrusion detection to the most useful one. Additionally, the
operation of the IDS ideally is limited and not performed continuously or periodically.
The main advantage is that an attacker cannot know well in advance, which node in
which part of the network will perform attack detection.
1.2 goals
As highlighted in our survey on intrusion detection in wireless sensor networks in
Chapter 3, the practical effects of denial-of-service attacks have not yet been studied
widely. As a consequence, the decision on which features are relevant for intrusion
detection is rather arbitrary. Most existing solutions rely on different features without
proper reasoning. Furthermore, the current state-of-the-art intrusion detection systems
are still resource-intensive. They typically require (1) to install an IDS on the nodes
permanently, (2) to constantly perform intrusion detection possibly analyzing a large
number of metrics, and (3) to collaborate with other nodes in order to identify an
attack.
To overcome these shortcomings, the key objective of this thesis is to investigate
the effects of denial-of-service attacks and to design lightweight IDSs based on the
obtained results, reducing the load of the nodes. In particular, the following goals are
addressed in this thesis:
. To develop a systematic approach for measuring the impact of denial-of-service
attacks
. To show the feasibility of building lightweight IDSs for sensor networks
. To evaluate the designed systems with respect to common metrics
1.3 contributions
With the aim to overcome the identified shortcomings, the contributions we have made
aligned to our research goals can can be summarized as follows.
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1.3.1 Measuring the Impact of Denial-of-Service Attacks
We follow a systematic approach to analyze the impact of denial-of-service attacks
on the network behavior; therefore, we first identify a large number of metrics easily
obtained and calculated without incurring too much overhead. Next, we statistically
test these metrics to assess whether they exhibit significantly different values under
attack when compared to those of the baseline operation. The metrics look into
different aspects of the nodes and the network, for example, microcontroller and radio
activities, network traffic statistics, and routing related information. Then, to show the
applicability of the metrics to different WSNs, we vary several parameters, such as
traffic intensity and transmission power. We consider the most common topologies
in wireless sensor networks such as central data collection and meshed multi-hop
networks by using the collection tree and the mesh protocol. Finally, the metrics are
grouped according to their capability of distinction into different classes. In this work,
we focus on jamming and blackhole attacks. Our experiments reveal that certain
metrics are able to detect a jamming attack on all nodes in the testbed, irrespective
of the parameter combination, and at the highest significance value. This knowledge
allows us to build intrusion detection systems, that only focus on the most useful
features for attack detection. After having obtained these initial results, we study the
combination of several metrics with regard to intrusion detection, applying a logistic
regression. The created regression models are then used to implement a fully localized
intrusion detection system requiring no collaboration, showing that the models can be
generalized to different networks.
1.3.2 Token-based Intrusion Detection
Due to the resource-constraints of the nodes, it is desirable to reduce the tasks of each
node to a minimum. We claim that even critical security functions such as intrusion
detection can be performed by means of randomizing the detection frequency with
the goal of making it more lightweight. To this end, we present Patrol, a system
which distributes the load caused by various tasks across the network. Patrol makes
use of tokens that are exchanged between nodes and activate a certain functionality,
such as intrusion detection, temporarily. As a proof-of-concept, we design and
implement within Patrol a lightweight intrusion detection algorithm based on the
energy consumption of the nodes. We show that by analyzing the energy consumption,
flooding attacks can be detected reliably. To illustrate these facts, we use a real-world
testbed consisting of the widely-employed TelosB nodes.
1.3.3 Mobile Agent-based Intrusion Detection
Similar to Patrol, we again strive to randomize the detection frequency. However,
in the system presented now we send the whole IDS routine through the network.
In particular, we propose a lightweight, energy-efficient system which makes use of
mobile agents to detect intrusions based on the energy consumption of the sensor
nodes as a metric. A linear regression model is applied to predict the energy con-
sumption. Simulation results indicate that denial-of-service attacks such as flooding
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and blackhole can be detected with high accuracy, while keeping the number of
false-positives very low.
1.4 outline
The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows:
Chapter 2 “Foundations” presents a detailed introduction to wireless sensor networks.
We specially cover security aspects and discuss challenges in guaranteeing security.
Chapter 3 “Related Work” summarizes related work to the fields of performance moni-
toring and intrusion detection in wireless sensor networks. Besides, the shortcomings
of existing approaches are portrayed. We also reformulate the identified shortcomings
into research questions, that we are going to address throughout this thesis.
Chapter 4 “Measuring the Impact of Denial-of-Service Attacks” describes a systematic
way to analyze the real-world effects of attacks and presents the results we obtained
through our evaluation. Futhermore, we design a fully localized intrusion detection
system.
Chapter 5 “Token-based Intrusion Detection” introduces an intrusion detection system
that makes use of tokens instructing the nodes to activate a specified functionality.
Chapter 6 “Mobile Agent-based Intrusion Detection” complements the randomized in-
trusion detection systems proposed within this thesis by applying mobile agents that
transfer themselves and the audit data from node to node.
Chapter 7 “Conclusions and Outlook” gives the conclusion to this thesis, summarizing
our contributions and discussing possible future work.
2
F O U N D AT I O N S
Start where you are. Use what you have.
Do what you can.
A. Ashe
This chapter presents an introduction to wireless sensor networks, the hardware
and application scenarios in Section 2.1. Next, Section 2.2 is devoted to discussing
security in wireless sensor networks. In particular, we present common adversaries
and attacks that we typically have to defend against.
2.1 wireless sensor networks
Typically, wireless networks are based on infrastructure, such as GSM, UMTS, etc. But
what if no infrastructure is available or if it is too expensive to set up? In these cases,
the solution is to use wireless ad hoc networks [Toh02]. They establish a network
without any infrastructure, solely using networking abilities of the devices. The
challenges associated with ad hoc networks are, among others, the lack of central
organization, the limited range of wireless communication, and the device mobility.
In particular, the access to the medium must be decided in a distributed fashion, and
routes need to be established. For many scenarios, the communication is multi-hop,
because a sender cannot communicate directly with an intended receiver. Sometimes,
mobility is an requirement which leads to a constantly changing topology. Wireless
sensor networks can be considered a subtype of wireless ad hoc networks, that focus
on interacting with the environment.
2.1.1 Basics of Wireless Sensor Networks
About a decade ago, the era of small sensor nodes which are low-cost, low-power,
and multifunctional has begun. The tiny nodes, also called motes, are deployed for
monitoring real-world phenomena. As shown in Figure 2.1, they typically consist
of a microcontroller, memory, radio chip, power unit, and one or more sensors for
measuring the environment. It is either possible to directly deploy them to specific
positions, e.g., inside the phenomenon, or to randomly distribute them in inaccessible
terrain, e.g., via aerial scattering. As a consequence, the position of a node may not
be known in advance. After deployment, the nodes form a self-organized network
and identify neighboring nodes. Usually, all data is flowing towards a central node,
called the sink or base station. In order to reach this sink, the messages likely have to
be forwarded via multi-hop routing, since the radio chip is not powerful enough to
communicate directly with the sink when the node is too distant.
The protocol stack used by the WSN is similar to the seven layers specified in
the OSI model, but does not adhere strictly to it. It consists of the application layer,
transport layer, network layer, data link layer, and the physical layer. Because of
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Microcontroller Communication Device Sensor(s) 
Power supply 
Memory 
Figure 2.1: Common structure of a sensor node
the resource-constraints, the main design goal of the protocols developed for sensor
networks is energy-efficiency. We briefly describe the purpose of each layer [ASSC02]:
. Physical layer – responsible for modulation, transmission and receiving tech-
niques
. Data link layer – responsible for medium access and ensuring reliable connections
. Network layer – responsible for routing the data supplied by the transport layer
. Transport layer – responsible for providing data to be transferred
. Application layer – responsible for specifying how the data will be provided
2.1.2 Hardware
The microcontroller is the core of a sensor node and has access to all modules. It is
a general purpose processor with a low power consumption. Typical examples are
the Texas Instruments MSP430 and the Atmel ATMega. While the first has a 16-bit
architecture, the latter is a slower 8-bit microcontroller, but offers a larger memory. A
widely used sensor node is the Telos node, which has been developed at the University
of California, Berkeley [PSC05]. It has a MSP430F1611 microcontroller, 48 KB ROM
and 10 KB RAM. As a radio chip, the CC2420 operating according to the IEEE 802.15.4
standard is used. The radio operates in the 2.4GHz band, providing data rates of up
to 250 kbps. The low power consumption is achieved by sleeping most of the time. At
the moment, these characteristics are common for default node platforms.
2.1.3 Application Scenarios
The above mentioned characteristics of sensor nodes allow their use in a plethora of
application scenarios. For example, Mao et al. [MMH+12] deploy a sensor network for
monitoring the CO2 emission in an urban area covering around 100 square kilometers.
In order to establish connectivity among this wide area, relay nodes are necessary.
The collection tree protocol (CTP) [GFJ+09] is used as routing protocol. Together with
GreenOrbs [LHL+11] (also using CTP) it is an example of a large-scale WSN consisting
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of thousands of nodes. GreenOrbs is deployed in a chinese forest for evaluating the
carbon sequestration ability, which is an opposite of carbon emissions.
In the logistics domain, Bijwaard et al. [BvKH+11] apply sensor networks in order
to monitor the cold chain of perishable goods such as fruits and pharmaceuticals.
Sen et al. [SMR+12] present a system to monitor road traffic queues in real-time. It
is able to classify the traffic states by measuring metrics such as signal strength and
packet reception rate in the communication between a transmitter-receiver pair.
Lu et al. [LSS+10] use sensors to determine the occupancy and sleep patterns in
a home with the intention to reduce the energy consumption needed for heating,
ventilation and cooling.
Ceriotti et al. [CCD+11] describe a WSN which is a part of a closed-loop control
system. The WSN monitors the light conditions in a tunnel and sends the readings
to a control station dynamically adjusting the lamps intensity for improving tunnel
safety and reducing power consumption.
Recently, Wang et al. [WAL+14] take a new perspective on WSNs by modeling
social networks, such as twitter, as sensor networks where a human can be considered
a sensor node.
2.2 security in wireless sensor networks
In this section, we present the definitions of important terms used in this work.
Furthermore, we discuss important security goals. We also present typical adversaries
and attacks in wireless sensor networks. Finally, we mention challenges associated
with providing security.
2.2.1 Terminology
Throughout this thesis, we adapt the following definitions:
. Confidentiality – information must be kept secret from anyone but those who
are authorized [MOV96].
. Integrity – information should not be alterable by unauthorized or unknown
means [MOV96].
. Availability – systems have to work promptly, and service to authorized users is
not denied [SB12].
. Authentication – corroboration of the identity of an entity (e.g., a node) or
corroborating the source of information (message authentication) [MOV96].
. Attack, intrusion – any attempt to access a service, resource, or information in
an unauthorized way; it also applies to attempts at compromising confidentiality,
integrity, or availability [WS04].
. Attacker, adversary – these terms are used synonymously to represent the
originator of an attack [WS04].
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. Denial-of-service – the result of an adversary intentionally and successfully
preventing any part of a WSN from functioning correctly or in a timely manner
[WS04].
2.2.2 Security Goals
Clearly, in the mentioned applications in Section 2.1.3, security can be considered a
baseline requirement. They require reliable data, i.e., an attacker shall not be able
to change the measured data of the sensor nodes. Otherwise, the systems are not
working as intended. It is also necessary to protect the WSNs from denial-of-service.
This is especially important in safety-critical applications such as the lighting control
in tunnels [CCD+11], where an adversary may disable switching on the light by
disrupting the network. Depending on the scenario, also confidentiality may be
desired. Mechanisms on how to provide these goals are described in what follows.
Confidentiality
As data is transmitted over the air, and not through a cable, listening to traffic is very
easy. A straightforward countermeasure is to use cryptography. Symmetric algorithms
such as AES are very resource-efficient and can be executed on sensor nodes without
incurring too much overhead. However, especially in dense networks key distribution
is a big issue [CA07]. Typically, in-network data processing to reduce the amount of
transmitted data is favorable [KEW02]. Hence, all nodes along a path need to share
a key at least with their direct neighbors. A single key for the whole network is
inappropriate due to security reasons [ZSJ06]. A common assumption is that nodes
are not tamper-proof because of cost-constraints, and therefore an adversary can
gain access to the key material by physically compromising a node [WS04, WAR06].
Even though asymmetric algorithms such as RSA and ECC have become feasible on
resource-constrained nodes, their execution time is still much higher than that of
symmetric algorithms [GKS05, LN08].
Integrity
Packets sent over the air can also easily be modified by an attacker. To combat this,
methods such as message authentication codes or digital signatures can be applied
[MOV96]. The same problems as with protecting confidentiality arise here as well.
Since the data is the most valuable asset in a sensor network, integrity needs to be
ensured in all deployments.
Availability
The resource-constraints make wireless sensor networks highly susceptible to attacks,
which render the network unavailable. These attacks are often referred to as denial-of-
service attacks [WAR06]. In some cases, cryptographic protection can be exploited to
cause denial-of-service, by letting the nodes perform expensive operations extensively.
For example, Wang et al. [WDN07] tackle a specific problem related to public-
key cryptography in WSNs. Since these operations are computionally expensive, an
attacker could abuse broadcast authentication schemes using asymmetric cryptography
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to cause denial-of-service. This can be achieved by broadcasting fake messages, whose
signatures have to be checked by the nodes to exhaust the energy. The authors design a
scheme that is a trade-off between two standard defense strategies, i.e., (1) forwarding
the message without authentication, and (2) verifying the message before forwarding.
The principle of their approach is as follows. As soon as a node is receiving a lot of
faked incoming broadcast messages, it will shift to defense strategy 2. Otherwise, it
will stick to the first strategy. The goal is to restrict the influence of DoS attacks to
small parts of the network by dropping fake messages as soon as possible, while at
the same time keeping the delay of the successful reception of legitimate messages
small. The scheme is evaluated in simulations.
Taking into account the fact that the focus of wireless sensor networks is to interact
with the environment, the question arises whether one or more security goals are
more important than others. As an exemplary scenario, we consider WSNs used in
industrial settings to automate processes, as presented in the work of Suriyachai et al.
[SBR10]. The WSN described is deployed at an oil refinery in order to monitor the
environment, such as pipe pressure and temperature. Based on the measurements
of the sensor nodes, actions can be taken with the assistance of actuator systems in
case of safety-critical situations. For instance, shut-off valves are used in the pipes to
stop operation. Hence, it is crucial that the sensed data arrives timely and unaltered
at the sink, and that the availability of the WSN is very high. In particular, a potential
threat is that an adversary maliciously changes the sensor data in order to cause
a negative effect with respect to the goal of the deployed WSN. Going back to the
example of industrial automation, false data may lead to defective products or even
the destruction of machines. Similar issues apply to all other scenarios, impacting
the purpose of the WSN. These requirements shift the focus of the classical security
goals from confidentiality, integrity and availability to the latter two. However, the
majority of research to provide security in WSNs is concentrated on methods to
guarantee confidentiality, such as key management schemes [EG02, ZSJ06] and crypto
implementations [GKS05, SOS+08, LN08].
2.2.3 Classes of Adversaries
The adversaries wireless sensor networks are exposed to are—until now—very differ-
ent from Internet adversaries. First of all, attackers on the Internet do not need to be in
physical proximity. They can possibly attack with a large number of malicious nodes
from different locations. Since very often standard applications are used, well-known
vulnerabilities might be exploited, e.g., with the assistance of security testing tools. In
contrast to that, the applications running on sensor nodes are typically tailor-made.
In what follows, we group adversaries in different categories. The grouping of
Karlof and Wagner [KW03] can be extended by the notion of passive and active
attackers:
. Outsider versus insider attacks – outsider attacks are performed by nodes which
are not part of the WSN; insider attacks are carried out by legitimate nodes of
the WSN which behave against their specification.
. Passive versus active attacks – passive attacks are typically not noticeable by the
victim network, since they do not involve actions that affect the network. Exam-
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ples include eavesdropping, i.e., listening to communication of other nodes, and
traffic analysis. In contrast to that, active attacks intentionally lead to changes
in the target network. Examples include changing messages of others (manip-
ulation, but also replaying), pretending to be someone else (impersonation),
denying a communication (repudiation) and denial-of-service. Hence, it is easier
to detect active attacks, whereas passive attacks mainly remain undetected.
. Mote-class versus laptop-class attacks – a mote-class attacker uses devices with
similar capabilities to the sensor nodes for attacking the WSN; an adversary
with laptop-class capabilities will attack the WSN with more powerful devices
with regard to bandwidth, processing power, memory, transmission range and
energy, as compared to the sensor nodes.
2.2.4 Attacks on Wireless Sensor Networks
Many of the traditional attacks in computer networks are also applicable to WSNs. Yet,
the inherent characteristics of wireless sensor networks make them especially prone
to attacks. As data is transmitted over the air, it is extremely easy for an adversary to
sniff traffic. Having to meet stringent budget requirements, sensor nodes tend not to
be tamper-proof and as such offering no protection against node compromise. Unless
in traditional wired networks, there is often no firewall available.
The majority of attacks that current intrusion detection systems try to detect affect
the network layer. Nevertheless, sensor networks can be attacked on all available layers.
In what follows, we present common attacks in WSNs with respect to the protocol
stack described in Section 2.1.1 [KW03]. The majority of them are denial-of-service
attacks.
Physical layer
Physical layer attacks mostly interfere with the sending, receiving, or broadcasting of
packets on the lowest level. With jamming, physical node compromise, and cloning
we describe three severe attacks.
. Jamming
Jamming can occur at different layers. At the physical layer, it refers to the
interruption of wireless communication by emitting radio signals that fill a
wireless channel [WSS03]. To combat this attack, techniques such as channel
hopping can be used [XTZ07].
. Node compromise
A very powerful physical attack is the node compromise. Since sensor nodes
are likely to be placed in outside, unprotected environments, it is possible to
capture them, alter their memory, or in the worst case they can even be destroyed.
Hence, an adversary might, for example, get access to the cryptographic keys,
and become a legitimate member of the WSN. Furthermore, the attacker can also
reprogram a node to behave in a different way. Benenson et al. [BCF08] describe
in detail the ways how a node can physically be captured. To protect against
node compromise attacks one could, e.g., use a tamper-proof case. However, this
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would increase the costs dramatically and therefore is commonly considered
impractical [WS04]. Instead, it is necessary to detect attacks during operation.
. Cloning
The replication of a compromised sensor node is referred to as cloning [CPMM11].
Conti et al. [CPMM11] take a decentralized approach to clone detection, requir-
ing a number of assumptions: (1) nodes are relatively stationary, (2) are aware of
their own location, (3) are time-synchronized, and (4) use an ID-based public
key cryptosystem. Nodes continously identify clones and exclude them from
network operation. In each run of the protocol, two steps are executed. First, a
random value is broadcasted by a centralized mechanism to all nodes. Second,
each node signs and broadcasts a message containing its ID and geographic
location. Upon reception of such a message, it is forwarded with a certain
probability to multiple pseudorandomly selected locations. After verifying the
signature and ensuring the message freshness, the destination checks for IDs
with incoherent locations indicating a cloning attack. The authors consider an
adversary able to compromise a certain fixed number of nodes, replicating at
least one into several clones. In addition, they assume that the adversary tries
to prevent its detection by circumventing the detection protocol. The strongest
adversary assumed can compromise nodes independent of their position, lever-
aging information obtained about the detection protocol to compromise those
nodes, that give a high probability to remain undetected clones. The scheme is
evaluated in simulations, showing that it is effective in attack detection given an
adversary selectively dropping messages. Besides, it is shown that the algorithm
outperforms the similar approach proposed earlier by Parno et al. [PPG05] with
respect to efficiency and effectiveness.
Link layer
The link layer manages the medium access control, which is a frequent target of an
attacker. In this section, we consider eavesdropping and jamming attacks. Other
attacks related to fairness issues are covered in [WAR06].
. Eavesdropping
The wireless communication medium allows to passively capture traffic without
exposing an identity. Detection of such an eavesdropper is difficult. Hence, data
should be encrypted.
. Jamming
When jamming occurs at the link layer, the adversary sends packets without
following the carrier sense access rules of the medium access control. The
effects of this attack are different. In some cases, the nodes will not sense a
free channel, and therefore are not able to transmit packets. In other cases,
the ongoing communication is interrupted, e.g., by causing collisions [WAR06].
Typically, the adversary is able to prevent communication over the wireless
medium. There are different attacker models, which are described in detail in
Section 4.1.3. Jamming is also very energy-intensive for the attacker, which is the
reason why devices other than sensor nodes are commonly used for attacking,
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also allowing to transmit at a higher power. Similar to jamming at the physical
layer, countermeasures include, for example, frequency hopping.
Network layer
The network layer is essential for routing data, and hence is susceptible to a variety of
attacks. Data often has to be transferred using multi-hop routing. This mechanism
assumes that the forwarding nodes are honest. However, if an attacker controls a
node, he can change its behavior.
. Selective forwarding
In a selective forwarding attack, certain data packets are discarded by the
malicious node instead of forwarding them. Neighboring nodes of the attacker
can possibly detect this attack by monitoring the traffic flow, and consequently
avoid the route via the compromised node.
. Message flooding
An attacker may inject packets at a very high rate at the network layer. The
analysis of network traffic statistics can discover a message flooding attack.
. Sinkhole
In a sinkhole attack, traffic gets attracted by the attacker through a compromised
node. This may be exploited to enable further attacks, like selective forwarding.
In general, the goal is to have an attacking node look like an ideal node with
respect to the routing metrics. Methods for attracting traffic include announcing
a low hop-count or a high link quality to all destinations. In some cases the link
quality is indeed very high, for instance, if the attacker is using a powerful radio.
If the link quality is low, the attacker may spoof it. This increases the chances
of the attacker to be part of the routing paths of its neighbors. An intrusion
detection approach for detecting sinkholes is described in [NLL06].
. Greyhole / Blackhole
A combination of selective forwarding and the sinkhole attack is called greyhole.
Packets received by the attacker get dropped randomly. In case that all incoming
data packets are discarded, this attack is referred to as blackhole. An approach
to detect blackhole attacks is presented by Krontiris et al. [KDF07].
. Wormhole
The attacker tunnels messages from one part of the network and replays them
in another part via a low-latency link. Thus, two nodes might believe that they
are neighbors, even though they are multiple hops distant. Or, the wormhole
convinces nodes far away from the base station, that the route via the attacker is
just one or two hops away, effectively creating a sinkhole. An approach to detect
wormholes is described in [DG10].
. Sybil
A sybil attack occurs, if an adversary represents multiple identities with only one
physical device. For example, the attacker may compromise routing or voting
algorithms. One solution to prevent sybil attacks are authentication mechanisms.
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Transport layer
The purpose of the transport layer is to manage end-to-end connections [ASSC02].
With flooding and desynchronization, we present two transport layer attacks [WAR06].
. Connection flooding
If a protocol has to maintain the state of a connection, it becomes vulnerable
to denial-of-service attacks. An attacker can cause resource exhaustion by
repeatedly making new connection requests. As a consequence, legitimate nodes
cannot successfully establish a connection. A countermeasure against this attack
is to use client puzzles, i.e., the entity requesting the connection has to solve a
puzzle in order to demonstrate its commitment to the connection. The intuition
behind that is, that a connecting client does not spend energy for creating
unnecessary connections.
. Desynchronization
When an existing connection is disrupted, this is called a desynchronization
attack. For example, an adversary may claim in the name of a victim node
to have missed some packets, causing the other honest node to retransmit the
messages. The usage of packet authentication prevents such an attack.
Application layer
The application layer manages the application-related operations and gathers the
sensor readings. The considered attacks are path-based denial-of-service and malicious
sensor stimuli [RM08].
. Path-based Denial-of-Service
Usually, sensor nodes honestly forward the packets they receive to the base
station. An attacker injecting a large amount of data traffic leads to a waste of
the network bandwidth, and will also drain energy of the nodes on the paths.
A combination of packet authentication and anti-replay protection is able to
prevent this attack [RM08].
. Sensor stimuli
When a detected event results in communication, an attacker may trigger false
events by physically stimulating the sensors, e.g., by using a lighter, in order to
overwhelm the network with messages. Mechanisms such as rate-limiting can
reduce the effects of this attack [RM08].
2.2.5 Challenges
Some of the security goals can be achieved by using cryptography, for instance, when
securing the communication against eavesdropping. However, certain characteris-
tics unique to wireless networks require the usage of intrusion detection systems,
monitoring the network during operation. Nodes may be deployed in unattended
environments, where they could be physically captured and cryptographic material
compromised. As a result, an insider attacker can bypass cryptographic mechanisms.
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Besides, due to the wireless medium, it is difficult to prevent denial-of-service attacks
such as jamming [PIK11]. This is another factor that motivates the need for intrusion
detection systems.
Intrusion detection, and providing security in general, is a challenging task in a
WSN for several reasons. First of all, the communication is multi-hop, i.e., nodes
are required to forward traffic from their neighbors, which implies a notion of trust.
The topology of the network is very often not known a priori and subject to regular
changes, allowing an attacker to insert his own nodes, but also creating routing errors
when no adversary is present, e.g., due to node failure or mobility. Many frequently
used nodes have severe constraints in CPU, memory, bandwidth, and energy. Due to
these resource limitations, traditional techniques used in wired networks cannot be
applied without modifications. For example, the amount of audit data is restricted by
low storage, and complex computation is impossible. Another issue is the wireless
communication, information can be retrieved or inserted easily by an attacker. There
is no central point (except for the base station) which receives all traffic directly with
no hops in-between, rendering classic IDS architecture (network-based [MHL94] and
host-based [WS02]) unsuitable. In addition, transmitting data is very costly in terms
of energy for the sensor nodes and thus should be minimzed. These factors altogether
require intrusion detection systems specifically tailored to wireless sensor networks.
Even when confidentiality and integrity is guaranteed, a WSN cannot fulfill its
task if it suffers from denial-of-service, and thus is not available to authorized users
[WS04]. Because denial-of-service attacks may severely reduce the value of a WSN,
and in some scenarios also threaten the health and safety of people, we focus on this
type of attack.
2.3 summary
Wireless sensor networks have become an indispensable technology in many applica-
tion areas. Within this chapter, we have highlighted their unique characteristics that
have to be taken into account when designing security solutions for them. We also
discussed common security threats that we have to defend against. In particular, we
identify denial-of-service attacks to be a major concern.
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R E L AT E D W O R K A N D P R O B L E M S TAT E M E N T
All things are the same except for the
differences, and different except for the
similarities.
T. Sowell
After having outlined the threats wireless sensor networks are exposed to and
motivating the need for IDSs to detect attacks during operation, we examine the
current state-of-the-art approaches in this field. We present an IDS taxonomy to
compare different solutions. In this thesis, we focus on systems specifically developed
for wireless sensor networks.
Firstly, we address the field of intrusion detection in Sections 3.1 and 3.2. We then
turn our attention to the problem of measuring the impact of attacks on network
operation in Section 3.3. Related work which is specific to our contributions will be
discussed subsequently in each corresponding chapter.
3.1 intrusion detection systems
The field of intrusion detection in computer systems was mainly influenced by the
seminal works in [And80, Den87]. Wireless sensor networks differ greatly from
traditional networks. For that reason, IDSs tailored to wireless sensor networks have
been introduced, which are now the focus of our survey. This work is an extended
version of [RH11].
A taxonomy allows to compare different intrusion detection systems. Each system
considers a special type of attacker with possibly different capabilities. The system
may be dedicated to a specific attack or could be applicable to multiple attacks. The
architecture allows detecting the attacks using some type of detection technique at a
given detection frequency. For the decision on whether there is an attack or not, often
a type of collaboration is needed. The IDS has certain requirements regarding the
wireless sensor network. The analyzed intrusion detection systems are evaluated in
simulations and/or implementations. Therefore, we believe that an intuitive taxonomy
should answer the following questions:
. Who is the attacker?
. What is the attacker capable to do?
. What type of attacks can be detected?
. What is the architecture of the IDS?
. Is collaboration needed?
. How are attacks detected?
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Figure 3.1: IDS taxonomy (adapted from [BMS14])
. At which frequency is intrusion detection performed?
. What type of WSNs can run the IDS?
. How is the IDS evaluated?
The IDS taxonomy to answer these questions is shown in Figure 3.1. It is similar
to related work [BMS14], however, we believe that it is important to include the
attacker capabilities an IDS is designed for, as well as the attacks the IDS can defend
against. Note that the presented taxonomy is not fixed; new categories may be added,
depending on the future development in this area. We now describe the individual
elements in detail.
3.1.1 Attacker Type
A main dimension to characterize an attacker is the internal versus external distinction.
External attacks are performed by nodes which are not part of the WSN, whereas
internal attacks are carried out by legitimate nodes of the WSN which behave against
their specification. Typically, internal attacks are harder to detect.
3.1.2 Attacker Capabilities
A mote-class attacker uses devices with similar capabilities to the sensor nodes for
attacking the WSN; an adversary with laptop-class capabilities will attack the WSN
with more powerful devices with regard to bandwidth, processing power, memory,
transmission range and energy, as compared to the sensor nodes.
In most of the proposed IDSs it is assumed that an attacker may compromise a node
and gain access to the cryptographic material. Sometimes it is possible that multiple
nodes collude in performing the attack. However, a common assumption is that the
majority of nodes is well behaving.
3.1.3 Detectable Attacks
The purpose of an IDS is per definition the detection of an attack. Some systems are
targeted to detect a particular attack, while others try to identify general malicious
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behavior. In the latter case the challenge is to distinguish truly malicious behavior
from temporal anomalies or from unknown behavior.
3.1.4 Architecture
Intrusion detection systems can be classified according to their architecture into
centralized and decentralized, as well as hybrid systems, each of which has specific
advantages/disadvantages.
As the term decentralized implies, intrusions are detected locally by the sensor
nodes. The nodes are equipped with an IDS and monitor their environment. Having
an incomplete picture of what is going on in the network, decentralized solutions
might be unable to detect certain attacks. In addition, the nodes cannot apply powerful
statistical analysis methods and the amount of audit data is limited, due to the resource
restrictions. However, if those systems are designed in a lightweight fashion (e.g., low
communication overhead), decentralized IDSs are suitable for WSNs. Besides, the
decentralized architecture is more resilient in case of an attack.
In a centralized system, all information relevant for intrusion detection has to be
transferred to a single point, typically the base station. Intrusion detection is only
performed at the base station, which is assumed to be more powerful in terms of
memory and processing power than sensor nodes and thus allowing for more sophis-
ticated detection methods. Centralized systems have a global view of the network,
offering the possibility to detect attacks that would have remained undiscovered in
other architectures. However, the amount of control/reporting traffic is increased. A
challenge is to find a trade-off between reporting frequency and detection accuracy.
Besides, a centralized architecture creates a single point of failure and is of special
interest to an attacker.
Hybrid IDSs are a combination of centralized and decentralized IDSs, i.e., in this
architecture, intrusion detection is performed both locally and globally. In our opinion,
hybrid IDSs are a promising avenue for further research. They can exploit advantages
of both approaches while at the same time minimizing the disadvantages.
3.1.5 Collaboration
While in some approaches nodes need to collaborate with their neighbors to spot
the attacker, others are capable of that without cooperation. Cooperating with other
nodes and using several monitoring nodes enables to cope with malicious motes
that try to hide from detection and give wrong intrusion alerts. In our definition,
the term collaboration comprises (1) the need for cooperating with other nodes, e.g.,
for identifying the attacker; (2) monitoring the communication of other nodes; or (3)
analyzing exchanged information in the network which is not purely node-centric,
such as routing information. In addition, centralized systems are assumed to always
use collaboration, because the data from various nodes is analyzed.
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3.1.6 Detection Technique
There are two predominant approaches an intrusion detection system can follow. The
first approach is rule-based detection [IKP95], where signatures containing typical attack
characteristics are used to detect known attacks. Thus, it works in a similar way as
virus detection using signatures. The big advantage of this approach is, that it can
detect known attacks with an accuracy of 100%. However, novel attacks cannot be
detected at all. The second approach to intrusion detection is called anomaly detection
[GDMV09]. A profile of the normal network behavior is created, and deviations of this
behavior (anomalies) will be detected. Anomaly detection techniques are based on the
assumption that regular behavior in a sensor network is the usual case, and attacks
occur only with low frequency. An anomaly or outlier is an observation that differs from
the majority. It can be identified by analyzing either the sensor data itself or traffic
within the network. Clearly, this approach is much more flexible than rule-based
detection, as it may detect new types of attacks. This advantage comes at the cost of
possible false alarms. False alarms might arise from the fact, that the normal operation
changed slightly or the regular behavior has not been covered completely, such that
supposed anomalies are also adhering to system specification.
3.1.7 Detection Frequency
The frequency at which intrusion detection is performed influences how much over-
head is introduced on the responsible nodes. In our survey, we identify four different
detection frequencies:
. Event-based: the algorithm is activated when a certain event is triggered, e.g.,
packet reception
. Periodic: after a concrete time interval has passed, the IDS functionality is
executed
. Continuous: in this case, intrusion detection is performed without interruption
. Random: a node is selected in random intervals to perform attack detection
From an energy consumption perspective, continous monitoring is the most expen-
sive. The energy consumption of the remaining three options depends on the settings
and the specific WSN application.
3.1.8 WSN Topology
An IDS may require a particular topology. In our survey, we describe works that either
need a clustered WSN, a tree topology, or are not limited to a specific topology.
3.1.9 Evaluation
The proposed IDS can be evaluated in simulation, implementation, or a combination
of both. Whereas simulations are very useful to analyze scalability issues, implemen-
tations can better assess the actual behavior in real-world.
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Table 3.1: Overview of existing intrusion detection systems for wireless sensor networks
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[OM05] 2005 Specific D Yes Anomaly-based Event-based U S
[dSMR+05] 2005 Specific D Yes Rule-based Periodic U S
[RZL06] 2006 n/a D Yes n/a n/a U n/a
[LNLP06] 2006 Specific D Yes Anomaly-based Periodic U S
[NLL06] 2006 Specific C Yes Anomaly-based Periodic U S
[KDF07] 2007 Specific D Yes Rule-based Periodic U S
[SCK07] 2007 Specific D Yes Rule-based Periodic C S
[LCC07] 2007 General D Yes Anomaly-based Periodic U S
[LKP07] 2007 Specific D Yes Anomaly-based Periodic U None
[GZC07] 2007 General C Yes Anomaly-based Periodic U I
[KDGM08] 2008 Specific D Yes Rule-based Periodic U S + I
[YT08] 2008 General D Yes Anomaly-based not specified U None
[KBG+09] 2009 n/a D Yes n/a n/a U S + I
[WFK+09] 2009 Specific C Yes Rule-based Periodic T S
[DG10] 2010 Specific D No Rule-based Event-based U S + I
[HHJ10] 2010 Specific D Yes Rule-based Continuous C S
[VJU+12] 2012 General D Yes Rule-based Periodic C I
[RWV13] 2013 General H Yes Hybrid Periodic U I
[KE14] 2014 Specific D Yes Rule-based Continuous C S
Abbreviations:
1 C = Centralized, D = Decentralized, H = Hybrid
2 U = Unrestricted, C = Clustered, T = Tree
3 S = Simulation, I = Implementation
3.2 state-of-the-art intrusion detection systems
We have grouped important IDSs proposed for wireless sensor networks according to
our taxonomy and present them in what follows. For an overview of the analyzed
intrusion detection systems, please refer to Table 3.1.
3.2.1 Decentralized IDSs
Onat and Miri [OM05] follow a cooperation-based approach to intrusion detection,
assuming static nodes and a tree-based routing protocol. The nodes identify abnormal
behavior of their neighbors with regard to two features, the average receive power (in
dBm) and the average packet arrival rate (in packets/unitTime). In their algorithm, they
define a main packet buffer length N, and only the last N packets received from each
neighbor are used to calculate the statistics to describe the normal behavior. Deviations
from normal behavior are then identified as intrusions. The approach is able to detect
node impersonation and resource depletion attacks. The algorithm proposed by
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Onat and Miri, however, needs a training phase in which the normal behavior of
a node is learned. During this phase, no intrusions can be detected. In evaluating
the results for the packet arrival rate, Onat and Miri state that the mechanism only
works for networks with uniform traffic patterns, where, e.g., nodes measure a certain
phenomenon in fixed intervals. If, however, only the changes in the phenomenon are
observed and reported, this mechanism might fail. As an example let us consider a
sensor that observes changes to the temperature and reports them to the sink. During
the day, the temperature might not change at all, but in the morning and evening, the
changes are bigger. Thus, the method would not work as there is no homogeneous
traffic pattern.
Another decentralized approach to intrusion detection tailored to wireless sensor
networks is proposed by da Silva et al. [dSMR+05]. Special monitor nodes are
responsible for intrusion detection, however, the authors provide no guidance on
where to place these monitor nodes, and on the optimal number. It also remains
unclear, when a monitor node is activated. Their algorithm consists of three phases:
data acquisition, rule application, and intrusion detection. In the data acquisition
phase, the monitor node overhears messages and stores important information to be
used for analysis in the following phase. Information is considered important, if it
is useful for the rule application. The rule application phase evaluates the stored
information according to predefined rules. A message failing one of the rules results
in the incrementation of a failure counter. Besides, this specific message is no longer
subject to evaluation of other rules because of resource restrictions. The authors
argue, that this strategy reduces the detection latency. As they mention, there is a
trade-off between accuracy, processing cost, and runnnig time. The smaller the buffer
size (no. of messages processed during rule application), the larger is the number of
false-positives. Finally, in the last phase, an attack is detected if the number of failures
is greater than an expected value. The expected value is based on a failure history
(expected amount of occasional failues) for each node in the neighborhood, which is
kept by the monitor node.
In [RZL06], Roman et al. introduce a technique for monitoring neighbors, called
spontaneous watchdogs. The authors propose a general IDS architecture for static sensor
networks, consisting of local agents and global agents. Local agents monitor only local
activities and the packets sent and received by the node itself. Global agents overhear
the communication of their neighbors, and can also behave as watchdogs. Since
the operation of global agents is more costly in terms of energy, the global agent
is activated only with a probability of 1n , where n is the number of nodes fulfilling
certain requirements (spontaneous watchdog). In case a local or global agent detects
a possible intrusion, an alert is sent to the base station. They do not a provide an
evaluation of their approach, no implementation or simulation exists.
Loo et al. [LNLP06] present a method to detect routing attacks in sensor networks.
They use a clustering algorithm to build a model of normal traffic behaviour, which
in turn is applied to detect abnormal traffic. Thus, this approach is able to detect
unseen attacks, as it is not based on rules. Their intrusion detection scheme does not
require communication between sensor nodes, which significantly reduces the power
consumption. A wide range of routing attacks can be detected. In their approach, each
node is equipped with an IDS which should work independently and detect intrusions
locally. The only information used is the node’s own routing table, and all packets
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the node received. They identified a set of twelve features to detect routing anomalies
in a variety of routing protocols. These features are listed in Table 3.2. Feature 1 is
used to detect anomalies in data traffic, which could be signs for a denial-of-service
attack. Features 2,3, and 4 can be used to detect sinkhole attacks, as sinkholes may
require the nodes to request routes. In a similar way, features 5, 6, and 7 indicate a
sinkhole attack due to the manipulation of the routing protocol. Route error attacks
can be detected using features 8 and 9. The last three features recognize path changes
of the nodes to the base station, again to detect sinkhole attacks.
Table 3.2: Features used for intrusion detection [LNLP06]
No. Feature Description Attack
1 No. of Data Packets Received DoS
2 No. of Route Requests Received Sinkhole
3 No. of Route Requests Sent Sinkhole
4 No. of Route Requests Dropped Sinkhole
5 No. of Route Request Replies Received Sinkhole
6 No. of Route Request Replies Forwarded Sinkhole
7 No. of Route Request Replies Sent Sinkhole
8 No. of Route Errors Received DoS
9 No. of Route Errors Sent DoS
10 No. of Updates on Route to Base Station Sinkhole
11 Mean of Hop Count to Base Station Sinkhole
12 Standard Deviation of Hop Count to Base Station Sinkhole
Krontiris et al. [KDF07] design an IDS to detect the blackhole and the selective
forwarding attack using only partial and localized information. Every node monitors
its neighborhood, i.e., it promiscuously listens to the channel and temporally buffers
the overheard packets. Within a defined window of time, the monitor node checks
whether the overheard packets have been forwarded or not. Collaboration with its
nearest neighbors is required to detect the attacker. They follow a rule-based approach
(rate of messages dropped above a certain threshold) to detect deviations from normal
behavior; the attacker node is identified, if more than half of the watchdog nodes raise
an alert for this node. This approach is extended in [KDGM08], in order to detect
sinkhole attacks. It is specifically designed to work with the MintRoute [WTC03]
protocol of TinyOS [HSW+00], having link quality estimates as the routing cost metric.
The architecture remains the same as in [KDF07], i.e., every node has its own IDS
client which communicates with others in order to reach a conclusion on an intrusion
event. A difference in detecting sinkhole attacks now is, that the nodes do not have to
store overheard packets or any other information in their memory, as the rules of the
IDS client are applied to temporarily buffered packets. In this paper, they introduce
rules to detect the sinkhole attack. A node checks for each overheard route update
packet, if the sender field is different from its own node ID and if it is the ID of one of
its neighbors. When this is not the case, an alert is produced, as route update packets
should only originate from a legitimate sender. If a rule is satisfied, it is possible to
conclude that the attacker is a neighboring node, since the route update packets are
only broadcasted locally. To identify the attacker, nodes must cooperate, as the sender
field is altered. Nodes broadcast a list with the IDs of their neighbors as an alert
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message. Upon receiving this message, a node removes all node IDs from the list of
potential attackers, that are not part of its own neighbors. Thus, its own neighbor list
and the list of node IDs in the alert message are intersected. This process continues, as
the result is stored and used for the intersection with the next alert the node receives.
As soon as there is only one node left in the result, this node will be identified as the
attacker. Depending on the topology, it might be the case that the attacker cannot be
identified. This is referred to as false-negative. In their experiments, the false-negative
rate decreases with the network density.
The collaboration of sensor nodes is more generalized in [KBG+09], in which the
approach does not focus on specific attacks, but rather on cooperative techniques.
The problem of intrusion detection is formally defined and necessary and sufficient
conditions on the solvability of the cooperative intrusion detection are identified.
However, they only investigated the case of a single attacker. Their implementation
demonstrates, that the algorithm is lightweight enough to run on sensor nodes.
Su et al. [SCK07] propose a security system called eHIP which combines intrusion
prevention and intrusion detection. They assume a time-synchronized, static cluster-
based WSN, in which data is routed through the cluster heads to the sink. To prevent
intrusions, they use two authentication mechanisms, one for control messages (such
as routing messages) and one for sensed data. The reason for this approach is to
conserve energy efficiently, as from a security point of view these types of messages
are of different importance. As control messages should be highly secured, a keyed-
hashing message authentication code (HMAC) is applied to them on the basis of
hop-by-hop security. That means, each intermediate node has to verify a control
message by checking the HMAC code and re-generating a new one for the verified
control message until it arrives at the destination node. Regarding the delivery of
sensed data, each intermediate node needs to authenticate the data sender. Otherwise,
an attacker could send bogus data which would be forwarded and thus deplete energy.
The HMAC computation and transmission consumes much time and energy, but as
they assume sensed data is not as sensitive, they use an energy-efficient one-time
key chain to authenticate the sender. As a second line of defense they implement
a collaboration-based intrusion detection system monitoring cluster heads as well
as member nodes. A cluster head aggregates the data from other nodes and thus
requires more security. In cluster head monitoring, the member nodes cooperate to
detect misbehavior, whereas the cluster head is responsible for monitoring the member
nodes. The authors claim that attacks like packet dropping, packet duplicating, and
packet jamming can be detected, but no details are given. Their simulation focuses on
energy-efficieny and makes no statements about detection accuracy.
An insider attacker detection algorithm using only localized information is pre-
sented by Liu et al. [LCC07]. It explores the spatial correlation existent among the
networking behaviors of sensors in close proximity. In a typical sensor network,
neighboring sensors should have similar communication and computation workloads.
Deviations from these characterics thus indicate a malicious behavior. In their ap-
proach, each sensor monitors the behavior of its immediate neighbors. The algorithm
considers multiple attributes simultaneously in node behavior evaluation, without
requiring prior knowledge of what normal/abnormal behavior is. A node is consid-
ered malicious, if its behaviour is significantly different from that of nodes in the
same neighborhood. In that case, a report is generated and sent to the base station.
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Generally, the algorithm consists of four phases: first local information is collected,
second the collected data is filtered, third initial outliers using Mahalanobis distances
are identified, and fourth the majority vote to obtain a final list of outlying sensors is
applied. Filtering the data is necessary to remove falsified information by an attacker.
This is achieved by assigning a trust value to each neighbor in the range [0,1], where a
value closer to 1 indicates a higher possibility that the node is a normal sensor. The
trust value is computed according to the degree of the node’s deviation from the
neighborhood activities.
In [LKP07], Li et al. use monitoring nodes, observing the quantity of packets
which are erroneously received. The approach requires a training phase, in which the
monitor node learns the number of "regular" collisions, i.e., collisions during normal
operation without attack. The detection algorithm uses Wald’s Sequential Probability
Test (SPRT) [Wal04] to conclude from a given set of observed samples (collision/no
collision) whether there is indication for a jamming attack or not. An evaluation of
the approach is missing.
Yu and Tsai [YT08] develop a framework of a machine learning based intrusion
detection system. Their system is not limited to particular attacks. Each node runs an
intrusion detection agent and overhears the traffic of its neighbors. The first component
of the intrusion detection agent is called Local Intrusion Detection Component (LIDC)
and detects if the node itself is attacked by analyzing local features. The Packet
based Intrusion Detection Component (PIDC) monitors the neighbor nodes to find the
attacker. To build the detection model, they apply a rule-learner called SLIPPER [CS99]
which is then used to classify observed traffic into normal and abnormal traffic. Whereas
a single rule for itself might not have a high detection accuracy, the accuracy based on
the complete set of rules is very high. The detection model has been evaluated on a
dataset that was constructed from raw TCP data for a wired local area network. No
evaluation is given for the proposed framework for WSNs.
The proposed decentralized algorithm by Dimitriou and Giannetsos [DG10] is inves-
tigating connectivity information to find evidence that no attack is being conducted.
If, after the start-up has finished, a node overhears packets that include the IDs of
unknown nodes, these nodes are put in a list of suspected nodes. The individual
nodes then have to check whether the suspected nodes are legitimate and should be
included in the neighborhood information or not. This is done by finding a short path
to a suspected node which excludes all other suspected nodes. The existence of such
an alternative path proves that no wormhole is present and that the suspected node
can be added to the neighborhood list. Otherwise, the suspected node is removed
from the neighborhood. However, in rare cases the algorithm may not be able to find
a short path to legitimate nodes and hence treat them as attacked nodes. It is shown
that the algorithm always prevents the wormhole attack.
The decentralized approach proposed by Hai et al. [HHJ10] concentrates on clustered
sensor networks and is able to detect several routing attacks, based on neighbor
knowledge and routing rules. In their architecture, every node has an IDS agent and
belongs to a single cluster. There are two intrusion modules, a local and a global IDS
agent. The local agent monitors sent and received packets by the node. In addition,
a list about malicious nodes in the network (blacklist) is kept. The global agent
monitors the communication of the neighboring nodes. In order to detect anomalies,
the overheard communication is checked using pre-defined rules (similar to those in
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[dSMR+05]) and two-hop neighbor knowledge. Alerts are sent to the cluster head,
who decides if there is an attack or not. An anomalous event is considered an attack, if
the number of alerts concerning a specific node is greater than a certain threshold. In
that case, the attacker is isolated from the cluster by sending a blacklist update to the
nodes. The used pre-defined rules detect selective forwarding, sinkhole, hello flood,
and wormhole attacks. Nodes with a low trust value cannot take part in intrusion
detection.
Regarding detectable attacks, research focused so far on developing specific solutions
to defend against individual attacks [VJU+12]. To overcome this limitation, Valero
et al. [VJU+12] present a security framework called Di-Sec that only applies to
clustered heterogeneous WSNs consisting of low-end nodes together with high-
end nodes serving as cluster heads. It works similar to virus detection engines:
illegitimate behavior is specified in so-called Detection and Defense Modules (DDMs)
and checked against the actual behavior observed through the Monitoring-Core (M-
Core) [VUV+12]. The default DDMs supplied with Di-Sec can detect jamming, sybil,
selective forwarding, and internal attacks aiming at modifying the sensed values. A
domain specific language can be used to develop own defense mechanisms. The
M-Core is constantly given all information a node has or receives. This includes,
for instance, the numbers of received and lost packets, the neighbors, and even all
incoming packets not necessarily addressed to the node.
Karapistoli and Economides [KE14] design an IDS for ultra-wideband (UWB) sensor
networks. In their approach, the WSN is divided into clusters which are re-organized
each round by assigning new cluster heads. Nodes are assigned a trust value; untrust-
worthy nodes cannot be elected a cluster head. Cluster heads are supposed to monitor
the cluster members, while three cluster members are in charge of monitoring the
cluster head. The monitoring nodes need to store each collected/overheard packet
and evaluate it against pre-defined rules. When a node is found to be malicious, the
location is obtained by invoking an UWB ranging-based localization algorithm.
3.2.2 Centralized IDSs
Ngai et al. [NLL06] propose an algorithm to detect sinkhole attacks, even in presence
of colluding nodes. The first step consists of estimating the attacked area and thus
finding a list of suspected nodes. They assume, that the base station has a rough
understanding on the location of nodes, e.g., obtained through various localization
mechanisms. The base station can detect data inconsistencies using the following
statistical method. Let X1, ...,Xn be the sensing data collected in a sliding window,
and X be their mean. Define f(Xj) as
f(Xj) =
√(
(Xj−X)2
X
)
Then a node is suspected, if f(Xj) is greater than a certain threshold, because the
data from this node is different from others in the same area. Hereafter, the base
station can estimate the position of the sinkhole and circle a potentially attacked area
containing all suspected nodes. The radius of the circle is chosen to cover all suspected
nodes. In a second step, the intruder will be identified. This is accomplished by
analyzing the routing pattern in the affected area. In detail, the base station broadcasts
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a request message containing the IDs of all affected nodes. The request includes a
timestamp to prevent replay attacks and is signed with the private key of the base
station. On receiving the request, the affected node replies with its own ID, the ID
of the next-hop node and the routing cost (e.g., hop-count) to that node. The reply
message is sent along the reverse path in the broadcast, as the next-hop and routing
cost could already be affected by the attack. At the base station, the routing pattern is
then analyzed by constructing a tree using the next-hop information. In a sinkhole
attack, all network traffic flows towards the same destination which reveals the identity
of the intruder. With some adjustments, the authors are able to deal with multiple
malicious nodes. As a first measure, symmetric encryption is used to avoid alteration
of packets during transmission. Every node has an individual key shared with the base
station. In addition, path redundancy is introduced by forwarding reply messages to
a certain number of neighbors. Multiple malicious nodes may collaborate and provide
incorrect routing information like hop-count in order to expose a non-malicious node
as intruder. However, the base station can detect this inconsistency by calculating the
difference between the hop-count which is supplied by a node and the count of edges
from the node to the current root.
Gupta et al. [GZC07] design a centralized IDS which collects and analyzes appli-
cation data as well as management information. The latter information is collected
through a separate routing protocol either periodically or event-based, in case an
anomaly has already been detected from application data. A decision tree is applied
to identify attacks from the collected data.
Wang et al. [WFK+09] propose a scheme to detect packet droppers and modifiers
in wireless sensor networks. They require tree-based routing towards the sink with
changing topology from round to round. Each node adds special bits to messages in
order to allow the sink to calculate the individual packet dropping rate, having to
be aware of the topology and the parents of all nodes. Besides, each packet needs
to be encrypted. Three different algorithms can then identify the packet dropping
nodes. Existing en-route filtering schemes [YLLZ04, ZSJN04] can be integrated to
detect packet modifiers. The scheme is evaluated only in simulations.
3.2.3 Hybrid IDSs
Raza et al. [RWV13] design an IDS specifically for the Internet of Things, i.e., internet-
connected 6LoWPAN networks. Processing-intensive IDS modules run on the 6LoW-
PAN Border Router (6BR), which connects 6LoWPAN networks with the Internet. In
addition, the corresponding lightweight modules are executed on the nodes. Apart
from IDS functionality, a distributed mini-firewall is provided. Three main modules
run on the 6BR: a module collecting information about the network (parent and neigh-
bor information for each node as well as information to reconstruct the destination
oriented directed acyclic graph used in the routing protocol [RWV13]), an intrusion
detection module, and a firewall module. Similary, two corresponding lightweight
modules are installed on the nodes: a module to map information to the 6BR, and
a module for the centralized firewall. The authors present algorithms to detect in-
consistencies in the routing graph, selective forwarding, and sinkhole attacks. The
firewall can block manually specified external hosts as well as hosts that are found to
be malicious by the nodes in real-time.
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3.3 performance and security metrics
The research area quality of service in wireless sensor networks is a very active one.
Much attention is paid to metrics such as delay, throughput, and duty cycle. However,
the systematic quantification of the effects of denial-of-service attacks on WSNs has
been neglected in the field literature.
Several works investigate link quality metrics, for example, to combat interference
or to improve the quality of service. Liu et al. [LC11] introduced a link estimator
based on machine learning techniques. Their models can predict the link quality by
using a combination of PHY parameters (Signal to Noise Ratio (SNR), Link Quality
Indicator (LQI), and Received Signal Strength Indicator) and the Packet Reception
Rate (PRR) as input. Boano et al. [BZV+10] investigate the combination of PRR, SNR
and LQI into a single, more robust metric to estimate the link quality. Boano et al.
[BVN+11] also developed JamLab, a system to generate accurate interference, and
analyzed the impact of interference on the packet reception rate. All these works are
not concerned with attack detection.
Dong et al. [DLHZ13] conduct a study on the packet delivery performance in a
large-scale WSN, and identify the underlying causes of the losses with the packet
drops due to an exceeded retransmission threshold being the most relevant. They
note that the link quality is greatly affected by the environment, e.g., temperature and
humidity. Hence, this behavior has to be taken into account when designing intrusion
detection algorithms.
Marfievici et al. [MMP+13] present a case study on the impact of environmental
factors on outdoor wireless sensor networks. In particular, the effects of the vegetation
as well as seasonal and daily variations on the packet delivery rate are studied.
Wennerström et al. [WHR+13] conduct a similar study analyzing the influence of
meteorological conditions on the packet reception ratio and the signal strength of
outdoor wireless sensor networks.
Also Zhao et al. [ZG03] conducted a study on packet delivery performance in
dense wireless sensor networks. Even though they take into account interfering
transmissions at the MAC layer occuring during normal operation, an intended attack
is not considered. Another work dealing with packet delivery performance was
presented in [HHW09]. Hauer et al. evaluated the effects of WLAN interference on
packet delivery performance in IEEE 802.15.4 body area networks.
Xu et al. [XTZW05] analyzed several detection approaches for jamming attacks.
They used three different metrics to distinguish between jamming and normal or
congested traffic: (1) the averaged received signal strength indicator (RSSI), (2) the
carrier sense time, and (3) the packet delivery ratio (PDR). The authors concluded that
the combination of PDR and RSSI is able to detect jamming attacks reliably. These
same authors extended their work on jamming attacks in [XTZ07], and examined
the impact of jamming attacks on the packet delivery ratio as well as implemented
channel surfing techniques to cope with interference.
Recently, Lu et al. [LWW11] introduced a system to detect jamming attacks in
time-critical networks. They proposed a new metric for performance quantification
called the message invalidation ratio. Eventually, a message is regarded as invalid
if the message delay is greater than a certain threshold. They studied the impact of
jamming attacks on this particular metric.
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Despite some of these works address the impact of jamming attacks on packet
delivery performance, they lack a comprehensive analysis of other mote-level metrics,
such as energy consumption or routing-related information. In addition, they are not
concerned with different classes of denial-of-service attacks, such as blackhole attacks.
3.4 summary and problem statement
Relying only on intrusion detection systems in securing systems is not sufficient.
Security sometimes is regarded as a standalone component within the whole system,
providing security in a separate module. However, this approach is considered a
flawed approach in establishing network security. Instead, to build a secure system,
security needs to be integrated into each component. Otherwise, the unprotected
components become an attack vector [PSW04].
Several works are concerned with intrusion prevention. Sun et al. [SLX+09] design
a secure network access control system, restricting network access only to eligible
sensor nodes. Luk et al. [LMPG07] present a system to secure the communication
of sensor nodes. While jamming is commonly considered an attack, Martinovic et al.
[MPS09] use it as security primitive to prevent sensor nodes from receiving fake data.
Wood et al. [WSZ07] focus on a mote-class adversary mounting four different types of
jamming attacks. To combat these attacks and to allow the network to operate while
the attack is ongoing, they propose four countermeasures. The general idea behind
them is to hide messages from the jammer.
Using technologies such as 6LoWPAN [HC08] it is possible to connect sensor
networks to the internet. Hence, these devices will also face security threats that are
typically defended against with firewalls. To the best of our knowledge, Hossain and
Raghunathan [HR10] present the first firewall system for wireless sensor networks.
This system is a stateless, rule-based firewall similar to a traditional packet-filter
firewall. Firewall policies can be created using a rule definition language. For energy
saving reasons, the rules are transformed into executable binary code.
The research area of monitoring and debugging wireless sensor networks is a very
active one. Even though the majority of works do not focus on attack detection,
they can help preventing bugs, and thus hinder an attacker from exploiting them.
Sundaram et al. [SEZ10] present a technique for debugging WSN applications by
encoding and recording the control-flow. Upon fault detection, the recorded trace may
be sent to the base station for analysis and reproducing the fault. This work focuses
on node-level faults. Recently, Sundaram and Eugster [SE13] develop a solution
supporting distributed diagnosis of complex failures that are the result from node
interaction. Another distributed system is presented by Liu et al. [LMZL11], where
nodes collaborate in diagnosis tasks. A hardware-software approach that requires no
modification to the application or the operating system was proposed by Tancreti et
al. [THBR11]. Systems that monitor the health of WSNs are able to identify, e.g., node
failures, isolated nodes, and traffic anomalies [KBT13, RRV07, RB06, RM09]. A secure
network monitoring system with randomly selected monitoring nodes whose identity
is not exposed is presented by Yu and Li [YL08].
o
During the last years, a couple of intrusion detection systems have been proposed,
which are targeted at WSNs. In this chapter, we have surveyed the most important
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contributions in this area. The majority of them are decentralized solutions, in which
the sensor nodes are responsible for detecting intrusions. A first unsolved challenge
remains in finding suitable features to build the detection model upon. Those features
should be able to discriminate well between normal and abnormal behavior. Secondly,
the proposed systems are still rather heavyweight: a variety of features needs to be
analyzed in a mostly periodic or continuous fashion. Besides, the large majority of
current intrusion detection systems require some type of collaboration. To the best of
our knowledge, the only exception is the IDS proposed by Dimitriou et al. [DG10].
However, this system is limited to detect wormhole attacks.
We now discuss both shortcomings and formulate the arising research questions we
are going to address in this thesis.
3.4.1 Systematic Methodology for Measuring the Impact of Denial-of-Service Attacks
As our survey on related work in the field of performance and security monitoring
has shown, the main research interest until now was on the behavior of quality of
service metrics during normal operation of the sensor network. Intended attacks are
mostly not considered at all. Besides, these works lack a comprehensive analysis of
other metrics provided by the nodes, which could possibly be helpful in identifying
attacks.
What is missing so far, is an understanding of the real-world effects of denial-of-
service attacks on wireless sensor networks. It is this understanding that would allow
us to build effective intrusion detection systems by analyzing the behavior of the WSN
with regard to those metrics, that are significantly influenced by attacks. We strive
to base the decision of an intrusion detection system whether the network faces an
attack or not on the most discriminating metrics for efficiency reasons.
Thus, we identify two main research questions:
. How can the impact of attacks be measured in a systematic fashion?
. Which metrics are the most influenced and thus the most appropriate for attack
detection?
Addressing these questions paves the way to practical lightweight intrusion de-
tection systems, taking only the most appropriate metrics into account. As detailed
in Chapter 4, we answer the aforementioned research questions by presenting a
systematic approach for measuring the impact of denial-of-service attacks.
3.4.2 Novel Lightweight Intrusion Detection Systems
Furthermore, the current state-of-the-art intrusion detection systems are still rather
heavyweight:
. A large number of different metrics needs to be analyzed in order to detect an
attack.
. Typically, it is required to install an IDS on the nodes permanently, and to
constantly perform intrusion detection.
3.4 summary and problem statement 31
. Nodes rely on collaboration for attack detection.
The following open issues are to be resolved:
. Are lightweight IDSs feasible? How can the load of the nodes be reduced? Is
collaboration always required?
. Which performance can be achieved?
Answering these questions is essential in enabling lightweight IDSs. In Chapters 5
and 6 we present two novel IDSs investigating the trade-off between detection fre-
quency and detection time, the first system using a randomly activatived, pre-deployed
attack detection algorithm while the latter applies mobile agents. Furthermore, in
Chapter 4, we propose a fully localized IDS that does not need collaboration at all.
The literature review we have conducted in this chapter served as the basis for the
definition of our problem statement. It is specified along two key research directions.
Firstly, we aim at establishing a methodology that can be used universally to asses
the quality of metrics for identifying an attack. Secondly, our objective is to design
lightweight IDSs. The contributions of this thesis are aligned to the identified research
questions and will subsequently present answers to the questions mentioned in this
chapter, which are refinements of the goals of this thesis as mentioned in Section 1.2.

4
M E A S U R I N G T H E I M PA C T O F D E N I A L - O F - S E RV I C E AT TA C K S
Measurement is the first step that leads to control
and eventually to improvement. If you cannot
measure something, you cannot understand it. If
you cannot understand it, you cannot control it. If
you cannot control it, you cannot improve it.
H. Harrington
The decision on which features are relevant for intrusion detection is crucial. To
identify the most pertinent features, we need to develop an understanding of the
real-world effects of attacks on WSNs. In this chapter, we describe a systematic way to
analyze these effects in a testbed consisting of TelosB motes, which has been published
in [RTH14], but has been extended in this thesis. For this purpose, we collect a
large number of local metrics under various combinations of parameters, such as
topology and traffic intensity. The jamming and blackhole attacks we carry out are two
benchmark denial-of-service attacks, which operate on the link and the network layer,
respectively. By using statistical tests, we identify those metrics deviating significantly
in an attacking scenario as compared to normal working conditions. The metrics are
classified according to their distinction capabilities.
Our work contributes to evaluate the effects of attacks against WSNs in a systematic
way. Particularly, (1) in the case of denial-of-service attacks, we identify metrics
which are able to differentiate between attacking and non-attacking scenarios. (2) Our
results lay the foundation for developing lightweight intrusion detection systems for
WSNs, focusing on the most suitable metrics. (3) Using logistic regression models, we
implement a fully localized intrusion detection system.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.1, we present our
system design. Section 4.2 is devoted to describe our exhaustive scheme to analyze
whether a metric is appropriate to detect an attack. In Sections 4.3 and 4.4, we assess
our procedure, and thus we classify metrics according to their response to attack
detection. The proposed IDS is presented in Section 4.5, before discussing the work of
this chapter in Section 4.6. Related work is mentioned in Section 4.7. Finally, some
concluding remarks are given in Section 4.8.
4.1 design
A number of factors might influence a WSN under attack. For example, in a dense
WSN the attack effects should propagate faster. In a systematic fashion, we control
the topology, the intensity of the normal data traffic in a WSN, and the transmission
power in order to understand the impact of these factors on the metrics, and thus on
attack detection. We consider two DoS attacks, one prohibiting other communication
(jamming) and one misdirecting the traffic (blackhole).
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Figure 4.1: Mote placement at the computer science building and sample deployment in one
office (image source: http://www.tudunet.tu-darmstadt.de)
In what follows, we describe in detail the testbeds we use, the underlying protocols,
attack implementations and the metrics we analyze.
4.1.1 Testbeds
Our measurements are carried out in the TUDµNET1, a federation of wireless sensor
network testbeds deployed at various buildings of the Technische Universität Darm-
stadt. We performed initial tests to pre-test our assumption that a large number of
metrics is significantly influenced by denial-of-service attacks in two small testbeds,
followed by measurements in two larger testbeds, thereby considering additional
attacker models. Subsequently we present the test setups.
Initial Tests
We have selected two different initial testbeds, i.e., subgroups of TelosB motes within
the TUDµNET (Figure 4.1 is showing the mote placement in the corresponding offices;
the attacker has node ID 14 in initial testbed 1 and node ID 7 in initial testbed 2).
These motes provide a MSP430 MCU and a CC2420 radio chip. We run the operating
system Contiki [DGV04] using ContikiMAC. The first initial testbed contains 14
motes, located in neighboring office rooms of the computer science building. The
second initial testbed is located at a different place of the TUDµNET to compensate
for environmental influences or interferences, and to show the applicability of the
analyzed metrics to other WSNs. This second initial testbed consists of 7 sensor nodes.
1 http://www.tudunet.tu-darmstadt.de
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The main difference between the two initial testbeds is the environment influencing
the networks. While one initial testbed is located in office rooms with few people, the
second is, among others, located in a pool room with frequently moving people and
other interference resulting in a more challenging environment with respect to factors
such as link quality. We vary a number of parameters such as:
. Topology (mesh/collect) - With the mesh and the collection tree protocol2 [GFJ+09],
we consider two of the most widely-used protocols in WSNs.
. Traffic (high/low) - We want to analyze the impact of different traffic intensities
on the detection capabilities of the metrics.
. Transmission power (high/low) - To vary the average node degree, we use two
different transmission power settings.
. Attack (jamming/blackhole/no attack) - The influence of two different DoS attacks
on the metrics is analyzed, and compared to an attack free scenario.
To generate data traffic in the mesh network, messages containing a timestamp are
exchanged between a random source and destination node on a regular basis. The
nodes in the collect network periodically transmit messages to the base station. The
intervals between the transmissions are set to 4 (for high traffic) and 10 seconds (for
low traffic). Thus, each node either generates 6 or 15 packets per minute. Each packet
has a message size of 6 bytes.
The varied transmission power leads to new topologies with changing network
density. The CC2420 radio chip allows to set it to a value in the range of 1 (minimum)
to 31 (maximum). For the first testbed, the transmission power is set to 10 (-11 dBm)
for the “low power” setting, and to 16 (-6 dBm) for the “high power” setting. In the
second testbed, the configuration is set to 8 (-13 dBm) and 16 (-6 dBm), because the
second WSN is smaller and the distance between nodes is reduced.
During the series of measurements, each node periodically collects local metrics and
makes them available through its serial port. The local collecting cycle time is set to 4
seconds which corresponds to the high traffic setting. Note that all metric values are
measured for the duration of the collecting cycle and then reset. The TUDµNET allows
collecting all serial outputs in one centralized SQL database. This approach offers
the advantage that all the metrics are collected over an out-of-band communication
channel. Thus, the artificial traffic and our measurement collection do not interfere
with each other.
Figures 4.2 and 4.3 depict the topologies of the two testbeds depending on the
transmission power. Nodes are labeled with an ID number. Each arc connecting two
nodes is labeled with the minimum transmission power value required to establish a
path between both nodes. In the first collect testbed, node 13 is the base station. In
the second collect testbed, the base station is located at node 1. When running the
mesh protocol, base stations are not needed. The adversaries are placed close to the
inner nodes of the two testbeds. To compensate for specific measurement errors or
temporary anomalies, we perform three different test-runs at different daytimes for
each combination of the testbed parameters topology, traffic flow, transmission power
2 In the remainder of this document we use the terms collect protocol as well as collection tree protocol
interchangeably.
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Figure 4.2: Topologies of the two initial testbeds with high transmission power (each arc
connecting two nodes is labeled with the minimum transmission power value
required to establish a path between both nodes) [Thi12]
and attack. Each test-run has a duration of 15 minutes. We have chosen the test-run
duration after assessing the time the network requires to reach steady state, which
is about 1 minute. Overall, there are 144 measurement test-runs performed in both
testbeds, providing about 3 million data samples.
Final Tests
For the final tests, we have selected two larger independent testbeds consisting of
TelosB motes. The first testbed (referred to as final testbed 1) is located in neighboring
office rooms of the computer science building, containing 37 motes in total (see
Figure 4.4). The second testbed (referred to as final testbed 2) is located at a different
building to take environmental influences or interferences into account. Besides, we
are able to show that the analyzed metrics are applicable to different WSNs. This
second testbed consists of 35 sensor nodes (see Figure 4.5). The main difference
between the two testbeds is the environment in which they are deployed, having an
impact on the networks. The first testbed faces a challenging environment with a lot
of interference and poor link quality, since it is deployed in a large number of office
rooms separated through doors and walls, and a pool room with frequently moving
people. In contrast to that, the second testbed is deployed in a large rectangular hall.
Figure 4.3: Topologies of the two initial testbeds with low transmission power (each arc
connecting two nodes is labeled with the minimum transmission power value
required to establish a path between both nodes) [Thi12]
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Common problems such as unidirectional links and a constantly changing topology
are observed in our testbeds. Hence, many challenges of real-world deployments are
addressed. Besides the parameters considered in the initial tests, we now also vary:
. Attack (constant jamming/random jamming/reactive jamming/blackhole/blackhole with
random jamming/blackhole with reactive jamming/no attack) - In general, we consider
two different DoS attacks, namely jamming and blackhole. Three different
jammers are implemented. Also, we analyze the combination of both attacks.
. Attacker location (inner/outer and inner) - The location and the number of attackers
influence the metrics.
. Attack delay (no delay/delay) - Depending on when the attack starts, the metrics
are influenced differently.
To resemble a real deployment, we again generate artificial data traffic. The intervals
between the transmissions are set to 3 (for high traffic) and 10 seconds (for low traffic).
Thus, the artificial traffic varies between 6 and 20 transmitted packets per minute in
each node. Each packet has a message size of 100 bytes, including the header. We have
chosen the packet size according to [SMR+12]. For the final testbed 1, the transmission
power is set to 9 (-12 dBm) for the “low power” setting, and to 15 (-7 dBm) for the
“high power” setting. In the final testbed 2, the configuration is set to 4 (-21 dBm) and
8 (-13 dBm). In Figures 4.4 and 4.5, the base stations are marked in blue, while the
attackers are marked in red.
Figure 4.6 shows heatmaps of the nodes in the final testbed 1 representing the
required power to reach a specific neighbor under various transmission powers. Grey
areas are not reachable by the node. The respective heatmaps for the final testbed 2
are given in Figure 4.7.
The attacker location parameter can be set to inner, which means the attacker is
placed near the sink in the CTP or near the center of the WSN in mesh networks.
Hence, the attacker can reach a large number of neighbors and heavily influence the
network. If the parameter is set to both, then two attackers are placed in the testbed,
the first having the same position as in the inner setting, the second being placed on
the outer limits of the networks. For the combined attackers, the blackhole will always
be placed near the sink/center.
Regarding the attack delay, when using no delay, the adversary will immediately
attack when the test-run starts. The delay setting, in contrast, allows the network to
establish its operation without attack. Then, 7.5 minutes after the start of the test-run,
the attacking begins. Note that the attacking nodes remain silent until they start their
attacks, and do not take part in the WSN operation. Otherwise, this would lead to
different metric values.
Each test-run is repeated two times and has a duration of 20 minutes, out of which
15 minutes are actually used for measuring. As the initial test-runs have shown, the
actual starting time of a job can be slightly different for the individual nodes. The
reason is that flashing the nodes lasts for a varying amount of time.
38 measuring the impact of denial-of-service attacks
3331
323029
282624
2523
2119
2220
1715
1816
09
10
1311
1412
0605
0807
01
51
1E
71
1E
91
1E
81
1E
E112 D110 D108
D113
D106
E111 D111
E108
03
27
36

515022
1E
12
1E
60
1E
70
1E
53
E123
E125
E126
12 39
E101
E102
E104
Figure 4.4: Mote placement final testbed 1 [Alm15]
4.1 design 39
1
2
6

11
12
13
14
16
17
19
20
21
22
24
25
26
27
28
29
31
32
33
35
36
38
3949
51
53
54
55
56
57
58
Figure 4.5: Mote placement final testbed 2 [Alm15]
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4.1.2 Protocols Employed
We have chosen the mesh and collection tree protocol topologies, because they are
among the most relevant protocols in WSNs. They are common for a lot of practical
deployments [LHL+11, CCD+11], and are used in scenarios such as central data
collection and meshed multi-hop networks.
Collect Protocol
The collect protocol [GFJ+09] is used in data collection scenarios and provides mecha-
nisms for building up a tree-based topology within the WSN. It also yields reliable
hop-by-hop data packet forwarding to the base station at the root. Therefore, the
collect protocol has desirable properties such as tracking network information and
message delivery state, for example, packet successful reception. Furthermore, it
has built-in methods for collecting statistical network data, which we use as protocol
specific metrics in our analysis.
With the progress of IPv6 as a communication standard for wireless sensor networks
[VD10], new routing protocols such as RPL [WTt12] may become the standard in
wireless sensor networks. Our methodology can then be applied to analyze the impact
of attacks on this technology as well.
Mesh Protocol
The mesh protocol is implemented by Contiki’s Rime stack and allows sending
messages using multi-hop routing to specific destinations in the WSN. For finding
the best route to the destination, each node manages an own routing table containing
the next-hop neighbor for a specific receiver. However, the multi-hop forwarding
mechanism cannot ensure packet delivery, since no acknowledgement packets are sent
at the reception of data. Hence, the mesh protocol provides support for less metrics
than the collect protocol.
4.1.3 Attack Implementations
An analysis of the literature reveals that the question of security has been mainly
tackled from the cryptographic point of view, with a focus on data integrity and
confidentiality. For instance, besides standard symmetric algorithms which run
very efficiently on the resource-constrained nodes, also public-key cryptography has
become feasible [WGE+05, LN08]. Still, given the often unattended nature of sensor
nodes, it is reasonable to assume an attacker physically compromising the nodes and
gaining access to the cryptographic key material. Therefore, defense mechanisms
against threats to the availability of the WSN, such as denial-of-service (DoS) attacks,
and mechanisms to provide operational security are needed. Hence, we consider two
(standard) denial-of-service attacks, operating on layer 1 and layer 3. First, we analyze
a physical layer jamming as it is a simple but still powerful attack. Then, we evaluate a
blackhole attack. We implement both attacks in the collection tree and mesh protocol,
respectively.
The jamming attack is carried out in three different ways: constantly, randomly, and
reactively. The constant jammer is the simplest attack model, in which the attacker uses
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the radio communication to constantly keep sending packet after packet. This results
in the radio channel being blocked for all neighboring nodes.
The random jammer operates in a similar way, except that the intervals between
jamming and sleeping are chosen randomly. The size of those intervals influences the
network disturbance, which can range from light to heavy.
The reactive jammer is the most sophisticated attacker model we consider. Rather
than proactively flooding the channel, this attacker will jam certain packets reactively
upon sensing traffic.
The implemented jammers are independent of the network protocols used in the
WSN.
Constant Jamming
Jamming is a denial-of-service attack on the availability of the communication channel.
One of the most simple jammers is the constant jammer. This type of attacker
constantly sends packets on the used channel. Every regular node in range of the
jammer’s signal will postpone sending data until the jammer stops. The reason for
this is, that collisions occur with two concurrent transmitters. These collisions make it
impossible to correctly reconstruct the sent information because of the overlapping
signals. Hence, the regular nodes do not send when the channel is busy. As a
consequence, all nodes in transmission range of the jammer are effectively rendered
out-of-service.
In our implementation on the TelosB motes, we directly access the physical layer
transmitting method provided via the radio chip. Using this method, the jamming
node directly transmits the jamming packets to the environment. In our initial tests,
only this type of jammer is evaluated.
Random Jamming
The constant jammer is the basis for the random jammer, the only difference being
that the intervals between jamming and non-jamming are random. Hence, the regular
nodes can successfully transfer messages from time to time, until the jamming blocks
the communication again.
Reactive Jamming
A reactive jammer becomes active upon sensing a packet on the channel, trying to
cause packet collision. For that purpose, it constantly listens to the channel. If the
attacker senses that a packet is being transmitted he will instantly start sending a
pre-defined packet. If this is done fast enough, this single packet will cause a collision
on the network layer. The node whose transmission is being targeted will sense this
collision and try to send the packet again, leading to another counter-packet sent
from the reactive jammer. This process will continue until the maximum number of
retransmissions on the regular node is reached, or the reactive jammer does not send
its packet fast enough. The repeated retransmissions of the packet will increase the
battery consumption.
We expect this attack to be hard to detect, since the jammer is active only occasionally.
With no ongoing traffic, the attacker is silent. In addition, a successful collision will
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hide the jammer because of the channel being inaccessible. However, if the jammer
fails to send its packet fast enough, its transmission can be observed.
Contiki Modifications
Contiki employs various mechanisms in order to ensure a fair and robust network
performance. Hence, certain features have to be disabled or modified to allow the
jammers to operate. We have made changes to the following parts:
. Watchdog
. CC2420 network stack
. Clear channel assessment (CCA)
. Energysaving
Watchdog: The watchdog regularly checks all running processes for loops causing
constant CPU consumption. Upon finding such a process stuck in a loop, the mote gets
rebooted by the watchdog. The constant listening to the radio channel, as performed
by all jammers, leads to the watchdog rebooting the mote repeatably every 2 to 3
seconds. Disabling the watchdog prevents this behavior.
CC2420 network stack: By default, the CC2420 network stack does not support
jamming, because turning off the radio is considered beneficial. Hence, this function is
disabled in order to allow a constantly listening jammer. Besides, the sending process
had to be realized in an efficient way. Since the jammer always uses the same packet
to cause denial-of-service, continuously removing and allocating a new packet is not
necessary. Instead, just one packet is allocated on start-up which is used repeatedly for
transmission, and never changed or freed. This is especially necessary for the reactive
jammer, because allocating a new packet would consume too much time before it
could be sent.
Clear channel assessment: If sending a packet would lead a collision, the CCA
prevents the transmission. With the assistance of the CCA, a mote can detect an
ongoing transmission, and pause its own transmission until the channel is free again.
However, this behavior is the opposite to the intended behavior of the jammer, and
therefore the CCA is disabled.
Energysaving: As motes are often battery-powered, decreasing the energy con-
sumption is crucial. Contiki’s default energysaving routines cause the mote to sleep
regularly. In order to keep the jammer always active, this feature is deactivated.
Blackhole
A blackhole node tries to attract all the neighborhood traffic. Instead of forwarding this
traffic to the destination, it discards all incoming data packets. The implementations
of this attack on the routing protocol need to be specifically adapted to mesh and
collect networks. In the case of a mesh network, the blackhole node advertises route
announcements with the best routing metric to all destinations and also replies to
route requests by handling the incoming requests as the desired final destination
and replying on behalf of it. The collect protocol also requires some modifications
for attracting the traffic. The blackhole node periodically broadcasts announcement
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messages with routing information which are used for selecting the parent node. In
particular, it sets its own announcement routing metric to one in order to trick the
other nodes into selecting it as parent. Since the base station has announcement
value zero, a blackhole setting this value to zero would be suspicious. The routing
metric is not only announced directly, but is also piggybacked onto outgoing data
or acknowledgement packets. In addition, the blackhole will modify the routing
information sent by other nodes, setting its costs again to one.
Containing blackhole attacks is possible by using secure routing protocols [WFSH06],
but preventing jamming attacks is difficult. Taking into account the characteristics
of jamming and blackhole attacks in both collect and mesh networks, it is possible
to develop specific detection approaches. However, we are interested in the actual
impact of these attacks on real wireless sensor networks.
4.1.4 Metrics
We identify an exhaustive list of metrics that have been selected based on two main
criteria. First, we focus on metrics that are already provided by the node or the
used protocols. Second, the metrics should be calculatable in a lightweight manner.
These choices stem from efficiency reasons, as we envision the metrics to be used in
lightweight IDSs. In our experiments, metrics can be divided into three categories:
basic metrics, collection tree specific metrics, and mesh network specific metrics. Due
to the lack of acknowledgments in the mesh protocol, metrics such as the packet
delivery rate are missing for this type of network. In the following, we describe our
metrics that were directly provided by Rimestats/Energest in detail.
Basic Metrics
All sensor nodes can obtain basic metrics, independently of the underlying protocol.
. B01 - Received Signal Strength Indicator (RSSI): RSSI represents the current radio
signal power measured at the receiver and is typically expressed in dBm.
. B02/B03 - Transmit/Listen time: It represents the amount of time the radio chip is
in transmitting/listening mode during a specific time period. We measure the
time with a timer of 8192Hz.
. B04/B05 - Transmit/Listen duty cycle: It depicts the usage of the transmit and listen
time as percentage values with respect to the entire measurement period.
. B06/B07 - Transmitted/Received packets on network layer: The packet rate metrics at
the network layer contain counters for all outgoing and incoming packets.
. B08/B09 - Transmitted/Received packets on MAC layer: It counts the outgoing and
incoming packets on the MAC layer.
. B10 - Packets with invalid CRC checksum: It counts, how often a received packet is
discarded because of an invalid CRC checksum.
. B11 - Energy consumption by radio activities: It is calculated as
energyr = (l · 18.8+ t · 17.4+ i · 0.426) · v
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where energyr is the current energy consumption of the radio activities, l is the
listen time, t is the transmit time, i is the idle time, and v is the current operating
voltage. The specific values are taken from the CC2420 manual.
. B12 - Radio load percentage: This metric also represents the uptime of the radio.
It is given as the percentage value of the uptime with respect to the entire
measurement period.
. B13 - Energy consumption by MCU activities: It is calculated as
powerMCU = m · 0.5 · v
where powerMCU is the current energy consumption of the MCU, m is the
MCU uptime, and v is the current operating voltage. The specific values are
taken from the MSP430 manual.
. B14 - MCU load percentage: This metric represents the percentage value of the
MCU uptime with respect to the entire measurement period.
. B15 - Contention drop: This metric counts the number of times the node fails to
send a packet due to a busy channel.
. B16 - Pending packets: This is a boolean metric indicating whether the node has
unprocessed packets in the incoming packet buffer.
. B17 - Too short packets: When received packets are shorter than the footer (also
called trailer) plus the checksum, this counter is increased.
. B18 - Too long packets: Similar to “Too short Packets”, this metric counts all
received packets that have a greater size than specified in the packet header.
Metrics of the Collection Tree Protocol
The collection tree protocol provides additional routing statistic measurements which
can be used as possible detection metrics:
. CTP01/CTP02 - Transmitted/Received data packets: These counters represent the
amount of transmitted/received data packets using the collection tree protocol.
. CTP03/CTP04 - Transmitted/Received acknowledgement packets: It counts the amount
of transmitted and received ACK packets.
. CTP05- Received duplicate packets: It describes the amount of received duplicate
data packets.
. CTP06 - Dropped packets by queue overload: If the queue buffer for incoming data
packets is overloaded, the next arriving packets will be discarded. This metric
counts the occurrences of this event.
. CTP07 - Packet delivery rates (PDR): The PDR describes the fraction of successfully
transmitted data packets.
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. CTP08 - Changing parent node: If a sensor node is not able to communicate directly
with the base station, it will connect to a parent node which then forwards its
data traffic. The amount of changes is counted by this metric.
. CTP09 - Parent congestion: It counts the number of occurences the parent was
congested and had to be changed.
. CTP10 - Link estimation of best neighbor: A node defines its parent node by
choosing the neighbor with the lowest routing costs. The routing costs are
calculated by either the link estimation or by the header information of incoming
packets. This metric estimates the link quality to the best neighboring node.
. CTP11 - Best neighbor: It represents the current best neighboring node based on
its CTP routing score (rtmetric).
. CTP12 - Number of neighboring nodes: This value represents the number of
reachable nodes in the neighborhood.
Metrics of the Mesh Protocol
The mesh protocol used in the testbed is based on a simple broadcasting of normal
data messages. The following metrics are derived:
. M01 - Number of direct neighbors in the routing table: It represents the number
of reachable nodes in the neighborhood. It is identified by those routing table
entries having the same value for the next hop and the destination.
. M02 - Number of entries in the routing table: This metric contains the number of all
entries in the routing table, and not only the direct neighbors as in the previous
metric.
Having detailed the metrics we study under two different denial-of-service attacks,
we will now illustrate a systematic way to assess the metric behavior. This assessment
can also be applied for evaluating additional metrics in arbitrary protocols. Note that
the metrics B18 - Too long packets, CTP09 - Parent congestion, and CTP11 - Best neighbor
have not been analyzed in the initial tests.
4.2 methodology
In this chapter, we quantify the effects of denial-of-service attacks in WSNs on a
variety of metrics. Our work aims at establishing a comprehensive scheme to find
out if there are metrics more susceptible to exhibit an altered behavior under attack
than others. Also, we want to rank a set of metrics fitting typical WSNs according to
their response in case of attack. This will be further applied to develop an intrusion
detection system in Section 4.5.
To determine whether the metric measured values under attack deviate significantly
from those in an attack-free scenario, we perform statistical tests. We inspect the
cumulative distribution function and perform the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test at a
significance level of α = 0.05 to check for normality. Both analyses show that there is
evidence enough to assume the data not to be normally distributed and, hence, we
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carry out a non-parametric test. We have chosen the so-called Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney
test [UKK+12] to contrast whether there are statistically significant differences between
attack and attack-free scenarios. The Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test is the analogue of
the t-test without the assumption of normality. We use the open-source statistic tool
R3 for all tests.
Before starting the evaluation process, we first have to preprocess the collected
data. We introduce a binary label (attack/no attack) to distinguish between values
in an attack/normal scenario. Furthermore, we have to remove the first minute of
each test-run, since the WSN is unbalanced during start-up, leading to wrong metric
values. For instance, the PDR (computed over intervals of 4 seconds) in the collect
protocol cannot be calculated, as no packets have been sent yet. Next, we group
the obtained information during the test-runs according to every combination of
parameters separately for each metric and for each node. With a significance level of
α = 0.05 we test the null hypothesis that the attack values and the normal values have
identical data distributions, and note the corresponding p-values. Therefore, if the
p-value is less than the significance value, we reject the null hypothesis. The lower
the p-values are, the more differ attack values from normal values. We also calculate
for each run and for each node the arithmetic mean and standard deviation of the
different metrics. Note that for the final tests, we test with a significance level of α =
0.01.
Using the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test, we are able to detect significant changes in
individual metrics. However, the combination of several metrics might also be helpful
in detecting attacks. For example, the detection capability of the transmit duty cycle
metric is higher in wireless sensor networks with high traffic, as shown in Section 4.4.
In contrast to that, the listen duty cycle metric has a better distinction capability in
low traffic WSNs. Thus, the combination of these two metrics might be a relevant
metric as well. Therefore, we apply a logistic regression to study such effects.
The sequence of the analysis we conduct is given by:
1. Model creation
2. Estimation of the logistic regression function
3. Assessing the model fit
4. Interpretation of the regression coefficients
First, we create the models using the AIC criterion [Aka72], which proved to provide
reliable models that do not suffer from overfitting [SH06]. The models describe the
relationship between the independent metrics and the dependent variable indicating
the presence of an attack. Our goal is the reduction of the number of independent
metrics during model creation. Therefore, we start with the null model containing only
the constant term. For each metric we now perform a univariate logistic regression.
The metric with the smallest AIC value is added to the model. Simultaneously,
we check whether removing a metric from the current model leads to a reduction
of the AIC value. The final model has the smallest deviation and, hence, the best
explanatory power. For every combination of the varied parameters, the models in the
3 http://www.r-project.org
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initial testbeds have been created for each node individually, as well as for all nodes
combined together. In our final testbeds, we also consider models that only take the
data of the direct neighbors of the attacker into account.
The result of our logistic regression analysis are those metrics that best represent
the observed data. With the likelihood-ratio test we check the statistical significance
of the chosen metrics as a group, i.e., we check whether the metrics can distinguish
between attack and no attack. Then, we perform an analysis of variance (also called
ANOVA) in order to assess how well the specified models represent the observed data.
Finally, we assess the model fit of each model with the assistance of McFaddens-R2
[LHS00] which allows to compare the quality of all models.
4.3 metric assessment
In order to assess the quality of a metric for distinguishing between attack and no
attack, we classify them into four categories, namely A, B, C, and D metrics. This
is done independently for the collect and mesh protocol, as they provide different
metrics. As explained before, the p-values are determined by performing the Wilcoxon-
Mann-Whitney test. The classification is performed for each attack in the following
way:
. Class A - These metrics are able to detect the attack in both traffic intensities,
both transmit power settings, on all nodes in both testbeds, and with highest
significance value (minimum and maximum p-values are lower than 2.2 · 10−16,
which indicates that the null hypothesis is rejected at all possible significant
values α = 0.1, 0.05, 0.01, ...).
. Class B - Metrics which can detect the attack in both traffic intensities, both
transmit power settings, and having a minimum significance level lower than
2.2 · 10−16 in both testbeds.
. Class C - Metrics that identify an attack in both traffic intensities, and both
transmit power settings.
. Class D - All remaining metrics that are capable to disclose the attack.
This classification allows us to identify widely applicable metrics for attack detection
(Class A), while others are only suited for specific scenarios or specific nodes (Classes
B, C, and D). We admit that our classification is biased towards globally effective
attacks and is dependent on the network size as well as on the strength of the attack.
Thus, in a larger network there might be no Class A metrics at all, which is true for
our final testbeds. Still, it gives us a more fine-grained view on the impact of the
implemented attacks on our inital testbeds. Regarding the results of the final testbeds,
we assess the quality of the metrics in a different way. In this case, we present the
detection rates of each metric, i.e., in how many cases the metric showed significantly
different values under attack.
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Table 4.1: Classification of the analyzed metrics for the different scenarios in the initial testbeds.
Sc. 1: Jamming (Collect), Sc. 2: Jamming (Mesh), Sc. 3: Blackhole (Collect), Sc. 4:
Blackhole (Mesh)
ID Metric Class
Sc. 1 Sc. 2 Sc. 3 Sc. 4
B01 RSSI B B C C
B02 Transmit time B B C C
B03 Listen time A A C D
B04 Transmit duty cycle B B C C
B05 Listen duty cycle B B B C
B06 NET Sent pkts B B B C
B07 NET Received pkts B B B C
B08 MAC Sent pkts B B B D
B09 MAC Received pkts B B B C
B10 Invalid CRC C C C D
B11 Radio energy B B B C
B12 Radio load B B B C
B13 MCU energy B B B C
B14 MCU load B B B C
B15 Contention drop D D D D
B16 Pending pkts C D - -
B17 Too short pkts D - - -
CTP01 Sent data pkts B N/A B N/A
CTP02 Received data pkts B N/A B N/A
CTP03 Sent ACK pkts B N/A B N/A
CTP04 Received ACK pkts B N/A - N/A
CTP05 Received duplicates C N/A C N/A
CTP06 Dropped pkts D N/A D N/A
CTP07 Packet delivery rate A N/A B N/A
CTP08 Changing parent D N/A D N/A
CTP10 Link estimation B N/A B N/A
CTP12/M01 No. of neighbors A A B C
M02 No. of routing entries N/A A N/A C
4.4 results
In this section we present the evaluation results for our initial tests in the smaller
testbeds, as well as for our final tests in the larger testbeds. We particularly investigate
the influence of the network density and the traffic intensity on the metric behavior.
4.4.1 Initial Tests
We find that several metrics are well-suited to detect the implemented attacks. From
Table 4.1 we observe that the metrics in the collect topology constantly perform as
good as the metrics in the mesh topology, and in some cases better (an entry in
the table marked with “-” indicates there is not enough evidence to reject the null
hypothesis; an entry marked with “N/A" signifies that the corresponding metric is
not available in this protocol). In the collection tree protocol setting, the implemented
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Figure 4.8: Jamming attack in a mesh WSN with low traffic and low transmission power (initial
testbed 1); the neighbor count is shown for every node
traffic is more deterministic because all traffic is destined to the sink, whereas in the
mesh protocol we use broadcast messages to different destinations. Thus, metrics
related to network traffic statistics perform better in the collection tree protocol.
The main finding is that jamming attacks have a more significant global influence
on the metrics than blackhole attacks, which tend to be locally restricted. Class A
metrics are only available for jamming attacks. For example, the number of neighbors
is significantly reduced. The most affected nodes are in the direct neighborhood of the
jammer, having a neighbor count of zero whenever the WSN is jammed, as shown in
Figure 4.8 (in all subsequent figures the error bars show the standard deviation of the
metric values). While this metric can be obtained in both collect and mesh networks,
another metric which is only available for collect networks also reaches class A quality,
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Figure 4.9: Jamming attack in a collect WSN with low traffic and high transmission power
(initial testbed 1); the PDR is shown for every node
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namely the packet delivery rate. As shown in Figure 4.9, in an attack-free scenario the
PDR is almost 100% for all nodes. In contrast, under a jamming attack, the PDR drops
to zero, i.e., no packets can be transferred successfully. In a wireless sensor network
with higher traffic, the average PDR in a normal scenario is reduced due to the higher
amount of collisions. Besides, the PDR is also able to detect blackhole attacks, but in
this case the effects of the attack are more local. The PDR is especially reduced for
nodes that are not the direct neighbors of the base station and hence have to route
their data via other nodes. In such a situation, the blackhole is effectively causing
denial-of-service by dropping packets.
There is also a large number of Class B metrics that are heavily influenced by
the attacks. Unsurprisingly, metrics covering traffic related information such as the
number of sent/received packets are helpful in detecting the attack. However, not all
nodes in the testbeds are affected in the same significant way, as some are more distant
from the attack. Next, we want to give insights on the impact of selected parameters
on the metrics’ attack detection capability.
Influence of the Network Density
We now investigate the influence of the network density on the metric distinction
capabilities between an attacking scenario and the normal operation. Therefore, we
describe the behavior of those metrics that are able to identify the attack in one
network density setting, but fail to do so in the other density setting. We perform
this analysis separately for the different network protocols and the different attacks.
From now on, we call a network using the high transmission power a dense network.
A network operating with the low transmision power setting is called a sparse network.
An overview of the results is presented in Table 4.2, in which we list the minimum
p-value we calculated across all nodes in both testbeds, if we were able to reject the
null hypothesis that the attack and the normal values of this metric have identical
data distributions. Otherwise, p is greater than 0.05, which means that the metric in
this density setting cannot differentiate between attack and normal operation.
jamming We start with analyzing the influence of the network density under a
jamming attack on the metrics in the collect topology. If we compare the dense to the
sparse WSN, we notice four differences. First, the jamming attack affects the sparse
WSN stronger and thus causes parent changing events (rows d1 and d4). The effects
of the jamming on the routing metric are more severe and influence the reachability
of nodes. Second, the dense WSN is subject to a greater message dropping due to
contention, because there is higher traffic than in a sparse network (row d2). Third, in
a sparse network the count of invalid packets because of short packet size is higher
(row d3). The jamming attack has a greater chance to corrupt messages because a
sparse network does not suffer as much from contention as a dense WSN. The same
reasoning explains the last difference. In a sparse wireless sensor network, there are
no dropped packets due to queue overload in an attack-free scenario, since the overall
traffic is lower. Consequently, packet dropping indicates the presence of jamming
attacks (row d5).
Regarding the mesh topology, the results are similar: in a dense network, the
number of messages dropped due to contention (row d11) and the number of pending
packets (row d10) is higher.
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Table 4.2: Influence of the network density on the initial testbeds
Row Metric Topology Traffic Attack p for Sparse WSN p for Dense WSN
d1 Parent change Collect Low Jamming p < 1.6 · 10−10 p > 0.05
d2 Contention Collect Low Jamming p > 0.05 p < 3.9 · 10−6
d3 Too short pkts Collect High Jamming p < 6 · 10−4 p > 0.05
d4 Parent change Collect High Jamming p < 7.3 · 10−15 p > 0.05
d5 Dropped pkts Collect High Jamming p < 2.2 · 10−16 p > 0.05
d6 Parent change Collect Low Blackhole p < 1.2 · 10−6 p > 0.05
d7 Parent change Collect High Blackhole p < 5.1 · 10−7 p > 0.05
d8 Contention Collect High Blackhole p > 0.05 p < 1 · 10−6
d9 Dropped pkts Collect High Blackhole p < 2.2 · 10−16 p > 0.05
d10 Pending pkts Mesh Low Jamming p > 0.05 p < 2.2 · 10−16
d11 Contention Mesh Low Jamming p > 0.05 p < 6.4 · 10−5
d12 Contention Mesh Low Blackhole p > 0.05 p < 6 · 10−5
d13 Listen time Mesh Low Blackhole p < 5.4 · 10−5 p > 0.05
d14 MAC Sent pkts Mesh Low Blackhole p < 7.7 · 10−5 p > 0.05
d15 Contention Mesh High Blackhole p < 3.6 · 10−12 p > 0.05
blackhole Concerning the collect protocol, the blackhole causes a higher number
of parent changing events in the sparse network due to the lower number of possible
parents (rows d6 and d7). As Figure 4.10 shows, nodes that are not direct neighbors
of the blackhole (node IDs 1-6) exchange their parent ID with the attacker. We also
find that in an attack-free sparse network there is a low number of dropped messages
caused by queue overload. A blackhole increases this count in a sparse network by
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Figure 4.10: Comparison of the effects of a blackhole attack in a low traffic collect WSN,
depending on the density (initial testbed 1); the count of parent changing events
is shown for every node
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Table 4.3: Influence of the traffic intensity on the initial testbeds
Row Metric Topology Density Attack p for Low Traffic p for High Traffic
i1 Too short pkts Collect Sparse Jamming p > 0.05 p < 6.7 · 10−4
i2 Contention Collect Sparse Jamming p > 0.05 p < 1.3 · 10−11
i3 Dropped pkts Collect Sparse Jamming p > 0.05 p < 2.2 · 10−16
i4 Contention Collect Sparse Blackhole p < 5.6 · 10−7 p > 0.05
i5 Dropped pkts Collect Sparse Blackhole p > 0.05 p < 2.2 · 10−16
i6 Contention Mesh Sparse Jamming p > 0.05 p < 6.9 · 10−5
i7 Pending pkts Mesh Dense Jamming p < 2.2 · 10−16 p > 0.05
i8 Contention Mesh Sparse Blackhole p > 0.05 p < 3.6 · 10−12
i9 Invalid CRC Mesh Sparse Blackhole p > 0.05 p < 4.7 · 10−5
i10 Listen time Mesh Dense Blackhole p > 0.05 p < 7.1 · 10−11
i11 MAC Sent pkts Mesh Dense Blackhole p > 0.05 p < 2.2 · 10−14
i12 Invalid CRC Mesh Dense Blackhole p > 0.05 p < 1.3 · 10−5
i13 Contention Mesh Dense Blackhole p < 6 · 10−5 p > 0.05
actively advertising routes very often (row d9). In addition, a blackhole attack in a
dense network provokes more message dropping at certain nodes due to contention
(row d8).
For the mesh network we make the following observations. The number of con-
tention drops is in general higher in a dense network with high traffic and is therefore
not a significant metric for detecting blackhole attacks. However, an increase in this
contention dropping rate is significant in a sparse network (row d15). In particular,
we notice that the direct neighbor of the attacker in the second testbed (node ID 6) has
a highly increased number of packets dropped due to contention. In a sparse network,
traffic is flowing to the blackhole over fewer nodes, provoking an increased number of
messages dropped due to contention at the direct neighbors of the blackhole. This
behavior cannot be observed in the tree-structured collect protocol and is weakened
in a low traffic scenario, where the corresponding metric is not significant in a sparse
network, as opposed to a dense network (row d12). Further, we note that when a
blackhole is active, the listen time for nodes on the route to the blackhole is increased
in a sparse network, as more messages have to be transferred over those nodes (row
d13). Similarly, the number of sent packets on the MAC layer is significantly reduced
in a sparse network because messages are not forwarded by the blackhole (row d14).
Influence of the Traffic Intensity
Equal to the analysis of the network density, in what follows we evaluate the impact
of the traffic intensity on the metrics. For an overview of the results, please refer to
Table 4.3. Again, for significant metrics we give the minimum p-value we calculated
across all nodes in both testbeds; otherwise p is greater than 0.05.
jamming Investigating the metric behavior in the collect protocol, we remark three
observations in a high traffic setting: (1) there is higher packet dropping due to
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contention (row i2) and (2) due to queue overload (row i3), and (3) the number of
too short messages is higher (row i1). Thus, the jamming attack has a more severe
negative effect on these three metrics, since more messages flow through the network.
Correspondingly, also the mesh protocol exhibits a higher packet dropping rate due
to contention under high traffic (row i6). Besides, with low traffic and under normal
operation, no pending packets are observed. A jamming attack increases the number
of pending messages (row i7). In a high traffic wireless sensor network, this metric is
not significant, as we also have pending packets without attack.
blackhole Focussing on the collect protocol, a high traffic results in more mes-
sages dropped due to queue overload (row i5), since a higher count of messages has
to be transferred over fewer links. When the traffic is low, the number of messages
dropped due to contention is significantly increased during a blackhole attack because
of the malicious node blocking the channel with its route announcements (row i4).
Again, we observe similar results in the mesh protocol. In a high traffic setting, the
number of packets dropped due to contention (row i8) and the number of packets
with bad CRC checksum (row i9) is higher. This holds for nodes on the route to
the blackhole, which experience an increased traffic flow. In contrast to the sparse
network, the number of packets dropped due to contention is not significant in a
dense high traffic WSN. Also without attack this number is relatively high, as opposed
to the low traffic WSN experiencing a significant increase under a blackhole attack
(row i13). Given high traffic, the number of packets with bad CRC checksum (row i12)
and the count of sent packets on the MAC layer (row i11) is higher when compared
to the low traffic WSN. Besides, in a high traffic WSN the listen time is reduced for
nodes that are exposed to the blackhole dropping packets, while with low traffic there
is no significant difference (row i10).
Logistic Regression
The results of the logistic regression analysis lay the foundation for a simple, lightweight
intrusion detection system. The general process of attack detection contains the fol-
lowing steps:
Given: Regression coefficients β0, . . . ,βk and
Given: data set x1, . . . , xk
Step 1: Creation of the logit model
Step 4: η = β0 +β1 · x1 + ·+βk · xk
Step 2: Calculation of the logit η
Step 3: Calculation of the logistic function
Step 4: Πˆi = 11+e−η
Step 4: Decision
Step 4: If Πˆi > 0.5 −→ Attack detected
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The single steps of this algorithm will be explained in the next subsection using a
simple example. For better readability, the values of the regression coefficients are not
shown in the following results.
jamming results To begin, we focus on the initial testbed 1. Table 4.4 represents
the relation between the factors in the logistic regression model and the associated
metrics in the collection tree protocol. It serves as the basis for all subsequently
presented results.
Table 4.4: Factors and associated metrics for the collection tree protocol
Factor Metric
β1 B01 - RSSI
β2 B03 - Listen time
β3 B02 - Transmit time
β4 B16 - Pending pkts
β5 B06 - NET sent pkts
β6 B07 - NET received pkts
β7 B08 - MAC sent pkts
β8 B09 - MAC received pkts
β9 B18 - Too long pkts
β10 B17 - Too short pkts
β11 B15 - Contention drop
β12 B10 - Invalid CRC
β13 B11 - Radio energy
β14 B13 - MCU energy
β15 CTP12 - No. of neighbors
β16 CTP11 - Best neighbor
β17 CTP10 - Link estimation
β18 CTP09 - Parent congestion
β19 CTP08 - Changing parent
β20 CTP03 - Sent ACK pkts
β21 CTP01 - Sent data pkts
β22 CTP02 - Received data pkts
β23 CTP04 - Received ACK pkts
β24 CTP05 - Received duplicates
β25 CTP06 - Dropped pkts
β26 CTP07 - Packet delivery rate
β27 B14 - MCU load
β28 B04 - Transmit duty cycle
β29 B05 - Listen duty cycle
β30 B12 - Radio load
Table 4.5 shows the significant factors as well as the model quality for the jamming
attack in a CTP network with low power and low traffic intensity. The models have
been created per node, and including all nodes simultaneously, as can be seen in
the last row. The second column contains those metrics, that have been used in
the logit model. They are labelled as βi; the corresponding names can be found
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Table 4.5: CTP, initial testbed 1, low power, low traffic, jamming
Node Factors Analysis of variance LR-test R2
11 β15 1, 25e− 8 < 1179, 31 764, 83 > 3, 84 1
13 β26 4, 41e− 8 < 1176, 20 762, 77 > 3, 84 1
14 β15 1, 25e− 7 < 1175, 17 762, 11 > 3, 84 1
15 β15 6, 38e− 8 < 1176, 20 762, 82 > 3, 84 1
16 β15 2, 01e− 8 < 1178, 27 764, 16 > 3, 84 1
17 β15 3, 02e− 8 < 1175, 17 762, 11 > 3, 84 1
23 β26 6, 71e− 9 < 1178, 27 764, 11 > 3, 84 1
25 β26 7, 10e− 9 < 1178, 27 764, 11 > 3, 84 1
26 β26 7, 27e− 9 < 1178, 27 764, 16 > 3, 84 1
28 β17 7, 16e− 8 < 1175, 17 762, 11 > 3, 84 1
30 β17 6, 39e− 9 < 1176, 20 762, 82 > 3, 84 1
31 β17 6, 39e− 9 < 1177, 24 763, 49 > 3, 84 1
all nodes β15 1, 27e− 6 < 13486, 47 9159, 60 > 3, 84 1
in Table 4.4. The analysis of variance is presented in the third column, comparing
the -2 log likelihood value (first term) to the value of the chi-squared distribution
(second term). The relation < indicates, that we cannot reject the null hypothesis, and
hence the model is perfectly fit. Otherwise, the relation 6< leads to the rejection of
the null hypothesis. The fourth column contains the results of the likelihood-ratio
test, assessing the significance of the chosen regression coefficients when separating
the two groups. The first term represents the value of the reduced, i.e., the chosen
model, whereas the second term is the chi-squared value. If the null hypothesis is
rejected (first term < than the second term), the chosen metrics are significant for the
separation of the groups. Details on these tests can be found in [Men02]. The fifth
column shows the quality criterion McFaddens-R2, indicating how well the model fits
the observed data. A value greater than 0.2 leads to an acceptable model fit, and a
value greater than 0.4 to a perfect model fit [LHS00]. These boundaries are common
in statistics. In the following, we use the term model fit synonomously for the analysis
of variance, the likelihood-ratio test, and the McFaddens-R2.
From Table 4.5 we observe that in this setting only single metrics are needed for
attack detection. The metrics are all specific to the CTP. The most often used metric
is the number of neighbors metric, followed by the packet delivery rate and the link
estimation.
We now describe the attack detection examplarily for node 23, given the general
process as outlined before.
Input: β0 = 26.0131,β26 = −0.5215, x26 = −1
Step 1: Regression model η = β0 +β26 · x26
Step 2: Logit η = 26.0131− 0.5215 · (−1) = 26.5346
Step 3: Logistic regression function Πˆi = 11+e−η
Step 4: Πˆi = 11+e−26.5346 = 1
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Step 4: Decision 1 > 0.5 −→ Attack detected
Table 4.6: CTP, initial testbed 1, high power, low traffic, jamming
Node Factors Analysis of variance LR-test R2
11 β15 1, 24e− 8 < 1147, 21 743, 75 > 3, 84 1
13 β26 7, 82e− 9 < 1146, 18 743, 05 > 3, 84 1
14 β26 8, 05e− 9 < 1148, 25 744, 44 > 3, 84 1
15 β26 1, 81e− 8 < 1033, 19 661, 09 > 3, 84 1
16 β15 2, 59e− 8 < 1145, 14 742, 36 > 3, 84 1
17 β15 1, 63e− 8 < 1147, 21 743, 75 > 3, 84 1
23 β26 6, 72e− 9 < 1147, 40 743, 75 > 3, 84 1
25 β26 9, 90e− 9 < 1146, 18 743, 05 > 3, 84 1
26 β17 1, 25e− 8 < 1147, 21 743, 75 > 3, 84 1
28 β17 6, 22e− 9 < 1146, 18 743, 05 > 3, 84 1
30 β17 6, 22e− 9 < 1147, 21 743, 75 > 3, 84 1
31 β3,β17 1, 52e− 8 < 1145, 14 743, 05 > 3, 84 1
all nodes β8,β13,β15 9, 06e− 6 < 13019, 86 8844, 85 > 3, 84 1
With high power and low traffic, the significant metrics (number of neighbors,
packet delivery rate, link estimation) remain the same in most cases, as can be seen in
Table 4.6. Exceptions are node 31 as well as the analysis over all nodes, requiring two
and three metrics per model, respectively.
Given low power and high traffic, we see that the packet delivery rate and the
number of neighbors are the most often used metrics (Table 4.7). Moreover, the basic
metric MAC received pkts is able to detect an attack on node 31.
Similar results are obtained for the high power in combination with high traffic
intensity. The packet delivery rate and the link estimation occur very often in the
generated models as shown in Table 4.8.
To summarize, in about 96 percent of the cases, a single metric is sufficient for
successful attack detection in the inital testbed 1. Regarding the used metrics, the CTP
specific metrics link estimation, number of neighbors, and packet delivery rate are the
most significant metrics. Besides, integrating the number of received packets on the
MAC layer into the model helps achieving better results in some cases. Throughout
all parameter combinations we achieve a perfect model fit, and the chosen metrics are
significant for the separation of the groups.
Next, we turn our attention to the initial testbed 2. In this setup, the number of
received packets on the MAC layer is most frequently used in the models. In addition,
the packet delivery rate is a highly significant metric, as it was in the initial testbed
1. However, the number of neighbors and the link estimation do not appear as often
as before, they are only relevant in a setting with low power and low traffic intensity.
The results are shown in Appendix A.1.1.
In summary, ordered descendingly according to the number of occurences, the most
relevant metrics across both initial testbeds for detecting the jamming attack using the
CTP are:
. Packet delivery rate
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Table 4.7: CTP, initial testbed 1, low power, high traffic, jamming
Node Factors Analysis of variance LR-test R2
11 β15 6, 62e− 8 < 1147, 21 743, 75 > 3, 84 1
13 β15 3, 07e− 8 < 1145, 14 742, 36 > 3, 84 1
14 β15 2, 17e− 8 < 1144, 10 741, 67 > 3, 84 1
15 β15 1, 88e− 8 < 1145, 14 742, 36 > 3, 84 1
16 β15 2, 99e− 8 < 1146, 18 743, 05 > 3, 84 1
17 β3,β15 3, 91e− 8 < 1146, 18 743, 75 > 5, 99 1
23 β26 6, 45e− 9 < 1148, 25 744, 44 > 3, 84 1
25 β26 6, 45e− 9 < 1148, 25 744, 44 > 3, 84 1
26 β26 6, 45e− 9 < 1148, 25 744, 44 > 3, 84 1
28 β26 5, 18e− 9 < 960, 51 600, 51 > 3, 84 1
30 β26 6, 22e− 9 < 1147, 21 743, 75 > 3, 84 1
31 β8 1, 35e− 8 < 1146, 18 743, 05 > 3, 84 1
all nodes β1,β8,β15 7, 28e− 5 < 12946, 10 8793, 23 > 7, 81 1
Table 4.8: CTP, initial testbed 1, high power, high traffic, jamming
Node Factors Analysis of variance LR-test R2
11 β26 7, 56e− 9 < 1148, 25 744, 44 > 3, 84 1
13 β4,β10,β17,β19 8, 23e− 9 < 1145, 14 744, 44 > 9, 84 1
14 β26 6, 63e− 9 < 1146, 18 743, 05 > 3, 84 1
15 β26 9, 67e− 9 < 1147, 21 743, 75 > 3, 84 1
16 β26 1, 80e− 6 < 1148, 25 744, 44 > 3, 84 1
17 β17 1, 17e− 8 < 1148, 25 744, 44 > 3, 84 1
23 β17 8, 38e− 9 < 1147, 21 743, 75 > 3, 84 1
25 β17 6, 29e− 9 < 1147, 21 743, 75 > 3, 84 1
26 β17 6, 30e− 9 < 1147, 21 743, 75 > 3, 84 1
28 β17 6, 23e− 9 < 1148, 25 744, 44 > 3, 84 1
30 β17 6, 22e− 9 < 1146, 18 743, 05 > 3, 84 1
31 β26 6, 54e− 9 < 1147, 21 743, 75 > 3, 84 1
all nodes β15 1, 25e− 6 < 13141, 09 8927, 04 > 3, 84 1
. Link estimation
. Number of neighbors
. MAC received pkts
. NET received pkts
. Transmit time
Hence, the results of the logistic regression analysis are similar to those of the
Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test.
For interpreting the results of the jamming attack in the mesh protocol, Table 4.9
relates metrics to factors. In general, the number of metrics in each model is increased,
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Table 4.9: Factors in the mesh protocol
Factor Metric
β1 B01 - RSSI
β2 B03 - Listen time
β3 B02 - Transmit time
β4 B16 - Pending pkts
β5 B06 - NET Sent pkts
β6 B07 - NET Received pkts
β7 B08 - MAC Sent pkts
β8 B09 - MAC Received pkts
β9 B18 - Too long pkts
β10 B17 - Too short pkts
β11 B15 - Contention drop
β12 B10 - Invalid CRC
β13 M01 - No. of neighbors
β14 M02 - No. of routing entries
β15 B11 - Radio energy
β16 B13 - MCU energy
β17 B14 - MCU load
β18 B04 - Transmit duty cycle
β19 B05 - Listen duty cycle
β20 B12 - Radio load
compared to the CTP setting. The relevant metrics are similar, and include the
following, ordered decreasingly:
. MAC received pkts
. Number of routing entries
. NET received pkts
. Number of neighbors
. Radio energy
The detailed results are presented in Appendix A.1.1.
blackhole results The models created for the blackhole attack require more
metrics, and hence are more specific. Besides, the model quality is worse than for the
jamming attack. This holds for both initial testbeds and both protocols. We examplarily
show the results for the initial testbed 1 using the CTP with low traffic intensity and
low power (see Table 4.10). Further results are given in the Appendix A.1.1. In this
example, the CTP specific metrics link estimation, packet delivery rate, and the number
of neighbors are among the most relevant metrics. At least one of these metrics is
included in each model. Regarding the basic metrics, the number of received packets
on the network layer as well as the number of sent packets on the MAC layer are
significant.
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Table 4.10: CTP, initial testbed 1, low power, low traffic, blackhole
Node Factors Analysis of variance LR-test R2
11
β8,β13 : β15,β17,
60, 20 < 1166, 88 734, 73 > 22, 36 0, 96
β19,β21,β23,β25 : β29
13
β2,β3,β5 : β8,β11,β13,
453, 12 < 1159, 64 536, 21 > 27, 59 0, 70
β14,β17,β20,β23,β26 : β29
14
β1,β6 : β8,β11,β15,
716, 19 < 1161, 71 403, 29 > 22, 36 0, 52
β17,β18,β25,β26,β29,β30
15 β15,β26 2, 01e− 6 < 1173, 10 761, 39 > 5, 99 1
16 β17,β26 5, 00e− 6 < 1177, 24 764, 16 > 5, 99 1
17
β1 : β3,β6,β7,β11,β15,
400, 49 < 1160, 67 764, 16 > 24, 99 0, 74
β17,β18,β21,β25,β26,β28,β29
23
β1,β3,β4,β6,β7,β11,β14,
6, 56e− 4 < 1160, 67 764, 11 > 28, 87 1
β15,β17 : β21,β23,β26 : β28,β30
25 β7,β17,β19,β20,β26,β27,β30, 4, 70e− 6 < 1172, 06 764, 11 > 14, 07 1
26 β17 6, 48e− 8 < 1178, 27 764, 16 > 3, 84 1
28
β1,β2,β4 : β10,β12,β13 : β15,
505, 01 < 1156, 53 510, 32 > 31, 41 0, 67
β17,β23 : β26,β28,β29
30
β1,β3 : β8,β13 : β15,β17,
641, 27 < 1159, 64 442, 14 > 27, 59 0, 57
β19 : β21,β23,β26,β28
31
β1,β6 : β8,β14,β15,
261, 01 < 1164, 81 662, 99 > 22, 36 0, 83
β17,β20,β23,β26,β29
all nodes
β1,β4 : β8,β11 : β13,β15,
11492 < 13463, 34 3412, 26 > 33, 92 0, 37
β17 : β21,β23,β26 : β30
4.4.2 Final Tests
In this section we analyze the metrics in the larger final testbeds. We start with
evaluating the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests before creating the logistic regression
models.
Basic Metrics
The overall performance of the basic metrics can be seen in Table 4.11, showing the
detection rate aggregated for all attacks, scenarios and nodes. The detection rate is
defined as the sum of all significant Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests that could detect
the six different attacker models for each single metric. The most influenced metrics
relate to the number of sent and received packets, as well as energy consumption.
Table 4.12 takes a closer look at how well the better metrics performed in detecting
the specific attacks. In this case, we define an attack to be successfully detected if
more than 75% of all the calculated Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests for this attack have
been significant. An interesting observation is the last metric NET sent packets, which
did not have a detection rate of more than 75% in Table 4.11. Instead, the detection
rate was only 66%. However, it is well-suited to detect the constant and the random
jammers. In contrast to that, the similar overall performing metric transmit time is
not listed in Table 4.12. This indicates that the metric NET sent packets performs very
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Table 4.11: Overall performance - basic metrics - final testbeds
Metric Detection rate
B09 - MAC received pkts 0.84
B11 - Radio energy 0.83
B07 - NET received pkts 0.83
B12 - Radio load 0.83
B08 - MAC sent pkts 0.80
B13 - MCU energy 0.80
B14 - MCU load 0.79
B05 - Listen duty cycle 0.79
B01 - RSSI 0.78
B04 - Transmit duty cycle 0.76
B02 - Transmit time 0.67
B06 - NET sent pkts 0.66
B03 - Listen time 0.57
B10 - Invalid CRC 0.39
B15 - Contention drop 0.37
B16 - Pending pkts 0.22
B18 - Too long pkts 0.22
B17 - Too short pkts 0.00
Table 4.12: Basic metrics with attack detection over 0.75 in the final testbeds
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B09 - MAC received pkts X X X X X X
B11 - Radio energy X X X X X X
B07 - NET received pkts X X X X X X
B12 - Radio load X X X X X X
B13 - MCU energy X X X X X X
B14 - MCU load X X X X X -
B01 - RSSI X X X X X -
B08 - MAC sent pkts X X X X - -
B04 - Transmit duty cycle X X X X - -
B05 - Listen duty cycle X X X - - -
B06 - NET sent pkts X X - - - -
good in two cases, while the metric transmit time has a more constant detection rate,
but is of lower quality for each attack.
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Table 4.13: Overall performance - basic + CTP metrics - final testbeds
Metric Detection rate
CTP12 - Number of neighbors 0.89
B09 - MAC received pkts 0.86
CTP10 - Link estimation 0.85
B05 - Listen duty cycle 0.85
B11 - Radio energy 0.84
CTP07 - Packet delivery rate 0.84
B07 - NET received pkts 0.84
CTP11 - Best neighbor 0.84
B12 - Radio load 0.84
B08 - MAC sent pkts 0.83
B13 - MCU energy 0.83
B14 - MCU load 0.82
B06 - NET sent pkts 0.81
B04 - Transmit duty cycle 0.79
B01 - RSSI 0.77
CTP04 - Received ACK pkts 0.75
CTP01 - Sent data pkts 0.73
CTP09 - Parent congestion 0.73
CTP02 - Received data pkts 0.69
CTP03 - Sent ACK pkts 0.69
B02 - Transmit time 0.68
B03 - Listen time 0.63
CTP06 - Dropped pkts 0.49
B15 - Contention drop 0.45
B10 - Invalid CRC 0.43
B18 - Too long pkts 0.32
CTP05 - Received duplicates 0.25
CTP08 - Changing parent 0.23
B16 - Pending pkts 0.22
B17 - Too short pkts 0.00
The constant jammer and the random jammer are the two most often detected
attacks. They affect the majority of metrics. The combined attacker models with
the blackhole attack and the random or reactive jammer are also detected by a large
number of metrics. Finally, the blackhole attack and the reactive jammer showed the
least amount of metrics suitable for detection. Regarding the blackhole attack, this is
consistent with the results obtained in our initial tests. The reactive jammer is difficult
to detect globally.
CTP Metrics
Table 4.13 shows the overall performance of the basic metrics together with the CTP
specific metrics.
The CTP metric number of neighbors shows the best performance, having a detection
rate of 0.89. Regarding the detected attacks, there are 18 metrics which can identify
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an attack over all nodes with a probability of p > 0.75 (Table 4.14 shows the results
averaged over both final testbeds). Note that the performance of many basic metrics
obtained using the CTP has increased. In detail, these are NET sent packets, transmit
duty cycle, MAC sent packets, MCU load and listen duty cycle. This is due to the
ability of the CTP to notify a sender whether a packet has successfully arrived or not,
leading to a performance increase for metrics related to packet transmission.
Table 4.14: Basic + CTP metrics with attack detection over 0.75 in the final testbeds
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CTP12 - Number of neighbors X X X X X X
B09 - MAC received pkts X X X X X X
CTP10 - Link estimation X X X X X X
B05 - Listen duty cycle X X X X X X
B11 - Radio energy X X X X X X
CTP07 - Packet delivery rate X X X X X X
B07 - NET received pkts X X X X X X
CTP11 - Best neighbor X X X X X X
B12 - Radio load X X X X X X
B13 - MCU energy X X X X X X
B14 - MCU load X X X X X X
B08 - MAC sent pkts X X X X - X
B04 - Transmit duty cycle X X X X X -
B06 - NET sent pkts X X X X - -
CTP01 - Sent data pkts X X X - - -
CTP04 - Received ACK pkts X X X - - -
B01 - RSSI X X X - - -
CTP09 - Parent congestion - - X X - -
Mesh Metrics
As the mesh protocol only provides two additional network metrics and is lacking the
advanced features of the CTP, the mesh metrics perform similar to the basic metrics.
The results can be found in Appendix A.1.2.
Influence of the Testbed
The data in our final tests has been obtained in two physically separated locations. In
this section, we analyze the influence of this parameter on the detection capabilities.
Examplarily, we show the results for the CTP metrics in the final testbed 1 (Table 4.15)
and in the final testbed 2 (Table 4.16). Further results are presented in Appendix A.1.2.
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We observe the trend that a denser network like the final testbed 2 improves the
detection. This is especially true for the constant jammer, the best metric having a
detection rate of 0.99. In contrast to that, the detection of the blackhole attack remains
mainly unchanged (even a slight tendency for better detection in the sparser final
testbed 1 is noticeable). The reason for these results is given by the attack characteris-
tics. Jamming can create more damage, if the network is denser, by rendering more
nodes unavailable. Regarding the blackhole attack, changes to the topology (caused
by the attacker) can be observed better, if the network is sparser.
Table 4.15: Detection rates CTP metrics - final testbed 1
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CTP12 - Number of neighbors 0.87 0.85 0.83 0.88 0.90 0.87
CTP07 - Packet delivery rate 0.87 0.80 0.80 0.84 0.78 0.83
CTP10 - Link estimation 0.74 0.76 0.78 0.78 0.88 0.88
CTP11 - Best neighbor 0.78 0.77 0.79 0.78 0.86 0.84
CTP09 - Parent congestion 0.70 0.63 0.66 0.65 0.78 0.75
CTP04 - Received ACK pkts 0.74 0.64 0.62 0.64 0.77 0.74
CTP03 - Sent ACK pkts 0.65 0.64 0.66 0.65 0.70 0.73
CTP02 - Received data pkts 0.65 0.64 0.66 0.65 0.70 0.73
CTP01 - Sent data pkts 0.74 0.65 0.57 0.62 0.72 0.71
CTP06 - Dropped pkts 0.43 0.43 0.47 0.42 0.48 0.46
CTP05 - Received duplicates 0.27 0.19 0.18 0.24 0.24 0.31
CTP08 - Changing parent 0.20 0.16 0.13 0.16 0.22 0.19
Influence of the Density
The density within a specific testbed has only a minor influence on the metrics. The
results can be found in Appendix A.1.2.
Influence of the Traffic Intensity
The traffic intensity may have different effects on the metrics, depending on the specific
attack. For example, the blackhole is highly dependent on the number of packets
sent by other nodes. The results can be found in Appendix A.1.2. We notice that
the detection rates mainly increase for all attacks when more traffic is sent. This is
expected, as an attacker can stronger influence the network given higher traffic.
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Table 4.16: Detection rates CTP metrics - final testbed 2
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CTP12 - Number of neighbors 0.99 0.86 0.78 0.83 0.87 0.81
CTP10 - Link estimation 0.93 0.83 0.81 0.84 0.85 0.81
CTP11 - Best neighbor 0.86 0.83 0.79 0.80 0.83 0.81
CTP07 - Packet delivery rate 0.92 0.79 0.80 0.76 0.79 0.80
CTP04 - Received ACK pkts 0.92 0.85 0.64 0.67 0.84 0.67
CTP01 - Sent data pkts 0.97 0.87 0.59 0.60 0.85 0.65
CTP09 - Parent congestion 0.74 0.73 0.71 0.71 0.73 0.73
CTP03 - Sent ACK pkts 0.73 0.69 0.65 0.63 0.69 0.64
CTP02 - Received data pkts 0.73 0.69 0.65 0.63 0.69 0.64
CTP06 - Dropped pkts 0.51 0.50 0.50 0.48 0.50 0.49
CTP08 - Changing parent 0.40 0.32 0.20 0.22 0.29 0.23
CTP05 - Received duplicates 0.42 0.21 0.20 0.23 0.29 0.17
Influence of the Attacker Location and Start
In general, two attackers increase the detection rates, which is expected. The start
of the attack, however, did not show significant differences in detection rates. Even
though in the setting with no delay, an attacker has higher chances to prevent a WSN
from operating, the attack effects are still strong enough when starting the attack in
the middle of the test-run. In other settings, different from our setup, this behavior
may change. The results are presented in Appendix A.1.2.
Comparison to the Initial Tests
The results obtained with the larger testbeds are similar to those of the smaller testbeds.
The large majority of metrics, that reach at least class B quality in the initial tests,
are also among the best metrics with attack detection over 0.75 in the final tests (see
Table 4.17). Minor differences occur due to the size of the networks, some metrics
are only influenced significantly if they are direct neighbors of the attacker. Metrics
marked as N/A have not been analyzed in the initial tests. Hence, we have shown
that our identified metrics are widely applicable for attack detection.
Logistic Regression
In our final tests, there are three different groups of models that have been created
and evaluated using a logistic regression:
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Table 4.17: Comparison between the initial and the final tests: metrics of good quality for
attack detection
Final Tests Initial Tests
Best neighbor N/A
Link estimation Link estimation
Listen duty cycle Listen duty cycle
- Listen time
MAC received pkts MAC received pkts
MAC sent pkts MAC sent pkts
MCU energy MCU energy
MCU load MCU load
NET received pkts NET received pkts
NET sent pkts NET sent pkts
No. of neighbors No. of neighbors
Packet delivery rate Packet delivery rate
Parent congestion N/A
Radio energy Radio energy
Radio load Radio load
Received ACK pkts Received ACK pkts
- Received data pkts
RSSI RSSI
- Sent ACK pkts
Sent data pkts Sent data pkts
Transmit duty cycle Transmit duty cycle
- Transmit time
. Single nodes:
This analysis is the similar to the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney evaluation, because a
logistic regression model is created for each single node.
. All nodes:
In an attempt to create generally applicable models, we used the data of all
nodes as input.
. All neighboring nodes:
The last group consists of models, that only take the data of the direct neighbors
of the attacker into account.
For assessing the model fit, we now concentrate on McFaddens-R2, because it
is considered the most appropriate for logistic regression [Men02]. The calculated
McFaddens-R2 classifies the models in three categories:
. Bad models: returned a McFaddens-R2 of < 0.2
. Acceptable models: a McFaddens-R2 in the interval [0.2 − 0.4] indicates an
acceptable model fit
. Perfect models: a value of > 0.4 for the McFaddens-R2 represents a perfect
model fit
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Our analysis showed that the models created for all nodes do not perform well,
because there are nodes too distant from the attacker to be influenced significantly
(see Appendix A.1.3). Hence, in the following we concentrate on the single and
neighboring nodes. For each of the remaining two groups an overview is given
about the model quality for the specific attacks. In addition, the metrics are ranked
according to the number of occurences in the models. Finally, we show how many
metrics are included per model. A high count of metrics indicates that the models are
very specific, and detection in different settings may be difficult.
Single Nodes
Using the data of individual nodes as input, we create separate logistic regression
models for each node.
Table 4.18: Model quality - single nodes - basic metrics - final testbeds
Mesh CTP
Count Percent Count Percent
JammingCnst Bad model 59 0.056 33 0.032
Acceptable model 106 0.100 118 0.115
Perfect model 891 0.844 873 0.853
Sum usable models 997 0.944 991 0.968
JammingRnd Bad model 37 0.035 39 0.038
Acceptable model 160 0.152 172 0.168
Perfect model 859 0.813 813 0.794
Sum usable models 1019 0.965 985 0.962
JammingReact Bad model 191 0.181 148 0.145
Acceptable model 281 0.266 315 0.308
Perfect model 584 0.553 561 0.548
Sum usable models 865 0.819 876 0.855
SingleBlackhole Bad model 174 0.165 125 0.122
Acceptable model 311 0.295 298 0.291
Perfect model 571 0.541 601 0.587
Sum usable models 882 0.835 899 0.878
BlackholeReactJamming Bad model 132 0.250 46 0.090
Acceptable model 209 0.396 156 0.305
Perfect model 187 0.354 310 0.605
Sum usable models 396 0.750 466 0.910
BlackholeRndJamming Bad model 34 0.064 22 0.043
Acceptable model 107 0.203 102 0.199
Perfect model 387 0.733 388 0.758
Sum usable models 494 0.936 490 0.957
basic metrics Table 4.18 shows the results when using only the basic metrics in
the CTP and mesh setting. A usable model is defined as a model of at least acceptable
quality. The basic metrics obtained from the CTP runs show a mean percentage of
about 0.92 usable models, while this rate is reduced to about 0.87 in the mesh runs.
Table 4.19 presents the most frequently used basic metrics in the regression models.
The results are similar to the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test, especially metrics related
to network traffic are very useful.
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Table 4.19: Most often used basic metrics in all single node models - final testbeds
Metric Occurences (%)
B06 - NET sent pkts 84.4
B07 - NET received pkts 80.5
B01 - RSSI 67.5
B08 - MAC sent pkts 64.9
B13 - MCU energy 57.1
B09 - MAC received pkts 56.5
B11 - Radio energy 53.2
B04 - Transmit duty cycle 51.9
B05 - Listen duty cycle 46.7
B03 - Listen time 37.6
B10 - Invalid CRC 36.6
B02 - Transmit time 36.3
B12 - Radio load 32.4
B14 - MCU load 31.1
B15 - Contention drop 30.9
B18 - Too long pkts 23.8
B16 - Pending pkts 12.9
B17 - Too short pkts 6.4
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Figure 4.11: Count of metrics used in each model created for single nodes using basic metrics -
final testbeds
We now analyze how many metrics are included in each generated model. Fig-
ure 4.11 shows the distribution, the majority of models do not need more than 10
metrics. There are also models requiring only one metric and having at least an
acceptable model fit. The metric no. of sent packets on the MAC layer occurs in almost
400 models as a single metric, and thus is well-suited to differentiate between attack
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and no-attack. In addition, the metrics MCU energy and radio energy appear as single
metrics in a smaller number of models (about 25 models in total). Taking a closer look
at which attacks can be detected by solely using the no. of sent packets on the MAC
layer as metric, we find that it can detect a constant jammer reliably.
Table 4.20: Model quality - single nodes - protocol specific metrics - final testbeds
Mesh CTP
Count Percent Count Percent
JammingCnst Bad model 92 0.087 1 0.001
Acceptable model 121 0.115 9 0.009
Perfect model 843 0.798 1014 0.990
Sum usable models 964 0.913 1023 0.999
JammingRnd Bad model 104 0.098 1 0.001
Acceptable model 280 0.265 22 0.021
Perfect model 672 0.636 1001 0.978
Sum usable models 952 0.902 1023 0.999
JammingReact Bad model 310 0.294 6 0.006
Acceptable model 430 0.407 42 0.041
Perfect model 316 0.299 976 0.953
Sum usable models 746 0.706 1018 0.994
SingleBlackhole Bad model 269 0.255 6 0.006
Acceptable model 463 0.438 41 0.040
Perfect model 324 0.307 977 0.954
Sum usable models 787 0.745 1018 0.994
BlackholeReactJamming Bad model 121 0.229 1 0.002
Acceptable model 194 0.367 8 0.016
Perfect model 213 0.403 503 0.982
Sum usable models 407 0.771 511 0.998
BlackholeRndJamming Bad model 29 0.055 0 0.000
Acceptable model 99 0.188 5 0.010
Perfect model 400 0.758 507 0.990
Sum usable models 499 0.945 512 1.000
protocol metrics From Table 4.20 we observe that using the CTP metrics, a
large number of usable models can be created for all tested attacks. The metrics of the
mesh protocol have more difficulties to detect the reactive jammer, the blackhole, as
well as a combination of both. The results of the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests also
using single nodes as input are similar.
Table 4.21 shows the relevant metrics using the CTP. Out of the CTP specific metrics,
the number of neighbors and the packet delivery rate appear in many models.
An interesting finding is, that the metric sent ACK pkts is never included in the
logistic regression models, but it had a detection rate of 0.69 according to the Wilcoxon-
Mann-Whitney test. This means that other metrics capture the effects of this metric as
well.
Including the CTP metrics during model creation leads to a large number of models
containing only one metric, as can be seen in Figure 4.12. Metrics such as the packet
delivery rate have the ability to detect attacks without further metrics.
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Table 4.21: Most often used CTP metrics in all single node models - final testbeds
Metric Occurences (%)
B06 - NET sent pkts 59.3
B07 - NET received pkts 57.9
B01 - RSSI 49.6
B08 - MAC sent pkts 44.8
B13 - MCU energy 42.7
B11 - Radio energy 40.6
B09 - MAC received pkts 40.0
B04 - Transmit duty cycle 35.8
B05 - Listen duty cycle 34.4
CTP12 - Number of neighbors 31.7
CTP07 - Packet delivery rate 28.9
B12 - Radio load 28.2
B10 - Invalid CRC 27.5
B14 - MCU load 26.2
B03 - Listen time 26.0
B02 - Transmit time 25.8
CTP11 - Best neighbor 24.8
B15 - Contention drop 22.0
CTP10 - Link estimation 19.3
B18 - Too long pkts 15.8
CTP09 - Parent congestion 15.5
CTP02 - Received data pkts 11.7
CTP04 - Received ACK pkts 11.6
CTP01 - Sent data pkts 9.6
B16 - Pending pkts 8.2
CTP08 - Changing parent 5.5
CTP06 - Dropped pkts 5.3
B17 - Too short pkts 4.1
CTP05 - Received duplicates 4.0
CTP03 - Sent ACK pkts 0.2
Regarding the mesh metrics, their overall performance is very similar to those of
the basic metrics (see Table 4.22). The two mesh metrics are frequently used in the
models, but the basic metrics transmitted and received packets on the network layer
are more significant.
Comparing the number of metrics per model to the CTP setting, we notice that the
amount of models using only one metric is significantly reduced (see Figure 4.13).
This is because also the basic metrics are influenced by the higher level checks of the
CTP for packet successful reception. Using the mesh protocol, the positive influence
of these mechanisms is lacking.
All Neighboring Nodes
The models created for single nodes turned out to be very good. The only drawback
is, that they are very node specific. To solve this problem and to obtain more generally
usable metrics, the logistic regression function was given the aggregated data of all
70 measuring the impact of denial-of-service attacks
0 10 20 30
0
500
1000
1500
metrics per model
co
u
n
t
Figure 4.12: Count of metrics used in each model created for single nodes using CTP metrics -
final testbeds
Table 4.22: Most often used mesh metrics in all single node models - final testbeds
Metric Occurences (%)
B06 - NET sent pkts 59.4
B07 - NET received pkts 58.1
B01 - RSSI 50.0
B08 - MAC sent pkts 44.5
B13 - MCU energy 41.8
B11 - Radio energy 40.5
B09 - MAC received pkts 39.1
M02 - No. of routing entries 37.8
B04 - Transmit duty cycle 35.1
M01 - No. of direct neighbors 34.9
B05 - Listen duty cycle 33.7
B12 - Radio load 28.3
B10 - Invalid CRC 27.9
B14 - MCU load 25.9
B03 - Listen time 25.7
B02 - Transmit time 25.3
B15 - Contention drop 21.6
B18 - Too long pkts 16.2
B16 - Pending pkts 8.1
B17 - Too short pkts 4.0
nodes as input. However, the model quality turned out to be bad because of the range
of the attack on the network. Whereas the direct neighbors of the attacker exhibit
significant changes in their metrics when under attack, the very distant nodes may not
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Figure 4.13: Count of metrics used in each model created for single nodes using mesh metrics
- final testbeds
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detect any changes in the network at all. Including these distant nodes in the model
creation phase proved to be a disadvantage, as can be seen in Appendix A.1.3.
Therefore, in this section we analyze the logistic regression models created taking
only the neighboring nodes of the attacker into account. Table 4.23 shows all the nodes
which are one-hop away from an attacker.
The most often used metrics in the models created for neighboring nodes are similar
to the single node setting. However, they typically require more metrics per model.
This holds for basic, CTP, as well as mesh metrics. The corresponding results are
shown in Appendix A.1.4. The most promising models are obtained when using
protocol-specific metrics, especially CTP metrics. Figure A.5 reveals that several
models using the CTP require less than 6 metrics per model and thus outperform the
mesh metrics as shown in Figure A.6.
basic metrics The amount of usable models for detecting an attack, when fo-
cussing on the basic metrics, is shown in Table 4.24. Except for the models created for
the constant as well as the random jamming, the amount of usable models is reduced
compared to the models created for single nodes.
protocol metrics Table 4.25 shows that the CTP produces perfect models more
often than using the mesh. Even though also the mesh protocol is able to detect the
jammers, the amount of usable models for blackhole and combined blackhole attackers
is low. These results are in line with the initial tests, showing that the mesh protocol
metrics cannot offer a good blackhole detection, even when using a combination of
multiple metrics.
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Table 4.23: Attacker neighbors
Final testbed 1
Node Attacker
6 5
7 5
10 23
14 23
16 23
19 23
20 23
21 23
24 23
25 23
26 23
27 23
28 23
29 23
30 23
31 23
32 23
Final testbed 2
Node Attacker
11 27
12 27
17 27
19 27
20 27
21 27
22 27
25 27
26 27
28 27
29 56
32 56
33 56
35 56
36 27
38 56
49 56
51 56
53 56
54 56
57 56
58 56
4.5 ids
We now describe the fully localized IDS, which does not rely on collaboration. There-
fore, we present the system, its storage requirements, its computation time, and
its energy consumption in Section 4.5.1. Next, we discuss the models selected for
intrusion detection in Section 4.5.2. Finally, we evaluate the IDS in Section 4.5.3.
4.5.1 Implementation
In this section, we implement an IDS on the nodes based on the usage of the previously
created logistic regression models. Hence, we do not calculate the models on the
nodes, but let them evaluate the existing models using the steps already presented in
Section 4.4.1:
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Table 4.24: Model quality - neighboring nodes - basic metrics - final testbeds
Mesh CTP
Count Percent Count Percent
JammingCnst Bad model 0 0.000 0 0.000
Acceptable model 0 0.000 0 0.000
Perfect model 32 1.000 32 1.000
Sum usable models 32 1.000 32 1.000
JammingRnd Bad model 5 0.156 5 0.156
Acceptable model 20 0.625 18 0.563
Perfect model 7 0.219 9 0.281
Sum usable models 27 0.844 27 0.844
JammingReact Bad model 21 0.656 25 0.781
Acceptable model 7 0.219 3 0.094
Perfect model 4 0.125 4 0.125
Sum usable models 11 0.344 7 0.219
SingleBlackhole Bad model 26 0.813 19 0.594
Acceptable model 5 0.156 10 0.313
Perfect model 1 0.031 3 0.094
Sum usable models 6 0.188 13 0.406
BlackholeReactJamming Bad model 16 1.000 9 0.563
Acceptable model 0 0.000 7 0.438
Perfect model 0 0.000 0 0.000
Sum usable models 0 0.000 7 0.438
BlackholeRndJamming Bad model 8 0.500 11 0.688
Acceptable model 0 0.000 5 0.313
Perfect model 8 0.500 0 0.000
Sum usable models 8 0.500 5 0.313
Given: Regression coefficients β0, . . . ,βk and
Given: data set x1, . . . , xk
Step 1: Creation of the logit model
Step 4: η = β0 +β1 · x1 + ·+βk · xk
Step 2: Calculation of the logit η
Step 3: Calculation of the logistic function
Step 4: Πˆi = 11+e−η
Step 4: Decision
Step 4: If Πˆi > 0.5 −→ Attack detected
Implementing these steps requires only a single funtion, resulting in few lines of
code. This function is given the current metric readings. A for loop iterating over all
metric readings is needed in order to calculate the logit model. Calculating the logistic
function is performed in three steps. The first step involves inverting the sign of the
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Table 4.25: Model quality - neighboring nodes - protocol specific metrics - final testbeds
Mesh CTP
Count Percent Count Percent
JammingCnst Bad model 0 0.000 0 0.000
Acceptable model 0 0.000 0 0.000
Perfect model 32 1.000 32 1.000
Sum usable models 32 1.000 32 1.000
JammingRnd Bad model 2 0.063 0 0.000
Acceptable model 20 0.625 12 0.375
Perfect model 10 0.313 20 0.625
Sum usable models 30 0.938 32 1.000
JammingReact Bad model 22 0.688 15 0.469
Acceptable model 6 0.188 9 0.281
Perfect model 4 0.125 8 0.250
Sum usable models 10 0.313 17 0.531
SingleBlackhole Bad model 28 0.875 9 0.281
Acceptable model 3 0.094 6 0.188
Perfect model 1 0.031 17 0.531
Sum usable models 4 0.125 23 0.719
BlackholeReactJamming Bad model 16 1.000 4 0.250
Acceptable model 0 0.000 5 0.313
Perfect model 0 0.000 7 0.438
Sum usable models 0 0.000 12 0.750
BlackholeRndJamming Bad model 8 0.500 3 0.188
Acceptable model 0 0.000 5 0.313
Perfect model 8 0.500 8 0.500
Sum usable models 8 0.500 13 0.813
logit model, before e−η is calculated. For that purpose, an extra math library has to be
loaded in Contiki for providing floating point arithmetics. Finally, the logistic function
is calculated and evaluated by an if-condition.
ROM and RAM Usage
One key aspect of the developed IDS is to be lightweight. Hence, the additional ROM
and RAM consumption which is introduced by the IDS is measured in this section.
Table 4.26 compares the ROM and RAM consumption of the baseline Contiki without
IDS to the IDS used with a different amount of metrics.
The increase of about 8056 bytes when adding the IDS is mainly due to the needed
math libraries for floating point arithmetic. Every metric which is added leads to an
increase of about 20 to 38 bytes. This increase per metric is slightly different, because
the applied compiler parameters and optimizations affect the firmware image size.
Per metric, the RAM usage increases by 4 bytes, which corresponds to the needed
amount for one variable of the type double. Given that the required math library is
not already loaded, an IDS image which makes use of one metric leads to an increase
of the firmware size by about 26 % as compared to the baseline image. However, an
option is to import only the code for the powf() function instead of the whole library.
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Table 4.26: IDS ROM and RAM usage
Image ROM in bytes RAM in bytes
Contiki without IDS 30164 6848
IDS with 1 metric 38220 6852
IDS with 2 metrics 38280 6856
IDS with 3 metrics 38320 6860
IDS with 5 metrics 38382 6868
IDS with 10 metrics 38586 6888
IDS with 15 metrics 38776 6908
IDS with 20 metrics 38956 6928
IDS with 25 metrics 39088 6948
Each added metric increases the image slightly by about 0.1%. In our setting, the node
started to refuse to boot with an amount of 700 metrics.
IDS Computation Time and Energy Consumption
We measure the clock ticks needed for the IDS function call, using between 1 and
25 different metrics. It takes four to five clock ticks to perform this task, which is
between about 31 ms and 39 ms. The most expensive computation is the floating point
arithmetic to exponentiate using powf(). Next, we measure the additional energy
consumption of the IDS. The lowest energy consumption was obtained for one metric,
resulting in about 330 µJ per IDS function call. If 25 metrics are used, the energy
consumption is about 463 µJ. In cases when the result of the calculated logit model
was largely negative, the powf() call simply returned the value 0 without actually
calculating. In such situations, the energy consumption highly decreased to about
100 µJ.
4.5.2 Selected Model
In order to evaluate the applicability of different models for attack detection, we have
chosen them according to the number of metrics used and the resulting model quality.
We expect models with few metrics to perform better in a similar, but different testing
environment than the environment they have been created for. The main performance
metrics are the false-positive as well as the detection rates. In addition, we analyze
the time it takes to detect the attack. The scenario we investigate has the following
properties:
. Testbed: Final testbed 1
. Protocol: CTP
. Transmission power: High
. Traffic intensity: Low
This testbed was chosen because the environment is more challenging, and therefore
the attack detection is harder. With the CTP, we expect to be able to detect the blackhole
attack better than with the mesh protocol.
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We concentrate on detecting the constant jammer, the blackhole, as well as the
combination of blackhole and random jammer. For each of these attacker models, we
focus on logistic regression models that have been created by analyzing the data of
the direct neighbors of the attacker.
Constant Jammer
As we can observe from Table 4.27, two out of the four available models involve just
one metric for attack detection, while at the same time they achieve a perfect model
quality. These single metrics are respresented by the packet delivery rate and the
number of sent packets on the MAC layer, respectively. The packet delivery rate
exhibits significantly different values when the attack occurs. However, there is a high
variation for each node, which is not the case for the number of sent packets on the
MAC layer. Hence, we choose the bold printed model in Table 4.27 for evaluation.
Table 4.27: Constant jammer models
Parameter Model quality Count of used metrics
Inner attacker, no delay 0.99 1: CTP07 - Packet delivery ratio
Inner attacker, delay 0.99 1: B08 - MAC sent pkts
Both attackers, no delay 0.94 18
Both attackers, delay 0.84 24
Blackhole
For the blackhole attack, we again selected a model with a perfect model quality, this
time using more than one metric. This bold printed model is shown in Table 4.28.
Blackhole and Random Jammer
The number of available models is reduced to two when using the combined attackers.
While both models require a similar amount of metrics, only the first model has a
perfect model quality. The details of the selected bold printed model are shown in
Table 4.29.
Table 4.28: Blackhole models
Parameter Model quality Count of used metrics
Inner attacker, no delay 0.99 6
Both attackers, no delay 0.73 22
Inner attacker, delay 0.51 16
Both attackers,delay 0.28 21
Table 4.29: Blackhole and random jammer models
Parameter Model quality Count of used metrics
Both attackers, no delay 0.47 20
Both attackers, delay 0.07 21
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4.5.3 Evaluation
Figure 4.14: Mote placement in the IDS evaluation testbed
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Next, we deploy the selected models to real sensor nodes. We use a similar, but
different (see below for a description) testbed for our experiments. The testbed
parameters for evaluating the IDS models are as follows:
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Figure 4.15: False-positives for model 1 (constant jammer)
. Testbed: Similar to final testbed 1
. Protocol: CTP
. Transmission power: High
. Traffic: Low
. Attacker location: Outer and inner
. Attack delay: No delay
. Repetitions: 5
Note that the evaluated models partly have been created with different parameters.
There is also a change in the network topology, because four nodes have been replaced,
as shown in Figure 4.14. Nodes marked in green have been added, while nodes marked
in orange have been removed, as compared to the final testbed 1. The attacking nodes
remain the same. We start the evaluation with running the IDS in a setting without
attackers, in order to determine the false-positive rates. The detection function is
always called after a node has updated its metrics, i.e., every 4 seconds. Each test-run
has a duration of 15 minutes and is repeated five times for each scenario.
Neutral Runs
The false-positive rate for each model is tracked directly from the start of the test-run,
including the initialization phase where the network is established. Since there is no
attacker present, no attack should be detected.
model 1 - constant jammer - false-positives The false-positive rate for
the constant jammer detection model is depicted in Figure 4.15. For most of the nodes
we achieve a false-positive rate of 0%.
model 2 - blackhole - false-positives Although only a few good regres-
sion models have been created for the blackhole attack, the false-positive rate is in
general low (see Figure 4.16). Recall that the blackhole was one of the attacks that are
difficult to detect with the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test.
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model 3 - blackhole + random jammer - false-positives The model
resulting from the combination of blackhole and random jammer included 20 metrics.
Still, the false-positive rate shown in Figure 4.17 is rather low.
Attack Runs
This section is devoted to describe the evaluation of the the attack runs, with a present
attacker. The detection rate is defined as percentage of correctly identified attacks,
given the periodic metric measurements, and is averaged over the 5 different test-runs.
Nodes marked with a "*" are neighbors of an attacker.
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Figure 4.18: Model 1 - constant jammer - detection rate
attack detection - model 1 - constant jammer The constant jammer
can reliably be detected on certain nodes, as can be seen in Figure 4.18. The outer
attacker at node 5 influenced its neighbors significantly, while the attacker at node 23
was difficult to detect. The density around node 5 is lower, indicating that the model
is able to better identify the attacker if fewer normal traffic is observed. The detection
time of the neighboring node 3 is about one minute, measured from the start of the
test-run. After the network has stabilized (which takes about one minute), the attack
is almost instantly detected.
attack detection - model 2 - blackhole The detection of the blackhole
attack performs quite well, a large number of nodes detect the attack as shown in
Figure 4.19. This is especially true for the neighboring nodes of the attacker, but also
some non-neighbors identified the attack. The detection time is very similar to the
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Figure 4.16: False-positives for model 2 (blackhole)
80 measuring the impact of denial-of-service attacks
1 2 3 6 7 8 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 24 25 26 30 31 32 33 36 37 50 51 52 53
0
0.3
0.6
0.9
node id
fa
lse
−p
os
itiv
e 
ra
te
Figure 4.17: False-positives for model 3 (blackhole + random jammer)
constant jammer. During the first minute, the detection alternates between true and
false, and then stabilizes.
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Figure 4.19: Model 2 - blackhole - detection rate
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Figure 4.20: Model 3 - blackhole and random jammer - detection rate
attack detection - model 3 - blackhole and random jammer The de-
tection rates for the combination of blackhole and random jammer are very low. This
is due to the large number of metrics that are needed in the model, it cannot be
generalized to other wireless sensor networks. Yet, the nodes near the random jammer
at node 5 did detect the attack, as shown in Figure 4.20. In contrast to that, the
blackhole at node 23 has not been detected.
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4.6 discussion
Except for the metric dealing with too short packets, all other metrics we tested
with the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test are at least able to detect the jamming attack.
The distinction capabilities in the case of a blackhole attack are a little worse, as the
metric classification exhibits. The reason for these results is the different types of
attacks. Jamming targets the physical or low layer communication medium, while
the blackhole is an attack on the routing algorithms at higher layers. Therefore, it
is difficult to find indications for a blackhole at the lower layers. One of the best
blackhole metrics in the collect network is the link estimation, which measures the
link quality to the neighbors with expected transmissions to the sink as cost metric.
Routing algorithms make use of these values on higher layers. Therefore, the link
estimation provides information about network anomalies with regard to manipulated
values. For this reason, the metric might also have detection capabilities for sinkholes
and wormholes, being also based on the same traffic attracting scheme.
The received packet rate on the MAC layer, counting all received regular packets
using the radio chip, is another metric that can detect jamming attacks. The imple-
mented attacker uses regular packets for the jamming, which is the reason for the
highly increased values in the jamming scenarios. If a jammer uses a random signal
without any packet structure, this metric might be unsuitable for jamming detection.
Regarding the results of the IDS using logistic regression models, we have shown
that some models are general enough to detect attacks in different networks than
they have been created for. We want to emphasize that the same IDS image was
uploaded to all nodes, which has been created taking into account the data of the
neighbors of the attacker. If a node-specific model would have been used in the same
testbed the data has been gathered with, we expect even better results with regard
to false-positives and detection rates. However, it may be limited to very similar
networks.
As we have seen, in the final tests it was necessary to change the metric classification
that has been originally applied in the initial tests. In larger testbeds, depending
on the attack, there are nodes that are too distant from the attacker, and hence their
metrics are not influenced significantly. For the same reason, including such nodes in
the model generation of the logistic regression is a disadvantage. It was further shown,
that in many cases the combination of metrics leads to better results with regard to
attack detection. However, in certain scenarios, e.g., using the CTP, a single metric can
effectively differentiate between attack and no attack. If many metrics are included in
a model, there is a higher probability that it is overfitted to the training data. From
the above mentioned observations we can derive guidelines on how to design the
IDS: (1) when building the model, the focus should be on nodes that are close to the
attacker, and (2) models with fewer metrics should be preferred over models with a
better statistical model quality, but with a larger number of metrics, if it is desired to
create a model that can be applied to slightly different networks.
4.7 related work
Apart from the works mentioned in Chapter 3, the closest approach to ours has
recently been presented in [PAS+14]. The authors detect jamming attacks in IEEE
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802.11 networks with the assistance of a machine learning algorithm. Similar to us, they
analyze the impact of jamming attacks on the system performance by investigating six
metrics that are either directly influenced by the attacks, or that support the attack
decision. However, the paper does not focus on identifying the most significant metrics
for attack detection. In a training phase, data is collected and then provided to the
machine learning algorithms for model creation. The authors focus on a classifier
called Random Forests, which is based on decision trees. The detection accuracy is
improved by including all metrics in the learning process instead of a single metric.
Deploying the created models to the devices allows an on-the-fly jamming detection.
4.8 summary
In this chapter, the effects of DoS attacks on a large number of distinct performance
and network metrics in WSNs are studied in a systematic way. We identify widely
applicable metrics and verify that they show a significantly different behavior under
attack when compared to the baseline operation. The local metrics are able to detect
jamming and blackhole attacks in a lightweight and practical way, since they are
easily obtained without incurring too much overhead. Most of the metrics are already
calculated by the lower network layers. Hence, it is possible to directly implement
the intrusion detection mechanisms in the operating system of the sensor nodes to
locally detect network anomalies. Unlike our proposed intrusion detection systems in
Chapters 5 and 6, this system is immediately working and does not require a start-up
phase. There is no need for communication with other nodes, it is fully localized.
Using models with few metrics proved to be more accurate than using models with
multiple metrics. While the overhead of the IDS is very low, attackers can be detected
reliably. We have shown that some of the created logistic regression models generalize
to WSNs with similar, but different topologies and setups.
We identify the packet delivery rate as a decisive metric to distinguish between
attacking and normal scenario. Other highly significant metrics for jamming detection
are the listen time and the number of neighbors; both can detect the attack on all
nodes in the initial testbeds, and across all combinations of parameters. The effects of
the blackhole attack are more locally restricted, yet we find several highly significant
metrics that are able to detect the attack on selected nodes. Examples include the
number of sent/received data packets, the link estimation of the best neighbor, and
the radio energy consumption.
We focused on lightweight detection of two denial-of-service attacks, however, our
approach to identify the quality of the metrics will also work to identify attacks
other than DoS, thus paving the way to practical lightweight IDSs in wireless sensor
networks.
5
T O K E N - B A S E D I N T R U S I O N D E T E C T I O N
Without deviation from the norm,
progress is not possible.
F. Zappa
After having identified useful features for intrusion detection in wireless sensor net-
works in Chapter 4, in the following two chapters we focus on novel IDS architectures.
Recently, applications such as distributed data mining [FCG10] or volcanic earth-
quake timing using wireless sensor networks [LTZ+13] have been introduced that
require the execution of resource-intensive algorithms. As a consequence, the energy
remaining for performing intrusion detection is reduced. Our work in this chapter
is based on [RYBH14] and aims at reducing the workload of the nodes by adding
randomization to the execution of tasks. For example, heavyweight operations are
only carried out upon special triggering. For that purpose we introduce Patrol, a
system based on tokens passed around the network, which instruct the nodes to
execute special tasks. After visiting a node, the token continues its walk through the
network. As a proof-of-concept, we develop a lightweight, decentralized intrusion
detection algorithm, analyzing a single metric which proved to be useful in detecting
denial-of-service attacks such as blackhole and flooding. In detail, a profile of the
normal energy consumption of each node is calculated. We show that even with
randomized intrusion detection, flooding and blackhole attacks can be detected very
fast. Using Patrol, the nodes only temporally perform intrusion detection, reducing
computational effort and distributing load across nodes.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 5.1, we present the
system overview. Section 5.2 is devoted to describing Patrol in detail. Therefore, we
show our basic setup, the security mechanisms we have implemented, and the token
communication. We then analyze the token distribution from a mathematical point of
view in Section 5.3. Next, in Section 5.4, we propose an efficient intrusion detection
algorithm and show that the energy consumption can be used as a sole metric for
the detection of flooding attacks. In Section 5.5, we evaluate the Patrol architecture
and the intrusion detection system. Directly related work is discussed in Section 5.6.
Finally, some concluding remarks are outlined in Section 5.7.
5.1 system overview
This section is devoted to the presentation of the network and attacker models, the
assumptions and requirements, and the brief description of Patrol.
5.1.1 Network Model
Our system design is suited for arbitrary wireless sensor networks, we do not impose
any restrictions on node capabilities, topology, or routing protocols. Each node has to
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be aware of its neighbors. We consider a network in which each node can eventually
be reached, i.e., all nodes need to be connected. The base station is required for the
token management.
5.1.2 General Attacker Model
We assume that an attacker can delete tokens from the network, which would prevent
the execution of the desired functionality. It is also possible that the adversary
replays tokens in order to cause DoS by letting the nodes perform the specified tasks
exhaustively. We further assume that the base station cannot be compromised.
5.1.3 Specific Assumptions and Requirements
Leveraging tokens, we have specific assumptions and requirements. At the system
start-up, a node can hold an arbitrary number of tokens. Every token has a unique
name. Thus, we are able to differentiate between tokens. This allows the use of
multiple tokens possibly activating different functionalities.
As a proof-of-concept application, we introduce a novel and lightweight IDS in-
tended to detect DoS attacks such as jamming and blackhole. The primary goal is
to minimize the computations for intrusion detection. Similarly, the communication
overhead must be kept at a reasonable level, i.e., we transmit audit data only to the
direct neighborhood of each node. We assume that the power consumption is relatively
constant, and that an adversary can mount attacks influencing the power consumption.
Therefore, our IDS is not applicable for each WSN scenario. It is most appropriate
for environmental monitoring settings with regular measurement and transmitting
patterns as in [TPS+05]. However, it may not be suited for area surveillance, where
intensive event-based activity may trigger false detection.
Furthermore, we assume that the attacker may compromise a node and is able to
alter its energy readings. However, he cannot change the transmitted data of other
nodes without physically capturing them. We also assume that the majority of nodes
is well-behaving. The attacker can employ multiple, possibly colluding malicious
nodes at different locations and may also change their positions. Note that Patrol
can be extended with other intrusion detection algorithms that cover different types
of attacks. The assumptions and requirements outlined above are specific to the
proof-of-concept application.
5.1.4 Patrol Overview
Patrol relies on tokens being exchanged between nodes. Upon receiving a token, a
node will activate a pre-deployed algorithm. In the remainder of this chapter we focus
on activating IDS functionality, however, Patrol is not limited to security tasks. Our
design has several advantages:
. Each node may perform intrusion detection, we do not require dedicated security
nodes.
. The load is distributed across all nodes in the network.
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. Multiple intrusion detection algorithms can be activated via different tokens,
allowing a very flexible configuration of desired functionalities.
. The token authorizes a node for attack detection.
All messages are authenticated and integrity-protected. Further information about
the security mechanisms are given in Section 5.2.2. Patrol has been implemented on
Contiki [DGV04].
5.2 patrol architecture
We now present Patrol in detail. Therefore, after showing the basic setup, we describe
the lightweight security mechanisms used to protect Patrol. Finally, we explain the
implementation of the token communication.
5.2.1 Basic Setup
Tokens are assigned to the nodes by the base station. We assume that each node
has at least one neighbor and at least one node holds a token. When a user-defined
delay has passed, the token is transmitted to a random node. However, different
forwarding strategies can be applied as well (see Section 5.5.2). Our architecture
allows one or more tokens to be used at the same time. The underlying application
we use for testing our architecture relies on (1) broadcasting the energy consumption
to all direct neighbors of a node (required for our intrusion detection algorithm), and
(2) broadcasting regular dummy traffic to resemble a real deployment (unicasting
would make no difference). The messages sent are protected, details are given in what
follows.
5.2.2 Security Mechanisms
The messages of the nodes are authenticated and integrity-protected using hash
chains, which automatically renew themselves. Every node knows all the hash
chain anchors (h0) of its direct neighbors, which can be used to authenticate them.
Every protected message has a prepended initialization vector (IV) of 8 bytes and
an appended hash chain value of 20 bytes. The data itself and the hash chain value
are encrypted using Salsa20/20 [Ber08] (256 bit key) to ensure integrity (through
inherent diffusion of the algorithm) and authentication (through hash chain value).
The message secrecy is also guaranteed through Salsa20/20, but is of minor importance
in our system. The individual pseudo-random IV for every message consists of the
message type and a pseudo-random number. We use SHA-1 as the hash algorithm.
The Salsa20/20 routines consume about 5454 bytes, while SHA-1 requires about 2690
bytes. En-/Decrypting 64 bytes with Salsa20/20 takes about 6ms on the TelosB motes.
Approximately the same amount of time is needed for hashing 20 bytes with SHA-1.
We choose Salsa20/20 for efficiency reasons, the AES implementation on the TelosB
mote needs more ROM and is consistently slower than Salsa20/20 [Ber08].
The keys and hash chain anchors are initially distributed by the nodes at the start-up.
We assume that this distribution is secure and that the nodes are aware of their poten-
tial neighbors, e.g., by using common protocols such as the collection tree [GFJ+09]
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and the mesh protocol, or by relying on the routing information provided by the
employed application. Alternatively, the keys/hash chains can be predeployed, which
would further reduce the code size. The integration of standard key management
schemes such as LEAP+ [ZSJ06] is also possible.
We propose the following mechanisms as countermeasures to an attacker deleting
and replaying tokens. A node sends an authenticated status message to the sink
indicating that it received a token. Whenever a system-defined threshold is passed
without seeing such a status message, a new token has to be generated by the base
station. Hence, it is not possible to remove all tokens without being detected, given
that an adversary cannot compromise the whole network. Less overhead would be
introduced, if instead of sending status messages, each token would be assigned
a time to live mechanism. When a token reaches the end of its lifetime, it simply
stops forwarding itself and a new token is created by the base station. To protect
against replay attacks, sequence numbers are used. Besides, each node only accepts a
well-defined number of tokens within a given period.
5.2.3 Token Communication
In our architecture, it is necessary to define one or more nodes that hold tokens
initially before the start-up. These nodes act as token distributors and send the tokens
to one of their direct neighbors. Currently, we choose this neighbor randomly. If an
attacker compromises a node holding the token and does not forward it, this would
be detected by Patrol since we expect a status message from each node upon token
reception.
As we test our system in a real-world testbed, we are facing the problem of unidi-
rectional links, e.g., A can reach B, but the opposite link is not functional. Therefore,
in our sample application presented in Section 5.4, we maintain a neighbor list created
from the broadcast messages each node overhears. Tokens are only accepted if they
are sent by a node in the neighbor list, which is maintained independently from the
routing protocol and updated frequently. The node must receive a message from the
neighbor regularly, otherwise the neighbor is removed from the list. However, in our
initial tests, not all tokens could be transmitted successfully due to the unidirectional
link.
To compensate for this and other interference, we add two mechanisms. First, we
unicast the token with the highest transmission power provided by the CC2420 radio
chip (0 dBm). Second, after sending the token we wait for acknowledgment. In case
that the acknowledgment does not arrive, we repeat the token sending for at most two
times. If the whole process of token sending fails, we instruct the initial receiver to
drop the token—if it was received— by sending so-called token-cancel packets for at
most three times. Then we try to pass the token on to another node.
The adding of token-cancel packets achieves a higher probability that both commu-
nication sides share the same token state, given a unidirectional link. For example,
consider node A sending a token to node B. When the link is unidirectional and we
do not use token-cancel packets, it is possible that node B actually received the token
while node A considers it is not accepted. Since links are bursty, given the token is
transferred successfully, it is also very likely that the token-cancel packets are received
successfully. Hence, both sides will have the consensus that the token should not be
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transferred over this link. Besides, a node checks if it has a specific token already.
When that is the case, it will reject the token. As a consequence, intrusion detection is
not performed consecutively on one node.
Patrol with CTP
When adapting Patrol to be used with the collection tree protocol, there are some
challenges caused by the characteristics of CTP which will be covered in what follows.
Patrol and the sample application are based on broadcasting and unicasting. In
detail, the topology is highly connected due to the broadcasted messages and this
implies a rather large neighborhood. The token distribution relies on the neighborhood
table, to be precise, the node holding the token chooses a node in its neighborhood
and sends the token via unicast. Compared to such a large neighborhood, CTP tries
to build up a topology which is minimally connected, this means that the perfect
topology is achieved if every node is reachable by at most one link. Hence, the
problem is that a node’s nighborhood consists of only one other node, which is its
parent. Thus, the token can only be sent to the parent and finally it will reach the base
station, in other words, a dead end.
The main issue to solve is a node’s lack of information regarding the neighborhood.
A possible solution is to propagate information about the topology. This can be done
at lower layers, for example, the network layer, or at higher layers by establishing a
communication channel and providing neighborhood information via messages. We
have chosen the latter one, since we did not want to change the original CTP code for
compatibility reasons.
In our implementation, the first step is to change Patrol’s original communications,
which are based on broadcasting, to the unicast-based CTP, therefore resulting in CTP
forming the network.
The next step is to generate a node’s neighborhood table to look up the possible
recipients of the token. This neighborhood table has to be updated with addresses
of the node’s parent and children. The addresses of the children can be obtained if a
child reports its address to the parent. This is realized in the following way:
. Establish a new communication channel based on unicast
. Look up the parent’s address
. Send the own address to the parent
Afterwards, the parent node will receive the addresses of all children and can add
them to the neighborhood table.
5.3 token distribution
We start this section by presenting a proper mathematical framework in order to
model the token distribution induced by our proposal. Due to the structure of wireless
sensor networks and the fact, that the WSN topology can be modeled by a directed
graph, we adopt the Markov Chain model. In particular, we denote a directed graph
by G = (V ,E) consisting of a finite set of states V = {Ni | i ∈ N}, |V | = d < ∞ each
associated to a single sensor node in the sensor network. Two nodes Ni and Nj are
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said to be neighbors, if there exists at least one directed edge ei,j ∈ E defining a link
between two of them.
According to our token-based approach, as indicated above, any sensor node
Ni ∈ V in the network that holds a token is required to forward it after some fixed
time period to a neighbor Nj. The Markov Chain model is applied for selecting the
next neighbor, which receives the token in the next transition. More specifically, each
neighbor obtains the token with probability pi,j, where pi,j = P(Xt = Nj | Xt−1 = Ni)
denotes the transition probability of transmitting the token from node Ni to Nj. In
order to keep track of the token, we introduce the random variable Xt, which points
to the position of the token after the t-th move. As a consequence of the Markov
property (memoryless property), we have P(Xt+1 = Nij | Xt = Nij−1) = P(Xt+1 =
Nij | Xt = Nij−1 , . . . ,X0 = Ni0), which particularly states that the transition probability
of any move depends only on the actual state and not on previous moves. In many
mathematical applications one considers the so-called transition matrix P containing
all transition probabilities, with zeros on the diagonal because forwarding the token
to oneself is prohibited. The row i of matrix P is filled with the transition probabilities
pi,16j6d from state Ni to any neighbor Nj represented by column j:
P =

p1,1 . . . p1,d
...
. . .
...
pd,1 . . . pd,d
 .
The dimension d of the matrix is equal to the number of nodes. Furthermore, the
entries within a row sum up to 1. The initial state at the beginning of the algorithm
is chosen uniformly at random over the set of states V with p0,j = 1/d. As a result,
we obtain the initial vector ~v(0) = (v(0)0 , . . . , v
(0)
d ) = (
1
d , . . . ,
1
d) that is filled at position
1 6 j 6 d with the probability for the state Nj to be selected in the initial phase. In
general, ~v(n) is filled with the probabilities of any state to be chosen after the n-th
move. This vector can efficiently be determined via
~v(n) = P ·~v(n−1) = Pn ·~v(0) .
Hence, the quantity ~v(n)j represents the probability of node Nj receiving the token
after the n-th transition. In this work, we also wish to determine the minimum number
of steps expected to move from state Ni to Nj. We start by defining mathematical
objects known from statistics. Thus, let Hj = inf{t ∈N : Xt = Nj} denote the hitting
time of the state Nj and
h
j
i = P(H
j <∞ | X0 = Ni)
denote the probability of hitting Nj when starting from Ni. From this, one can deduce
the expected number of steps (hitting time)
t
j
i = E(H
j | X0 = Ni)
from Ni to Nj. The hitting probability is obtained by solving the following system of
equations
h
j
i =

1 for Ni = Nj∑
Nl∈S
h
j
l · pi,l for Ni 6= Nj .
(5.1)
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Figure 5.1: Sample states with transition probabilities
As for the expected hitting time, it is required to solve
t
j
i =

0 for Ni = Nj
1+
∑
Nl∈S
t
j
l · pi,l for Ni 6= Nj .
(5.2)
To illustrate this approach exemplarily, consider the graph depicted in Figure 5.1. The
indicated numbers correspond to the different hitting probabilities.
For instance, in order to determine the hitting time and hitting probability of the
state N3, we have to build the systems of equations according to 5.1 and 5.2 using the
abbreviations hi := h3i and ti := t
3
i , which gives us:
h3 = 1 t3 = 0
h1 = 0.4 · h2 + 0.6 · h4 t1 = 1+ 0.4 · t2 + 0.6 · t4
h2 = 0.5 · h1 + 0.5 · h4 t2 = 1+ 0.5 · t1 + 0.5 · t4
h4 = 0.8 · h3 + 0.2 · h1 t4 = 1+ 0.8 · t3 + 0.2 · t1
A solution to these equations reveals the hitting probabilities hi and hitting times ti for
1 6 i 6 4 from stateNi to stateN3. The complexity to solve such a system of equations
is bounded by O(d2), where d denotes the dimension of the matrix. Following this,
the overall complexity raises to O(d3) when computing the corresponding quantities
for all nodes in V . Based on this method, the base station can compute the expected
number of steps to reach a certain state after each move of the token. We note that
due to changing links in a WSN, the corresponding quantities need to be recomputed
over time.
5.4 proof-of-concept application: energy-based ids
Common for many of the proposed intrusion detection systems for WSNs is the
large number of features that need to be analyzed in order to detect an attack. For
example, Liu et al. [LCC07] present an insider attacker detection algorithm using
localized information, relying on the spatial correlation among networking behaviors
of sensors in close proximity. In their approach, each sensor monitors the behavior of
its immediate neighbors with respect to the packet dropping rate, the packet sending
rate, the forwarding delay time, and the actual sensor readings. Based on our results
obtained in Chapter 4, we keep attack detection lightweight by focusing examplarily
on the energy consumption as a single metric in order to detect denial-of-service
attacks.
Using the Patrol architecture, we develop an IDS which lets the nodes periodically
collect the energy that has been consumed by the radio component for sending
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and receiving packets. The radio energy consumption is obtained using Energest,
the software-based power profiling of Contiki [DGV04]. Each node independently
stores and broadcasts its energy consumption in a certain time interval to the direct
neighbors of the node. Thus, we take into account that the load is not distributed
evenly across nodes, for example, nodes close to the base station often receive and
forward comparatively more messages.
To determine what a normal power consumption rate is for each node, we require a
training phase (called warm-up phase) in which we assume that no attacker is present.
In this phase, we collect all broadcasted energy values for each node and calculate
the mean µt. Besides, the standard deviation σt is computed. Hence, we have a
profile of the normal power consumption of each node. After the warm-up phase,
we calculate the actual µa out of the last n energy values received. We call n the
window size. We check whether µa falls within the range of µt ± k × σt√n , where
k is the parameter defining how big the interval is for values considered as normal
(we call k the detection tolerance; a larger k is more conservative in detection). If it
is not, we consider the value to be an outlier. Table 5.1 presents the costs of Patrol
and the proof-of-concept application in terms of storage. We observe that the security
mechanisms add ROM overhead of 9066 bytes and RAM overhead of 1504 bytes. Still,
the required amount of ROM and RAM are easily provided by state-of-the-art sensor
nodes.
To illustrate the influence of flooding attacks on the nodes’ energy consumption,
we perform a 45 minutes test-run in which node 22 is the attacker (the description
of the testbed is given in Section 5.5). Figure 5.2 shows the energy consumption of
two different nodes, one being close to the attacker, the other being distant. While the
attack has no impact on the distant node 15, the increase in energy consumption is
significant for node 21. These results confirm that analyzing the energy consumption
is helpful for detecting denial-of-service attacks.
5.5 evaluation
In this section we evaluate Patrol and its IDS implementation with respect to the main
metrics: the detection and hitting times. First, we provide details about the testbed
used. Next, we introduce a different token forwarding strategy, uniform sending, aimed
at a more evenly distributed token visit frequency. We then describe the influence
of critical parameters of the intrusion detection system on the detection and hitting
times. A discussion on the energy consumption of the IDS concludes the evaluation.
Table 5.1: Patrol ROM and RAM footprint (bytes)
Type ROM ∆ROM RAM ∆RAM
Contiki + Patrol 24894 - 6978 -
Contiki + Patrol w/Security 33960 9066 8482 1504
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Figure 5.2: Energy consumption of nodes 21 (direct neighbor of the attacking node 22) and 15
(very distant from the attacker); the attack is started after 30 minutes
5.5.1 Testbed
We use the TUDµNET [GGSB13] for our measurements, a federation of wireless
sensor network testbeds deployed at various buildings of the Technische Universität
Darmstadt. We have selected one testbed at the computer science building, with
TelosB motes running the operating system Contiki [DGV04] (Figure 5.3 is showing
the mote placement in the corresponding offices). These motes have a MSP430 MCU
and a CC2420 radio chip. The testbed contains 20 motes, out of which 15 motes are
well-behaving nodes and 5 are potential attackers.
The setup for the experiments is as follows. Each node generates dummy traffic
consisting of packets of 10 bytes sent every 60 seconds with the transmission power
set to level 11, which equals −10 dBm. A randomly selected attacker is triggered
after 30 minutes, broadcasting messages of 90 bytes at the rate of 1 packet/s with
a transmission power of 0 dBm using level 31. The aggressiveness of the attacker
influences the detection time. The warm-up phase requires 30 energy samples to
be collected before calculating µ and σ. Beginning at the system’s start-up, we
immediately send tokens at the highest transmission power (0 dBm). In test-runs
using only one token, node 25 is the initial token holder. When we use two tokens,
nodes 25 and 15 are in posession of the tokens. The delay between token sendings is
set to 60 seconds.
5.5.2 Different Token Forwarding Strategies
We first provide an analysis of the random sending followed by the introduction of
another sending strategy. Let G = (V ,E) be a connected graph which has n nodes and
m edges. When starting a random walk on G at node v0, we visit its next neighbor
with probability 1/d(v0), where d(v0) is the degree of v0. Given the fact that the
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transition from one node to another is independent of the preceding and succeeding
transitions, we can assume a Markov chain. For this Markov chain, let M = (pij)i,j∈V
be the matrix of transition probabilities from i to j with
pij =
 1/d(i) if i, j ∈ E
0 otherwise
(5.3)
As shown in Equation 5.3, every edge is passed through with the same frequency, i.e.
2m, since pi(i)pij = 1/(2m) for i, j ∈ E, given a stationary distribution [Lov96]. Yet we
find that in the real testbed this condition is not always true because of unmodeled
effects such as contention, unidirectional links, and varying link quality. In a 12-hour
test-run we investigate the relationship between the mean neighbor count and the
number of received tokens. From Figure 5.4 we conclude that a higher number of
neighbors generally leads to a higher amount of received tokens. The correlation
coefficient is about 0.59, hence, nodes with very low degrees, such as nodes 20 and 24,
are unprivileged by tokens. For example, node 25 receives the token approx. 50 times
more often than node 24. However, even though node 28 has almost twice the amount
of neighbors than node 30, it receives a token about half as often. To compensate for
this uneven number of visits, we modify the random forwarding strategy to achieve a
more evenly distributed visit frequency for all nodes. Let the neighbors of a node be
denoted by ni, i = 1, ...,L. Since we know the degree of all neighbors (the neighbor
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Figure 5.3: Mote placement at the computer science building and sample deployment in one
office (Image source: http://www.tudunet.tu-darmstadt.de)
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Figure 5.4: Received tokens and mean neighbor count (random sending), correlation coefficient
0.59
count is included in every broadcasted energy message), we can select ni as next
token destination according to the probability
p =
1
d(ni)
L∑
j=1
1
d(nj)
assigning each node a similar chance to get the token. This forwarding strategy is
called uniform sending. Figure 5.5 shows that this strategy achieves a slightly better
token visit distribution. The correlation coefficient is reduced to about 0.40. Even
though in the new test-run the mean neighbor count of node 24 is reduced from about
1.7 to about 0.9 when compared to random sending, it receives a token three times
more often. Nevertheless, we could not achieve a truly uniform sending due to the
conditions of the communication channel, especially because of the bad link quality.
We leave the detailed analysis of other forwarding strategies for future work.
5.5.3 Detection Time
We now investigate how long our system takes to detect the flooding attack. The used
parameters are listed in Table 5.2. We vary the detection tolerance k, the window size,
the forwarding strategy, and the number of tokens.
Initially we start with experiments having a window size of 30 and random sending
of one token. Each experiment has a duration of 60 minutes and is repeated five
times with a randomly selected attacker. The first parameter we vary is the detection
tolerance k. As expected, reducing k from two to one improves the detection time
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Figure 5.5: Received tokens and mean neighbor count (uniform sending), correlation coefficient
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(on average 136 seconds for k = 1, random sending), while a higher k value leads to
detection times that are about 20 seconds higher. Thus, we keep k fixed to one in all
future experiments. Table 5.3 compares the detection times with regard to the two
different forwarding strategies and different number of tokens. A higher number of
tokens could improve the detection time by performing intrusion detection more often
at different nodes. We observe that the use of uniform sending improves the detection
time on average by about 20%. It achieves significantly better results when the attacker
is located at corner positions and is flooding nodes that have a low degree, since the
token is sent more often into such areas as compared to random sending. Otherwise,
Table 5.2: Experimental setup
Parameter Value
No. of nodes 15
Initial token holder(s) Node 25 (15)
Warm-up phase 30 samples
Window size 10, 20, 30 samples
Detection tolerance k 1, 2
Start token sending immediately
Token sending delay 60 sec
Forwarding strategy random, uniform
Start flooding after 30 min
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the detection time is similar to random sending. Even though there is a relatively
large variance in the results induced by the randomness of token sending, the usage
of two tokens significantly reduces the detection times. The corresponding confidence
intervals do not overlap. However, the drawback of using two tokens is an increase in
energy consumption. While the average total energy consumption of the WSN over
all nodes and covering a period of 45 minutes is about 19 Joule with one token, this
number increases to about 24 Joule with two tokens. Due to interference and a very
poor link quality in the testbed, the tokens need to be retransmitted multiple times,
resulting in an increased energy consumption. Similar results are obtained for random
sending.
In all test-runs, multiple nodes detect the flooding attack. Uniform sending has a
positive effect on the number of detector nodes: while a randomly sent token leads to
about 6 nodes that can detect the intrusion, on average about 8 nodes can do so with
a uniformly sent token. No false-positives occured over all settings.
The effects of the window size on the detection accuracy and detection time when
sending one token randomly are studied in the following. Figure 5.6 illustrates the
results. By reducing the window size from 30 to 10, we achieve on average a detection
time of about 98 seconds in the latter case. However, this improvement comes at the
cost of a false-positive rate of 40%.
Finally, we analyze the trade-off between our proposed random intrusion detection
and constant detection. Therefore, we compare the implemented outlier detection
algorithm when it is activated without tokens. This means, whenever a node receives
an energy message, given that the warm-up phase ended, it will perform intrusion
detection. The mean detection time in this setup is reduced to about 55 seconds, which
is slightly better than sending two tokens uniformly.
Blackhole Attack
With the same setup described before, we have also tested Patrol using the CTP and
mesh protocol, and performing a blackhole attack. Again, each experiment has a
duration of 60 minutes and is repeated five times with a randomly selected attacker.
The attack implementation remains the same as described in Section 4.1.3.
The general trends observed for the flooding attack are also true in sensor networks
running the CTP and mesh protocol: uniform sending performs better than random
sending, and the usage of two tokens reduces the detection time. Table 5.4 shows the
results for the CTP and mesh protocol, respectively. While the detection times of the
blackhole attack in a mesh WSN are similar to those of a flooding attack as presented
Table 5.3: Detection times for the flooding attack, depending on the forwarding strategy and
the number of tokens
No. of Tokens Attack Forwarding Avg. Detection Time (sec)
1 Flooding Random 136
1 Flooding Uniform 110
2 Flooding Random 82
2 Flooding Uniform 66
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Figure 5.6: Detection times and false-positive rates for different window sizes (one token,
random sending)
before, the detection times of the blackhole attack when using the CTP are about twice
as high compared to the mesh setting. This is because in the collection tree protocol
setting, the implemented traffic is more deterministic since all traffic is destined to the
sink. Hence, also the energy consumption is more deterministic and the blackhole
attack does not influence it as much as in the mesh protocol.
5.5.4 Hitting Time
As explained in Section 5.3, the hitting time is defined as the timespan between two
consecutive token receptions at the same node. We investigate the influence of the
forwarding strategy on hitting times. The two test-runs each last for 12 hours during
Table 5.4: Detection times for the blackhole attack, depending on the forwarding strategy and
the number of tokens
No. of Tokens Attack Forwarding Avg. Detection Time (sec)
1 Blackhole (Mesh) Random 111
1 Blackhole (Mesh) Uniform 94
2 Blackhole (Mesh) Random 82
2 Blackhole (Mesh) Uniform 71
1 Blackhole (CTP) Random 276
1 Blackhole (CTP) Uniform 203
2 Blackhole (CTP) Random 227
2 Blackhole (CTP) Uniform 166
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Figure 5.7: Average hitting times and CDFs for the random sending (1 token)
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Figure 5.8: Average hitting times and CDFs for the uniform sending (1 token)
which no attacker is present. Figures 5.7 and 5.8 show the average hitting time and
the corresponding CDF with one token sent randomly and uniformly. If there is no
visible hitting time for a node, it means that this node was not active in our tests.
While the average hitting time for 90% of the nodes is similar for the two forwarding
strategies, the maximum hitting time for nodes with a low degree (node IDs 20, 24, 33)
is reduced when sending uniformly. Besides, node 24 is visited five times by a token
sent uniformly, but only once by a token sent randomly. Hence, we achieve a slightly
better connected network with regard to tokens. Similar results are obtained with
two tokens being used, as shown in Appendix A.2. Again, we observe that uniform
sending outperforms random sending with regard to nodes with a low degree, because
those nodes are visited more often within shorter time. In addition, the use of two
tokens instead of just one decreases the average hitting time. Since we are interested
in the frequency of performing intrusion detection, we do not differentiate between a
token visiting a node twice, and two different tokens visiting a node.
We argue that our system is scalable to the number of nodes in the network, since
we can increase the number of tokens proportional to the network size. In WSNs
consisting of a larger number of nodes, this could achieve that all areas are included
in intrusion detection.
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5.5.5 Energy Consumption
We designed our system to be energy-efficient. In the following, we elaborate on the
energy consumption of the intrusion detection system.
Regarding the communication overhead, the application layer payload of a token is
30 bytes, and that of an energy packet is 35 bytes, both including security mechanisms.
The actual energy consumption depends on the chosen settings. This includes, e.g.,
the transmission power, the number of tokens, the delay between token forwarding,
and the delay between sending energy messages. All communication is restricted to
the local neighborhood.
The execution time of the outlier detection algorithm is in the order of µs. Therefore,
this energy consumption is negligible. However, computationally more expensive
algorithms may be applied within Patrol as well, since we are able to randomize the
detection process.
In summary, the introduced overhead is tolerable in resource-constrained WSNs.
5.5.6 Discussion
In Chapter 6, we study the application of mobile agents for intrusion detection
[RBH13]. The agents contain the code for intrusion detection and move through the
network, carrying the energy status of the nodes and estimating the expected power
consumption with the assistance of a linear regression model. This approach is not
as scalable as the token-based approach proposed in this chapter. The size of the
agent reaches about 1 KB in a 12-node network because not only code, but also all
required energy readings have to be transferred through the whole WSN, creating a
much larger communication overhead. In contrast to that, Patrol transfers small token
messages and limits the transmission of energy readings to the direct neighbors of a
node. Besides, we significantly reduce the detection time.
However, there are also advantages of using mobile agents instead of the token-
based approach. Since the agent does not need to be stored permanently, storage can
be saved, e.g., for a larger amount of application data. Similarly, the agent can be
changed more easily, without the need for reprogramming the nodes.
Compared to the state-of-the-art intrusion detection systems presented in Chapter 3,
our randomized solutions cannot easily be evaded by an attacker. He cannot predict
well in advance and at exactly which point in time a node will perform intrusion
detection. In addition, an advantage lies in the flexibility our approaches offer with
respect to changes during operation, and to the requirements of the WSN. The
topology is completely irrelevant, as opposed to IDSs only working with clustered
or tree-structured wireless sensor networks. In our case, randomizing the detection
frequency leads to a small increase of the detection time. However, the main challenge
our proposed IDSs face is the communication overhead.
5.6 related work
Patrol allows randomizing the execution of the sensor nodes’ tasks. In this thesis we
focus on attack detection by developing a lightweight intrusion detection algorithm
based on the nodes’ energy consumption. Multiple authors have already used energy
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consumption as a metric for intrusion detection. However, there is little related work
in the area of sensor networks. Nash et al. [NMHH05] analyze several parameters in
their IDS such as CPU load and disk access for estimating the power consumption
of mobile computers with the assistance of a linear regression model. Therefore, the
complexity of the applied linear regression is quite high.
Buennemeyer et al. [BNC+08] also focus on mobile devices, and take a power
profiling approach for intrusion detection. Given a dynamically adapting threshold
value, their system generates an alert in case of abnormal current changes. The fact
that battery readings need to be transmitted to a central point renders the system
not applicable for wireless sensor networks, due to the significant communication
overhead. Moreover, the amount of data that needs to be analyzed in order to create a
reliable profile is high. Finally, at the central server, attack traffic is correlated with
Snort alerts. As a result, the combination of anomaly detection with a rule-based IDS
leads to a high complexity.
Furthermore, a plethora of intrusion detection systems have been presented in
the last years. However, as our survey on intrusion detection in Chapter 3 has
shown, no approach directly related to wireless sensor networks is concerned with
randomization, and existing systems have strong requirements. In [dC14], a different
type of randomization as compared to our intrusion detection systems is investigated
for the case of mesh networks.
5.7 summary
In this chapter we present Patrol, a flexible system for WSNs aimed at reducing
the load of nodes. Patrol allows to randomize the execution of tasks, even those of
security-critical functions. It relies on tokens which are exchanged in the network.
Upon receiving a token, a node performs a specified task. Otherwise, the node does
not have to spend energy for possibly heavyweight operations. As proof-of-concept,
we propose and implement a lightweight intrusion detection algorithm analyzing the
energy consumption of the network within Patrol. It can detect flooding and blackhole
attacks on a large number of nodes in the testbed, within a reasonable detection time.
Two different strategies for forwarding the token are presented and compared: random
and uniform sending. The latter achieves better detection times by assigning each
node a similar chance to get a token. We analytically and experimentally investigate
the frequency of performing intrusion detection, showing the feasibility of reducing it.

6
M O B I L E A G E N T- B A S E D I N T R U S I O N D E T E C T I O N
A person does not grow from the
ground like a vine or a tree, one is not
part of a plot of land. Mankind has
legs so it can wander.
R. Payne
As we have seen in Chapter 3, the existing intrusion detection systems differ not
only in architecture, but in applied detection techniques and detectable attacks. Some
are not limited to particular malicious behavior, while others can only detect specific
attacks like sinkholes or wormholes. In the approach of Liu et al. [LCC07], each
sensor monitors the behavior of its immediate neighbors, identifies outliers using
Mahalanobis distances, and applies a majority vote to create the final list of outlying
sensors. Consequently, this approach requires significant computational effort which
can be too heavyweight in certain situations. Valero et al. [VJU+12] present a security
framework which analyzes all information a node has or receives. This includes,
for instance, the numbers of received and lost packets, the neighbors, and even all
incoming packets not necessarily addressed to the node. This variety of analyzed
features is common for many of the proposed IDSs.
In Chapter 5, we show the feasibility of randomizing the attack detection process,
using a pre-installed intrusion detection algorithm. Hence, the storage costs are fixed.
If it is desired to reduce these costs, an alternative is to send the IDS routine through
the network. This approach is investigated in what follows. The proposed intrusion
detection system in this chapter is characterized by a mobile agent, which moves from
node to node, carrying the battery status of the nodes. The battery status is used
to estimate the expected power consumption based on past observations, with the
assistance of a linear regression model. This work is based on [RBH13] and [RBBH14].
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. We first present our system,
its requirements and assumptions in Section 6.1. Then, the usage of mobile agents in
wireless sensor networks is discussed in Section 6.2. After reporting simulation results
in Section 6.3, we summarize directly related work in Section 6.4. Finally, Section 6.5
concludes the chapter.
6.1 system overview
This section presents our system, states the assumptions, and describes the method
applied for intrusion detection.
6.1.1 Mobile Agents used for Intrusion Detection
As it was shown in Chapter 3, one possible classification of current intrusion detection
systems for WSNs is according to their architectural design (1) decentralized, (2)
101
102 mobile agent-based intrusion detection
centralized, and (3) hybrid systems. The majority of IDSs work in a decentralized
fashion, where intrusions are detected locally by the sensor nodes. Therefore, the
nodes must install an IDS such as Di-Sec [VJU+12], which consumes about 13 KB
out of 48 KB ROM provided by a default node platform such as TelosB. In some
approaches nodes need to collaborate and overhear each other’s communication,
spending a significant amount of energy. Another drawback is that decentralized
solutions might be unable to detect certain attacks, as a single node has only local
knowledge (including its direct neighborhood).
In a centralized system, all information relevant for intrusion detection has to
be transferred to a single point, typically the base station. This can create a large
communication overhead and is subject to a single point of failure.
Hybrid IDSs are a combination of centralized and decentralized IDSs. However,
they are still in their infancy for wireless sensor networks.
In the following, we propose a new IDS architecture based on mobile agents. Our
design has features that respect the unique requirements of sensor networks:
. Efficiency: The mobile agent must not be stored permanently by a node. It
carries only necessary data and may delete obsolete information.
. Flexibility: Instead of reprogramming all sensor nodes, a mobile agent is easily
changed. Multiple agents can be used with different IDS functionality.
Compared to our token-based approach presented in Chapter 5, the difference is
that we do not store the IDS functionality permanently on each node. Even though
also Patrol allows the execution of different intrusion detection algorithms, they need
to be pre-deployed.
6.1.2 Attacker Model, Assumptions, and Requirements
We require our IDS to be very lightweight and energy-efficient. To achieve this goal,
different design alternatives are possible. In this chapter, we focus on reducing the
permanent storage costs needed for the IDS, whereas in Chapter 5 we reduce the
communication overhead. Besides, both systems randomize the detection frequency.
Complex computations for attack detection should be avoided. Instead of analyzing
multiple features, we again focus examplarily on the energy consumption as a single
metric capable of detecting many types of DoS attacks. We further require the mobile
agent itself and the data it carries to be of reasonable size. For this purpose, the number
of energy readings needed to decide whether a node is under attack is minimized.
Similarly, the data representation has to be chosen appropriately.
We assume an adversary mounting attacks that influence the power consumption,
which is supposed to be relatively constant under normal conditions. We also assume
that the attacker may compromise a node and alter its readings, but he cannot change
those of other nodes without physically capturing them. Deviations from normal
power consumption must be strong enough to be detectable. For example, the attacker
might launch a flooding attack, causing a large number of additional messages to be
transferred. Even though an attacker might try to evade detection by flooding at a
very low rate, we argue that in a DoS scenario an aggressive attacker is more realistic.
We further assume that agents are transmitted as regular messages and can be
executed on the nodes. In order not to create new attack vectors, we assume means
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to ensure the integrity of the mobile agents and the carried data. For instance, the
messages of the nodes can be authenticated and integrity-protected using automatically
renewing hash chains, as implemented and described in Chapter 5. As a result, every
protected message has a prepended initialization vector of 8 bytes and an appended
hash chain value of 20 bytes.
Another assumption is that an attacker cannot remove a mobile agent without
evidence, i.e., missing agents can be detected by the sensor network for example with
the assistance of beacon messages. A node sends an authenticated status message
to the sink indicating that it received a mobile agent. Whenever a system-defined
threshold passed without seeing such a status message, a new mobile agent has to
be generated. In our simulations, the usage of beacon messages proved to provide
reliable results (this is again similar to Patrol).
In the case of an attack, a warning should be generated and transmitted to the base
station. As we focus on intrusion detection, this part is beyond the scope of this thesis.
6.1.3 Energy-based Intrusion Detection
In Chapter 4, we propose a systematic way to analyze the impacts of flooding and
blackhole attacks on the network behavior. We statistically test a large number of
metrics to assess whether their values under attack are significantly different from
non-attack values. In our experiments we find several metrics appropriate for attack
detection, one of them being the energy consumption, which is the basis of this system.
Instead of sending data to other nodes and/or the base station for intrusion analysis,
our proposed IDS is based on mobile agents that visit nodes and collect their energy
statuses. Our system thus exchanges the overhead of installing a local IDS with the
overhead of sending/receiving an agent. We then use a linear regression model to
predict the normal energy consumption for each node independently, i.e., we take
into account that the energy consumption varies across nodes, e.g., nodes near the
base station often exhibit higher load. If a node’s energy consumption is deviating
significantly, i.e., it consumes either too much or too little energy, a warning is
generated. The idea of analyzing the energy consumption is similar to the sample
IDS developed within Patrol. However, in the statistics-based approach in Chapter 5,
we calculate a range of the normal energy consumption. Now, we attempt to predict
the changes in the energy consumption. We want to emphasize that our system is
not limited to the energy as metric for intrusion detection; other metrics such as the
packet delivery rate might be applied as well.
Linear Regression
To determine a range in which the energy consumption of a node should fall, we
apply a linear regression model. The mobile agent produces a data set denoted
D = {(xij,yij)|i = 1, 2, ...; j = 1, 2, ...,M}
Each xij corresponds to the energy status of node j at the ith visit, and yij corresponds
to the energy status predicted at the (i− 1)th visit. For each node j, we learn a target
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(a) WSN with 12 nodes and mesh topol-
ogy
(b) WSN with 12 nodes and random topology
Figure 6.1: Mesh and random topologies of a WSN with 12 nodes
function fj which maps the observations x into the prediction y. As we assume a linear
relation between x and y, we can write the general form of the regression equation as
fj(x) = bj + ajx = y (6.1)
In Equation 6.1, the parameter bj is the y intercept of the linear model, and aj is the
slope. We minimize the sum of the squares of the differences between the predicted
and the actual values. At the ith visit, bj and aj are calculated using the last K pairs
of (x,y). The slope is calculated as
aj =
K
∑i
t=i+1−K xtjytj −
∑i
t=i+1−K xtj ∗
∑i
t=i+1−K ytj
K
∑i
t=i+1−K x
2
tj − (
∑i
t=i+1−K xtj)
2
The intercept is then given by
bj =
∑i
t=i+1−K ytj −
∑i
t=i+1−K ajxtj
K
This linear regression with ordinary least squares has a time complexity of O(MK).
The effect of the size of K (called history size) on the detection time is studied in
Section 6.3.
6.2 practical considerations of a mobile agent-based ids
We now analyze the usage of mobile agents in a sensor network in terms of energy
consumption and agent movement.
6.2.1 Energy Consumption
To show that mobile agents can be used in sensor networks, we analyze their energy
consumption.
As pointed out by Piotrowski et al. [PLP06], a TelosB node has about 6750 J of usable
energy. If we assume the agent to be 1 KB of size and using the power consumption
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per bit as presented in [PLP06], we conclude that receiving one agent needs 1851 µJ,
while sending one agent consumes at most 1712 µJ at highest transmission speed and
0 dBm transmit power. These costs only involve the radio energy.
Regarding an implementation of our IDS on real sensor nodes, certain aspects need
to be considered. Apart from the mobile agent code itself, the energy values have to be
transmitted alongside. In order to distinguish the agent code from regular data, e.g.,
sensor readings, the virtual channel concept of Contiki’s Rime communication stack
can be exploited. Packets containing the agent and the collected data may be tagged
with a special identifier, that allows the receiving node to determine if it received a
regular packet or an agent packet. A 4 bytes field for the total energy consumption
and an index to identify specific readings can be used. The index field can also have a
length of 4 bytes, leading to a total memory amount of 8 bytes for one energy reading.
The security mechanisms will add an additional overhead of 28 bytes, as described
in Section 6.1.2. That means, if the history size is set to 3, the data section of the
mobile agent reaches 1296 bytes in a 12-node network. Therefore, fragmentation is
needed, and the environmental conditions should guarantee a high packet delivery
rate. Otherwise, this system may not be very efficient, and approaches such as Patrol
could be advantageous.
6.2.2 Agent Movement
One crucial design decision in a mobile agent based system is the agent movement.
By default, the agent in our system performs a random walk, but we also analyze
different movement strategies which are more sophisticated. To start, we present basic
facts and simulation results about how often a node is visited by the mobile agent in
different topologies when walking randomly.
Random Walk
A random walking agent is similar to a token forwarded randomly, and hence, the
analytical considerations in Section 5.3 apply here as well.
In our experiments, we simulate a network with 12 sensor nodes arranged (1)
in a mesh and (2) in a random topology, an example is shown in Figure 6.1a and
Figure 6.1b, respectively. The arrows indicate a link between two nodes, i.e., the nodes
being in transmission range of each other. From Figure 6.2 we observe the influence
of the node degree; for instance, node 1 is visited approx. twice as often by the mobile
agent as node 2 in the random topology. This is due to the higher degree of node
1. Similar results are obtained for the mesh topology, in which a node at the border
(like node 8) is not visited as regularly as a node in the center (like node 5). As a
consequence, an attack started by a node with a low degree is likely to take more time
to be detected. However, nodes with many links are more attractive to an attacker, as
the effects of an attack propagate faster.
Other Walking Strategies
Since the random walk is favouring nodes with a high node degree, we want to analyze
modified walking strategies with more evenly distributed node visits. Again, we take
two different topologies into account, the mesh topology as shown in Figure 6.3
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Figure 6.2: Average distribution of visits of a random walking agent
Figure 6.3: WSN with 16 nodes and mesh topology
and the random topology in Figure 6.4. Both topologies consist of 16 nodes. First,
we increased the probability of visiting a node with a low degree (degree 2 in our
simulated topologies) to 0.75. We found that this modification leads to a drastic
disadvantage for nodes with a higher node degree, which are visited very rarely
by the agent. In contrast, nodes with low degree such as node 12, are visited often.
Therefore, we change the visit probabilities p for the mesh topology as follows:
p = 0.44 for choosing a node with two links, p = 0.33 for three links, and p = 0.23
for four links. This setup yields a more even visit distribution of all nodes, as can be
seen in Figure 6.5 which shows how often each node is visited in the three different
Figure 6.4: WSN with 16 nodes and random topology
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walking strategies. The visit probabilities for the random topology have to be adjusted
in the following way to achieve similar results as in the mesh topology: p = 0.38 for
choosing a node with one link, p = 0.26 for two links, p = 0.24 for three links, and
p = 0.12 for four links. The corresponding visit frequency dependent on the walking
strategy for the random topology is presented in Figure 6.6. This modified (also
called biased) random walk assures that the degree influence on the visit frequency is
reduced. In Patrol, the same idea is realized by forwarding the token uniformly.
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Figure 6.5: Average distribution of visits of an agent walking with three different walking
strategies in a mesh topology
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6.3 simulation study
We now describe our simulation-based evaluation. First, we show the feasibility
of our approach. Then we describe the determination of optimal values for the
critical parameters of our simulation, namely migration time, slope, and history size.
Furthermore, we evaluate the proposed detection algorithm with regard to detection
accuracy in a scenario with a flooding and a blackhole attack. We also study the
influence of the history size and the walking strategies on the detection time. Finally,
the limitations of our system are discussed. We summarize our findings in Table 6.1.
For all simulations, we extended an existing WSN simulator, designed for the
STEF scheme [KSBE07] and developed in Java, to be used with mobile agents. The
simulation platform is a standard ThinkPad W500 laptop with 4 GB RAM and an
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Table 6.1: A summary of the major simulation results of this chapter
Objective Section Conclusion
Feasibility 6.3.1 By launching a flooding attack we show that
the energy consumption is a feasible metric for
detecting intrusions.
Parameters 6.3.2 We determine optimal parameters for our simu-
lated network. They are unique for each WSN.
Detection Accuracy 6.3.3 Flooding and blackhole attacks can be detected
with a low false-positive rate.
History Size 6.3.4 Larger history sizes increase the detection time.
Walking Strategy 6.3.5 A biased random walk can improve the detec-
tion time.
Intel Core 2 Duo T9600. The simulated sensor nodes correspond to TelosB nodes; their
energy consumption rates were obtained from [PSC05]. Currently, we only simulate
the energy consumption of the radio chip CC2420 as this is the largest energy driver
in a WSN. As routing protocol we implement AODV, which is a reactive routing
protocol and therefore is challenging for the IDS, because the energy consumption
may fluctuate. As a consequence, this could lead to false-positive detection results.
The agent has a size of 1 KB.
6.3.1 Initial Demonstration
Simulations were performed to analyze the influence of a flooding attack on the energy
consumption of all nodes in the network. The goal is to detect attacks based on the
energy consumption on either the malicious node itself or indirectly on its neighbors.
The simulated WSN consists of 12 nodes arranged in a mesh topology (see Figure 6.1a;
the arrows indicate a link between two nodes, i.e., the nodes being in transmission
range of each other) with each node sending one random message per minute. After
128 minutes, node 3 starts an attack by flooding an additional message with a random
destination to the WSN every minute.
Figure 6.7 shows the energy consumption (averaged over four test-runs) of each
node. A very important finding is that this attack does not only influence the energy
consumption of the malicious node itself, but it also affects all other nodes. The
increase in energy consumption is especially significant for the direct neighbors of
the attacking node, namely nodes 2 and 7. Those nodes receive a considerably higher
number of messages than before launching the attack. Thus, the performed flooding
attack can be detected not only by analyzing the energy slope of the malicious node
itself, but also by monitoring other nodes in the WSN which have abnormal energy
consumptions. This is important, as the attacker is likely to report fake data to the
mobile agent.
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6.3.2 Determination of Parameters
To reliably detect attacks, we need to determine meaningful values for the parameters
used in our approach, in particular the warm-up phase and the slope limit, which should
not be exceeded without triggering an alert.
Before calculating the energy slopes, we need a warm-up phase expressed as the
number of agent migrations, in which the mobile agent collects multiple energy values
from each visited node. The warm-up phase should guarantee that the agent collects
as many energy readings of each node as required by the history size. Because the
agent moves randomly, the number of migrations has to be higher than the number of
nodes multiplied by the size of the history. Additionally, as shown in Section 6.2.2,
the visit frequency depends on the node degree. To account for this, we need another
multiplier k. In our simulations, k = 2 led to a high probability of collecting sufficient
energy values from all nodes, and is therefore used in the rest of this chapter. Thus,
we calculate the number of agent migrations needed before starting the detection
mechanism following Equation 6.2.
warmupmigrations = numbernodes × sizehistory × k (6.2)
Next, we have to determine a value for the slope limit, which is divided into
upper and lower slope limit to also take attacks into account causing a lower energy
consumption by, e.g., discarding packets. Exceeding or falling below those limits is
regarded an anomaly. For this purpose, we performed additional simulations. The
simulated sensor network consists of 12 randomly placed nodes. Each node injects
one random message per minute into the network. Every minute, the agent migrates
randomly from node to node. The history size is set to three, which means the agent
carries the measured energy values of the last three visits of each node.
Figure 6.8 shows the current slopes of the collected energy values calculated by
our randomly migrating agent (averaged over four test-runs). Immediately after the
start, the WSN is not balanced, and there are relatively high slopes in the energy
consumption due to the nature of the managing phase of the underlying routing
protocol. Since we use AODV, the nodes need to establish routes and create routing
tables after the start-up, resulting in a message overhead.
Figure 6.7: Measured energy of a WSN with 12 nodes arranged in a mesh
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After the warm-up phase, which lasts for 72 migrations following Equation 6.2,
the WSN becomes more balanced and the average slope of all nodes is stabilizing.
Considering the results of Figure 6.8, we choose a value of 0.3 for the upper slope limit,
i.e., the limit that applies to attacks increasing the energy consumption. Furthermore,
we use a lower slope limit of 0.02, i.e., the minimal slope each node should have;
otherwise an attack might be underway. Such an attack resulting in an abnormal
low energy consumption could be a blackhole attack (see Section 6.3.3). It is possible
to reduce the slope range, however, this could lead to an increased number of false-
positives.
6.3.3 Detection Accuracy
To evaluate the effectiveness of our approach, we measure the detection accuracy
when performing a flooding and a blackhole attack. The false-positive rate is therefore
tracked and we determine the average number of migrations until detection. As
a false-positive in the flooding attack scenario, we count all cases in which a node
that is not the attacking node itself or a direct neighbor is reported as anomalous.
Therefore, the false-positive rate is rather pessimistic, as effects of the attack might
also propagate to 2-hop neighbors. Regarding the blackhole attack, a false-positive is
reported whenever a node other than the attacker is wrongly identified as suspicious.
Throughout all simulations in both attacking scenarios we were always able to detect
the attack, i.e., the true-positive rate is 100%.
In our simulations, we vary the number of nodes from 8 to 16. Another parameter
we vary is the migration time of the agent.
Flooding Attack
We performed a flooding attack in WSNs with 8 and 16 nodes arranged in a random
topology; an example topology is shown in Figure 6.1b in Section 6.2.2. Each node is
transmitting one message per minute. The parameters used are listed in Table 6.2.
Immediately after the warm-up phase, a randomly selected node starts a flooding
attack by unicasting an additional random message every minute. Our agent uses
Figure 6.8: Energy slopes in a WSN with 12 nodes and random topology
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Table 6.2: Values used for attack simulation
No. of nodes Warm-up History size Slope limit
8 48 migrations 3 0.3
16 96 migrations 3 0.3
different migration times of 30s, 60s, and 90s. Moreover, the false-positive rate is
tracked. Figure 6.9 shows the averaged results of the simulations (for each network size
and for each migration time we performed 12 different test-runs). The false-positive
rate can be observed in Table 6.3.
In our initial tests (not shown here), we found that a high migration rate led to
a higher false-positive rate. This was due to the fact that the mobile agent needs
comparatively more energy for its own operation, thereby interfering with the normal
energy consumption of the wireless sensor network. To compensate for this, we let
the agent subtract its own energy consumption from the nodes’ energy readings.
Therefore, the agent keeps track of the number of visits of each node, as the nodes
themselves do not consider the agent’s energy consumption. Table 6.3 and Figure 6.9
show that in all configurations a low false-positive rate in combination with a useful
detection time is achieved. For instance, with a migration time of 30s, it takes about 5
migrations in a 8-node network until detection while at the same time the false-positive
Table 6.3: False-positive rate for the flooding attack
No. of nodes 30s 60s 90s
8 8.3% 8.3% 8.3%
16 8.3% 8.3% 0%
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Figure 6.9: Average migrations until detection of a flooding attack
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rate reaches 8.3%. The number of migrations needed to detect the flooding attack
increases linearly with the number of nodes.
Blackhole Attack
The flooding simulation setup presented above was also used to evaluate the detection
of a blackhole attack. Hence, the parameters of Table 6.2 remain mostly unchanged.
The only difference is that the slope limit is now set to 0.02, as the blackhole attack
should decrease the energy consumption (of the destination nodes and the nodes not
on a path to the attacker) due to dropped packets. Figure 6.10 shows the results of the
simulations. Again, for each network size and for each migration time we performed
12 test-runs. Compared to the results of the flooding attack, the agent needs more
migrations until detection. This is because the blackhole attack does not influence
the energy consumption of the attacker’s neighbouring nodes as significantly as the
flooding attack.
In a blackhole attack, the regular nodes have to be inactive, i.e., not receiving
packets for a certain period of time until the slope drops. This epoch is fixed and
therefore a higher migration speed cannot compensate the effect of the increasing
number of migrations until detection. The 95% confidence intervals also show that
the variation of the average migrations until detection is higher than for the flooding
attack. Depending on the location of the attacker, it takes longer to detect the attack in
a larger network. This is also true for the flooding attack.
Regarding the false-positive rate (Table 6.4), we achieve slightly worse results than
with the flooding attack. The lowest false-positive rate is 8.3% for a migration time of
30s in a 16-node network.
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Table 6.4: False-positive rate for the blackhole attack
No. of nodes 30s 60s 90s
8 16.6% 16.6% 16.6%
16 8.3% 16.6% 16.6%
6.3.4 Influence of the History Size
One way to optimize our IDS and keep it as lightweight as possible, is to change the
history size, i.e., the number of readings needed from each node to predict the energy
consumption. In simulations for a 12-node WSN we varied the history size from 2 to
3 and 4, while performing a flooding attack. Figure 6.11 presents the results showing
that the average number of migrations until detection increases with the history size.
A smaller history size is able to reflect the change in the energy consumption more
quickly, thereby generating an anomaly alert faster than a larger history size. The
drawback is a higher false-positive rate (see Table 6.5).
6.3.5 Influence of the Walking Strategy
Attacks that affect nodes with a low degree could potentially take more time to be
detected by a random walking agent as compared to different walking strategies.
Therefore, we now investigate the influence of the walking strategy on the detection
time.
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Figure 6.11: Influence of the history size (WSN with 12 nodes in a random topology and a
flooding attack)
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Table 6.5: False-positive rate for the flooding attack, depending on the history size, migration
time = 90s
History size False-positive rate
2 33.3 %
3 8.3%
4 0%
Table 6.6: Detection, false positive (FP) and false negative (FN) rates for the flooding attack
Topology Walking strategy Migrations FP FN
Mesh Random 86 18.75% 6.25%
Mesh Biased Random 37 6.25% 0%
The setup for the simulations evaluating different walking strategies is as follows.
The mesh wireless sensor network consists of 16 nodes, the topology of which is the
same as shown in Figure 6.3 in Section 6.2.2. Each node is transmitting one message
every two minutes, the agent migrates every 30 seconds, the slope limit is 1.0, and
the history size is set to three. The warm-up phase lasts for 256 migrations, after 320
migrations we start the flooding by letting node 0 send one additional message every
minute. If an intrusion was detected during the period the warm-up phase ended and
before the attack started, we count this event as false-positive. Cases, in which a node
that is neither a direct neighbor of the attacker nor the attacker itself was found to
be suspicious, also count as false-positive. If we did not detect an intrusion within
576 migrations, this event is counted as false-negative (see also Figure 6.12). The
probabilities for the biased random walk were defined as p = 0.44 for choosing a node
with two links, p = 0.33 for three links, and p = 0.23 for four links. Each experiment
is repeated 16 times.
The results can be found in Table 6.6. In such a setting, having a more isolated node
be the attacker, the biased random walk achieves significantly better results, given
a mesh topology. The average number of migrations needed to detect the attack is
reduced by about 43%. Besides, we were always able to detect the attack within 576
migrations. We achieve similar results for a random topology.
Figure 6.12: Evaluation setup
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6.3.6 Discussion
In this chapter we show that mobile agents can be used in WSNs to detect intrusions
reliably. However, our proposed approach has some limitations which we discuss in
the following:
. The system presented herein is not suited for every WSN scenario. While it
works very well in environmental monitoring settings with regular measurement
and transmitting patterns as in [TPS+05], the opposite is true for example in area
surveillance scenarios, where a detected event is resulting in intense activity.
. The assumption of the linearity of the energy consumption may not always hold
in a real-world testbed, in which we face problems with unreliable and bursty
links. As a consequence, such behavior could result in an increased false-positive
rate.
. An attacker with physical access could change the agent and let nodes execute
his own code. Since we assume that nodes can be physically compromised, a
trusted base station is required to prevent such an attack. One possibility to do
so is by using public-key cryptography, which has become feasible in wireless
sensor networks [LN08]. The base station signs the agent code with its private
key. As per assumption all sensor nodes know the public key of the base station,
they can verify that the code has not been changed.
. The low amount of storage available on today’s standard nodes limits the
applicability of our system to comparatively small WSNs.
. Transferring huge agents requires a large amount of energy. Hence, reducing
the size of the agent by using middleware such as Agilla [FRL05] is a promising
direction.
. Our approach is not supposed to be a general security framework capable of
defending against all types of attacks, such as sybil or data manipulation attacks.
Attacks that have no influence on the energy consumption remain undetected.
6.4 related work
Our work covers several aspects: (1) the mobile agent paradigm, (2) the usage of
mobile agents to detect intrusions, and (3) the energy consumption as a possible
metric for attacks. The combination of these techniques is unique in wireless sensor
networks. In this section we discuss related work for these aspects.
Mobile Agents in WSNs
With Agilla, a middleware for wireless sensor networks was presented by Fok et
al. [FRL05] which allows the development and usage of mobile agents. Instead of
deploying pre-installed applications, mobile agents perform the desired tasks. They
model each agent as an autonomous entity, but provide inter-agent communication.
The mobile agent-based computing model has been evaluated in the context of
collaborative processing in WSNs in the work of Qi et al. [QXW03]. The authors
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use the execution time and the energy consumption as metrics for evaluating the
performance of the client/server-based and mobile agent-based models. In their
simulations they found that even though both the execution time and the energy
consumption grow as the number of nodes increases, the growth is much faster for
the client/server model. They conclude that the mobile agent-based model is not
consistently performing better than the client/server-based model, but it may be
advantageous depending on the use case.
Intrusion Detection using Mobile Agents
Applying mobile agents for intrusion detection has been widely researched; several
works exist. Helmer et al. [HWH+03] designed an intrusion detection system for
traditional networks employing static as well as mobile agents. Stationary agents
reside at each monitored component, gathering information, e.g., from system logs
and providing this information in a common format. Mobile agents travel between
monitored components, classify the data collected from the static agents as normal
data and data signifying an intrusion, and pass this information to so-called mediators.
Mediators manage the mobile agents and further use data mining techniques to relate
single events to a specific attack.
Kachirski and Guha [KG02] proposed a mobile agent-based intrusion detection
system for wireless ad hoc networks. They use different sensor types to perform
specific functions. While few nodes have agents for network packet monitoring, every
node’s agent monitors the host itself for suspicious activities such as unusual user
operations (e.g., invalid login attempts). On a host-level basis, decisions on the threat
level of an intrusion are made individually. Certain nodes collaborate in order to make
decisions about intrusions affecting the network level. For the purpose of responding
and resolving an intrusion, each node is equipped with an action module.
Sparta is a system able to detect intrusions and security policy violations in a network
[KT01]. A pattern language is introduced allowing the user to define intrusion patterns
in a declarative manner. The approach to spot these patterns is fully distributed,
utilizing mobile agents to correlate event data gathered on the single hosts.
All three approaches mentioned above were not designed for WSNs and create
significant overhead.
Energy Consumption
Some authors have already used the energy consumption as a metric for intrusion
detection. Nash et al. [NMHH05] presented an IDS for mobile computers that uses
several parameters like CPU load and disk read and write access to estimate the power
consumption. The linear regression they used is therefore quite complex, while our
model only needs one variable: the energy status of a node. Moreover, their system
determines the energy consumption on a per process basis. This renders the IDS
vulnerable to attacks that distribute the workload to many different processes.
Buennemeyer et al. [BNC+08] developed an IDS that creates a power profile for
mobile devices, generating an alert in case of abnormal current changes. The threshold
value is adapted dynamically to account for false-positives and false-negatives. Battery
readings are transmitted to a central point, which would cause significant overhead in
WSNs. In order to create a reliable profile, a large amount of data has to be sent and
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analyzed, whereas we require only the last three energy readings from each node for
reliable attack detection. At the central server, attack traffic is correlated with Snort
alerts. Thus, their system is very complex as it combines anomaly detection with a
rule-based IDS. Another drawback of the last two approaches lies in the necessity to
run an IDS agent on every node. In contrast, our system takes into account specific
WSN requirements (typically, nodes run a single application, have severe resource
restrictions, sleep most of the time, etc.) by developing a lightweight method for
intrusion detection.
Shen et al. [SHS+12] proposed an intrusion detection scheme comparing the energy
consumptions of different sensor nodes in clustered WSNs. It can differentiate the
types of DoS attacks such as selective forwarding and wormhole attacks with the
assistance of energy thresholds. Nodes are required to send messages containing their
remaining energy to the base station. The energy consumption of all nodes is then
predicted at the base station by using markov chains. The scheme looks for nodes
which spend significantly more energy than the other nodes. In their work, they
assume that the energy consumption is similar for all nodes, which is an unrealistic
assumption.
6.5 summary
In this chapter we propose a novel lightweight IDS for wireless sensor networks. We
neither require nodes to monitor their environment and collaborate with each other,
nor do we need to transfer audit data to a central point. Instead, we use a mobile
agent that collects energy readings and raises an alert if sudden changes occur. The
feasibility of reducing the intrusion detection functionality using mobile agents in
wireless sensor networks has been demonstrated.

7
C O N C L U S I O N S A N D O U T L O O K
You rarely achieve finality. If you did,
life would be over, but as you strive new
visions open before you.
E. Roosevelt
7.1 summary and conclusions
Providing security in wireless sensor networks during operation involves addressing
multiple challenges, especially the reduction of complexity and resource-requirements
in intrusion detection. Throughout this thesis, we have contributed to solve this
challenge by providing solutions along two key directions. In our first research
direction, we have studied the practical effects of DoS attacks on wireless sensor
networks. Albeit important for attack dection, this aspect has mainly been neglected
by existing works. Moreover, in our second research direction, we have reduced the
intrusion detection frequency and built extensible and lightweight systems that allow
intrusion detection at a low cost.
Particulary, we have introduced a systematic approach for evaluating attack effects
on the network behavior. Therefore, we have identified a large number of local
node metrics, that can be easily obtained and calculated without incurring too much
overhead. Next, we have statistically tested these metrics to assess whether they
exhibit significantly different values when the network is attacked. The metrics we
have analyzed look into different aspects of the motes and the network, for example,
MCU and radio activities, network traffic statistics, and routing related information.
In our experiments, we have varied several parameters to show that the metrics
are applicable to different WSNs, such as traffic intensity and transmission power.
Using the collection tree and the mesh protocol, we have considered two of the most
common applications in wireless sensor networks, such as central data collection and
meshed multi-hop networks. Finally, we have analyzed the metrics with regard to
their capability of distinction. Our results show that certain metrics can be used solely
to detect a jamming attack, while in some scenarios a combination of metrics needs to
be analyzed. Even though we have focused on jamming and blackhole attacks, our
methodology can be applied to other metrics and attacks as well. Besides, we have
presented a fully localized IDS, which only analyzes node-specific metrics. In contrast
to existing works, we do not require any form of collaboration.
Because of severe resource-restrictions, it is desirable to reduce the tasks of each
mote to a minimum. We have proposed two intrusion detection systems that address
the conflict between energy consumption and detection frequency. In detail, we have
shown that even critical security functions, an example being intrusion detection, can
be performed by means of randomizing the detection frequency at the cost of a slightly
increased detection time. To this end, we have presented a system distributing the load
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which is caused by various tasks across the network. This system utilizes tokens which
are exchanged between nodes. Upon reception of such a token, a certain functionality,
such as intrusion detection, is activated temporarily. As a proof-of-concept, we have
designed and implemented a lightweight intrusion detection algorithm based on the
energy consumption of the nodes. We have shown by experimentation in a real-world
testbed that we can dectect flooding and blackhole attacks very fast also without
constant intrusion detection.
We have finally proposed a second intrusion detection system, which is similar to
the first one in the sense that we randomize the detection frequency. However, in this
system we are exchanging the whole IDS routine in the network. The central building
block is a mobile agent which migrates from node to node and contains code as well
as data used for intrusion detection. It carries the energy status of the nodes and
detects intrusions by analyzing the energy consumption with a linear regression model.
Consequently, this approach exchanges the overhead of storing an IDS permanently
with the communication overhead of transferring the mobile agent. We have shown
in simulations that denial-of-service attacks such as flooding and blackhole can be
detected with high accuracy, while keeping the number of false-positives very low.
In summary, this thesis contributes to the lightweight detection of denial-of-service
attacks on wireless sensor networks. Our solutions are flexible, configurable, and
extensible which allows them to be used in a large number of scenarios due to the
relatively weak requirements. All contributions are motivated by the low power and
low computational capabilities of state-of-the-art sensor nodes.
7.2 outlook
The contributions of this thesis lay the foundations for lightweight intrusion detection
in wireless sensor networks. In what follows, we shed light on a variety of new
research directions and challenges:
. powerful sensor nodes
The development of nodes with more powerful processing capabilities, such as
the ARM microcontroller, allows the usage of algorithms for intrusion detection
that are very sophisticated. To give an example, the application of traditional ma-
chine learning operators such as decision trees or support vector machines might
become feasible on sensor nodes. However, these microcontrollers consume
much energy, thus energy-efficiency is still important.
. attackers everywhere
With the progress of the Internet of Things (IoT), security becomes even more
an issue. IPv6 over Low-power Wireless Personal Area Network (6LoWPAN)
[KMS07, HT11] enables the connection of sensor nodes with the untrusted Inter-
net. Hence, an attacker can get access to the nodes from virtually everywhere;
he no longer needs to be in physical proximity. In the same way, the number
of potential attackers increases. To tackle this problem, new IDSs need to be
developed taking into account the architecture in the IoT: (1) the edge node
connecting 6LoWPAN networks with the Internet is assumed to be always acces-
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sible, (2) end-to-end message security is required, and (3) sensor nodes have a
globally unique IP address [RWV13].
. detecting false data
A characteristic feature for many WSNs is the high density of deployed sensor
nodes. Especially in industrial control scenarios, the number of sensors can reach
35.000 [SBR10]. This redundancy is necessary to account for the high criticality
of the system and allows us to exploit this fact for detecting false data. Nodes
in close proximity should exhibit highly correlated observations. Besides this
spatial correlation, the measured physical parameters typically are temporally
correlated. Measured processes are well-defined and executed repeatedly.
One possibility to exploit the spatio-temporal relationship between node readings
is to perform statistical anomaly detection at the sink. This central point can
leverage the global view it has on all nodes in the network and apply powerful
machine learning algorithms to first build a model of normal readings, and then
classify new observations based on historical data [NSBJ11].
Alternatively, the usage of decentralized algorithms to detect data anomalies
requiring little memory and processing power is promising. First proposals to
distributed data mining in WSNs have been made [BSG+06, BHL07, R0¨7, FCG10].
However, their focus is rather on false data caused by measurement errors
and node failures. Attackers that intentionally change the data to create a
specific malfunctioning are not considered. In addition, their memory and
communication overhead might still be too high in certain scenarios.
. intrusion response
Once an attack has been detected, it is necessary to take corrective action. A
challenge associated with this is how to inform the network operator while the
network is under attack, e.g., no communication over the wireless links might
be possible.
In conclusion, wireless sensors are widely used in the real-world, yet a number
of open challenges especially in the domain of security persist. To the best of our
knowledge, real WSN deployments are still missing intrusion detection functionality.
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IDS Intrusion Detection System
IoT Internet of Things
MCU Microcontroller
PDR Packet Delivery Rate
QoS Quality-of-Service
WSN Wireless Sensor Network
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A P P E N D I X
a.1 supplementary results for chapter 4
a.1.1 Logistic Regression Models for the Initial Testbeds
CTP, Jamming, Initial Testbed 2
Table A.1: CTP, initial testbed 2, low power, low traffic, jamming
Node Factors Analysis of variance LR-test R2
2 β6,β8 8, 60e− 9 < 1222, 76 794, 91 > 5, 99 1
3 β26 6, 70e− 9 < 1222, 76 794, 24 > 3, 84 1
4 β26 9, 25e− 9 < 1222, 76 794, 24 > 3, 84 1
5 β15,β17 3, 11e− 8 < 1223, 80 795, 62 > 5, 99 1
8 β26 8, 79e− 9 < 1224, 83 795, 65 > 3, 84 1
all nodes β8,β17,β26 3, 29e− 7 < 5907, 21 3974, 66 > 7, 81 1
Table A.2: CTP, initial testbed 2, high power, low traffic, jamming
Node Factors Analysis of variance LR-test R2
2 β7,β8,β20 7, 85e− 8 < 1253, 79 816, 44 > 7, 81 1
3 β6,β8 2, 84e− 8 < 1257, 93 818, 45 > 5, 99 1
4 β8 1, 09e− 6 < 1254, 82 815, 74 > 3, 84 1
5 β8 4, 74e− 8 < 1252, 76 814, 40 > 3, 84 1
8 β6,β8 3, 01e− 8 < 1254, 82 816, 39 > 5, 99 1
all nodes β6,β8 1, 14e− 5 < 6064, 58 4081, 44 > 5, 99 1
Table A.3: CTP, initial testbed 2, low power, high traffic, jamming
Node Factors Analysis of variance LR-test R2
2 β26 2, 00e− 8 < 1223, 80 794, 97 > 3, 84 1
3 β26 6, 71e− 9 < 1221, 73 793, 56 > 3, 84 1
4 β8 2, 07e− 8 < 1221, 73 793, 58 > 3, 84 1
5 β8 4, 43e− 8 < 1223, 80 794, 94 > 3, 84 1
8 β26,β28 1, 06e− 8 < 1224, 83 796, 33 > 5, 99 1
all nodes β26,β8 1, 02e− 6 < 5906, 20 3973, 37 > 5, 99 1
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Table A.4: CTP, initial testbed 2, high power, high traffic, jamming
Node Factors Analysis of variance LR-test R2
2 β15 1, 35e− 8 < 1193, 80 774, 85 > 3, 84 1
3 β3,β6,β7,β17 6, 32e− 8 < 1201, 04 781, 61 > 9, 49 1
4 β8,β13,β27 5, 66e− 8 < 1201, 04 780, 94 > 7, 81 1
5 β3,β17,β26 1, 32e− 8 < 1195, 87 777, 57 > 7, 81 1
8 β8 2, 08e− 7 < 1203, 11 780, 94 > 3, 84 1
all nodes β8,β13,β27 1, 73e− 6 < 5791, 45 3895, 95 > 9, 49 1
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Mesh, Jamming, Initial Testbed 1
Table A.5: Mesh, initial testbed 1, high power, low traffic, jamming
Node Factors Analysis of variance LR-test R2
11
β1,β5,β6,β8,
118, 53 < 1156, 53 697, 11 > 18, 31 0, 92
β12 : β14,β15,β17,β18
13 β1,β6 : β8,β12 : β14,β15 : β18 31, 90 < 1149, 28 736, 06 > 19, 68 0, 98
14 β6 : β8,β15 7, 64e− 8 < 1171, 03 761, 77 > 9, 49 1
15 β1,β3,β5,β6,β8,β12,β14 : β20 3, 55e− 5 < 1155, 50 758, 30 > 23, 68 1
16 β6 : β8 6, 79e− 8 < 1156, 53 751, 37 > 7, 81 1
17 β6 : β8 4, 52e− 8 < 1157, 57 752, 05 > 7, 81 1
23 β6,β8,β13 1, 60e− 7 < 1158, 60 752, 05 > 7, 81 1
25 β8,β14 1, 03e− 6 < 1161, 71 754, 14 > 5, 99 1
26 β3,β6,β13,β19 1, 64e− 7 < 1165, 85 758, 30 > 9, 49 1
28 β6,β8,β19 6, 61e− 7 < 1183, 45 769, 36 > 7, 81 1
30 β13 8, 44e− 8 < 1161, 71 753, 45 > 3, 84 1
31 β8 6, 84e− 8 < 1161, 71 753, 45 > 3, 84 1
all nodes β1 : β6,β8,β10 : β14 : β20 996, 59 < 14438, 95 9331, 22 > 28, 87 0, 95
Table A.6: Mesh, initial testbed 1, low power, low traffic, jamming
Node Factors Analysis of variance LR-test R2
11 β4,β6,β8,β13,β14,β17,β20 541, 04 < 1175, 17 413, 51 > 14, 07 0, 60
13
β1,β3,β6,β7,β9,
755, 23 < 1178, 27 309, 00 > 19, 68 0, 45
β12,β14,β15,β17,β18
14
β3,β7,β8,
553, 51 < 1177, 24 409, 12 > 18, 31 0, 60
β12 : β14,β15,β16,β19,β20
15 β6,β8,β11,β13,β16,β17 662, 04 < 1176, 20 352, 58 > 14, 07 0, 52
16 β3,β7,β12,β14,β17,β19,β20 641, 56 < 1181, 38 365, 02 > 15, 51 0, 53
17 β1,β2,β4,β6,β7,β13,β14 378, 22 < 1180, 34 496, 32 > 15, 51 0, 72
23 β8,β12,β13,β16,β17,β20 566, 42 < 1175, 17 400, 02 > 14, 07 0, 59
25 β8,β12,β14,β15,β20 641, 07 < 1176, 20 362, 70 > 12, 59 0, 53
26 β13,β16,β17,β19 583, 38 < 1180, 34 391, 38 > 11, 07 0, 57
28 β1,β8,β12,β16 570, 05 < 1194, 83 405, 24 > 11, 07 0, 59
30 β1,β8,β14,β15,β17 664, 47 < 1181, 38 352, 46 > 11, 07 0, 51
31 β1,β12,β13,β15 : β17 652, 33 < 1183, 45 359, 63 > 12, 59 0, 52
all nodes β1,β6,β8,β11 : β15,β17 : β19 9971, 80 < 14705, 52 3921, 28 > 22, 36 0, 44
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Table A.7: (Mesh, initial testbed 1, low power, high traffic, jamming
Node Factors Analysis of variance LR-test R2
11 β1,β5,β6,β8,β12 : β14,β17,β20 170, 07 < 1195, 87 697, 53 > 18, 31 0, 89
13 β3,β6,β8,β12 : β16,β19,β20 147, 75 < 1189, 66 705, 22 > 19, 68 0, 91
14 β8 2, 74e− 8 < 1190, 69 722, 86 > 3, 84 1
15 β1,β3 : β8,β13 : β16,β20 45, 55 < 1176, 20 748, 68 > 22, 36 0, 97
16 β6,β8,β12 : β14 6, 57e− 5 < 1200, 00 781, 87 > 11, 07 1
17 β8 2, 17e− 8 < 1196, 90 777, 02 > 3, 84 1
23 β8 1, 06e− 8 < 1198, 97 778, 40 > 3, 84 1
25 β6,β8 1, 67e− 8 < 1191, 73 774, 23 > 5, 99 1
26 β8 6, 32e− 8 < 1191, 73 773, 52 > 3, 84 1
28 β6,β8 3, 88e− 8 < 1218, 63 792, 23 > 5, 99 1
30 β8,β13 1, 49e− 7 < 1190, 69 733, 55 > 5, 99 1
31 β6,β8 2, 25e− 8 < 1188, 62 772, 15 > 5, 99 1
all nodes β1,β4 : β8,β11 : β20 1167, 10 < 14839, 80 9520, 46 > 27, 59 0, 94
Table A.8: Mesh, initial testbed 1, high power, high traffic, jamming
Node Factors Analysis of variance LR-test R2
11 β8,β17 1, 11e− 7 < 1192, 76 775, 58 > 7, 81 1
13
β1,β5,β6,β8,
8, 95e− 5 < 1167, 92 763, 10 > 16, 92 1
β13,β14,β15,β16,β19
14 β6 : β8 7, 58e− 8 < 1183, 45 796, 31 > 7, 81 1
15 β1,β6,β8,β12,β14 : β16,β18 : β20 27, 41 < 1173, 10 754, 24 > 19, 68 0, 98
16 β7,β8,β17 6, 63e− 8 < 1188, 62 773, 46 > 9, 49 1
17 β6,β8 2, 27e− 8 < 1172, 06 761, 07 > 5, 99 1
23 β6,β17,β19 7, 07e− 8 < 1188, 62 772, 76 > 7, 81 1
25 β8,β15 1, 10e− 7 < 1182, 41 767, 86 > 5, 99 1
26 β14,β19 1, 50e− 7 < 1185, 52 769, 99 > 5, 99 1
28 β5,β6,β8,β10,β13,β14,β17,β20 98, 75 < 1178, 27 719, 95 > 15, 51 0, 94
30 β1,β14 1, 29e− 7 < 1184, 48 769, 25 > 5, 99 1
31 β8,β14 4, 87e− 8 < 1177, 24 764, 44 > 5, 99 1
all nodes β1,β6,β8,β12 : β18,β20 877, 89 < 15066, 96 9816, 13 > 21, 03 0, 96
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Mesh, Jamming, Initial Testbed 2
Table A.9: Mesh, initial testbed 2, low power, low traffic, jamming
Node Factors Analysis of variance LR-test R2
2 β2,β13 7, 47e− 8 < 1205, 18 783, 94 > 7, 81 1
3 β8 1, 11e− 6 < 1214, 49 788, 76 > 3, 84 1
4 β8 1, 22e− 8 < 1212, 44 632, 05 > 3, 84 1
5 β1,β8,β14 4, 43e− 8 < 1212, 42 788, 76 > 7, 81 1
8 β8 3, 80e− 8 < 1214, 49 788, 74 > 3, 84 1
all nodes β1,β2,β14,β18,β19 4, 68e− 5 < 6807, 35 4586, 76 > 11, 07 1
Table A.10: Mesh, initial testbed 2, high power, low traffic, jamming
Node Factors Analysis of variance LR-test R2
2 β13,β16 2, 08e− 7 < 1188, 62 771, 22 > 5, 99 1
3 β14 1, 88e− 8 < 1190, 69 771, 87 > 3, 84 1
4 β13 2, 91e− 8 < 1190, 69 771, 95 > 3, 84 1
5 β14 3, 42e− 8 < 1192, 76 773, 34 > 3, 84 1
8 β14 3, 33e− 8 < 1188, 62 770, 56 > 3, 84 1
all nodes β14,β16,β18 6, 23e− 6 < 6874, 29 4360 > 7, 81 1
Table A.11: Mesh, initial testbed 2, low power, high traffic, jamming
Node Factors Analysis of variance LR-test R2
2 β14 3, 81e− 8 < 1234, 14 801, 97 > 3, 84 1
3 β13 7, 40e− 8 < 1228, 97 798, 49 > 3, 84 1
4 β14,β18 1, 28e− 7 < 1233, 11 801, 97 > 5, 99 1
5 β14 3, 42e− 8 < 1222, 76 794, 26 > 3, 84 1
8 β13 5, 19e− 8 < 1228, 97 798, 48 > 3, 84 1
all nodes β14,β18 1, 67e− 6 < 7107, 54 4794, 38 > 5, 99 1
Table A.12: Mesh, initial testbed 2, high power, high traffic, jamming
Node Factors Analysis of variance LR-test R2
2 β13 5, 59e− 8 < 1206, 21 783, 26 > 3, 84 1
3 β8 9, 68e− 9 < 1206, 21 783, 26 > 3, 84 1
4 β8 5, 16e− 8 < 1020, 74 642, 24 > 3, 84 1
5 β13,β14 4, 86e− 8 < 1204, 14 782, 56 > 5, 99 1
8 β8 7, 48e− 8 < 1205, 18 782, 56 > 3, 84 1
all nodes β6,β14,β19 2, 23e− 6 < 6783, 01 4571, 04 > 7, 81 1
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CTP, Blackhole, Both Initial Testbeds
Table A.13: CTP, initial testbed 1, high power, low traffic, blackhole
Node Factors Analysis of variance LR-test R2
11
β6,β9,β13,β15,β17,β19,β20,
941, 12 < 1135, 82 273, 19 > 21, 03 0, 37
β23,β26 : β28,β30
13
β1 : β5,β7,β13,β15,β17,β18,
71, 38 < 1129, 60 708, 06 > 28, 87 0, 95
β21,β23,β24,β26 : β28,β30
14
β1 : β4,β6,β8,β11,β12,β15,β17,
1149, 50 6< 1129, 60 168, 98 > 28, 87 0, 23
β18,β23,β24,β26,β27,β29,β30
15 β3,β6,β8,β11,β15,β21,β26, 968, 30 < 1141, 00 260, 29 > 15, 51 0, 34
16
β1,β2,β4,β6 : β8,β11,
1266, 30 6< 1133, 75 109, 91 > 22, 36 0, 14
β14,β15,β17,β20,β26
17
β2,β5 : β8,β15,β17,β18
467, 67 < 1132, 71 508, 53 > 22, 36 0, 69
,β20,β26,β27,β30
23
β1,β5,β7,β8,β15,β17 : β20,
766, 15 < 1132, 71 359, 28 > 22, 36 0, 48
β23,β26,β28,β29
25
β4 : β7,β10,β12,β14,β15,β17,
825, 34 < 1129, 60 329, 69 > 26, 30 0, 44
β18,β20,β23,β26,β28,β29
26
β2,β3,β5 : β8,β12,β15,
965, 53 < 1129, 60 259, 59 > 26, 30 0, 35
β17 : β19,β21,β23,β26,β30
28
β1,β5,β8,β10,β12,β13,
183, 99 < 1130, 64 648, 98 > 22, 36 0, 88
β15,β19,β24,β26 : β29
30
β1,β2,β5,β8,β13 : β15,
763, 30 < 1135, 82 362, 10 > 21, 03 0, 49
β20,β23,β26,β28,β30
31
β5 : β7,β9,β13,β15,β17,
791, 80 < 1129, 60 346, 46 > 26, 30 0, 47
β20,β21,β23,β25,β27 : β30
all nodes
β1,β4 : β6,β8,β11 : β15,β17 : β19,
15409, 00 6< 13103, 71 1210, 58 > 32, 67 0, 14
β23,β25 : β30
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Table A.14: CTP, initial testbed 1, low power, high traffic, blackhole
Node Factors Analysis of variance LR-test R2
11
β5,β7,β13 : β15,
103, 50 < 1134, 78 690, 61 > 19, 68 0, 93
β17,β18,β21,β27,β30
13
β1 : β3,β5 : β8,β11,β12,
300, 28 < 1122, 35 590, 14 > 31, 41 0, 80
β14,β15,β17,β18,β20,β25 : β29
14 β15,β17 1, 72e− 7 < 1142, 03 740, 97 > 5, 99 1
15
β1 : β3,β7,β12,β14,
413, 43 < 1128, 57 534, 95 > 26, 30 0, 72
β15,β17 : β21,β25,β28,β29
16
β6 : β8,β12,β14,β15,β17,
147, 32 < 1131, 68 669, 39 > 25 0, 90
β18,β20,β21,β23,β25 : β28
17
β1 : β3,β5,β7,β8,β11,
224, 10 < 1128, 57 630, 31 > 27, 59 0, 85
β14,β15,β17,β20,β23 : β26,β30
23
β1,β4,β6,β7,β11,β14,
259, 37 < 1135, 82 641, 76 > 22, 36 0, 83
β15,β17,β18,β20,β24,β26,β27
25
β1,β6,β7,
97, 79 < 1137, 89 695, 55 > 19, 68 0, 93
β13 : β15,β17,β21,β23,β29
26
β1,β5,β6,β11 : β15,
125, 47 < 1131, 68 681, 01 > 26, 30 0, 92
β17,β19 : β21,β23,β28,β29
28
β1,β5 : β8,β15,β17,
98, 83 < 949, 08 551, 10 > 21, 03 0, 92
β21,β23,β26,β27,β29
30
β1,β2,β6,β8,β14,
625, 77 < 1134, 78 430, 86 > 22, 36 0, 58
β15,β20,β23,β24,β28 : β30
31
β1,β5,β8,β14,β15,β17,
469, 80 < 1132, 71 507, 46 > 22, 36 0, 68
β19,β20,β23,β26,β28,β29
all nodes
β1,β5 : β8,β11 : β15,
8733, 00 < 12971, 81 4420, 62 > 33, 92 0, 50
β17 : β21,β23 : β25,β27,β29,β30
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Table A.15: CTP, initial testbed 1, high power, high traffic, blackhole
Node Factors Analysis of variance LR-test R2
11
β1,β4,β5,β7,β8,
311, 95 < 1133, 75 587, 77 > 23, 68 0, 79
β12,β13,β15,β17,β18,β20,β23,β26
13
β1,β5 : β7,β13 : β15,
375, 68 < 1135, 82 556, 60 > 22, 36 0, 75
β17,β20,β21,β23,β26,β27
14
β1 : β3,β6,β7,β13 : β15,
278, 81 < 1132, 71 604, 34 > 25 0, 81
β17,β18,β20,β23,β27 : β29
15
β2,β5 : β8,β10,β14,
902, 45 < 1132, 71 293, 22 > 26, 30 0, 39
β15,β17 : β19,β23,β26 : β28
16
β1,β6,β8,β10,β11,β13,
702, 53 < 1132, 71 393, 17 > 26, 30 0, 52
β15,β17 : β19,β23,β24,β26,β28,β30
17 β17 5, 60e− 8 < 1148, 25 744, 44 > 3, 84 1
23
β1,β2,β5 : β8,β11,
207, 34 < 1131, 68 640, 08 > 26, 30 0, 86
β13 : β15,β17,β19,β23,β24,β26,β29
25
β1,β3,β6,β8,β15,
119, 95 < 1136, 86 683, 08 > 18, 31 0, 92
β17,β20,β21,β26,β28
26 β17 6, 35e− 9 < 1147, 21 743, 75 > 3, 84 1
28
β1 : β3,β5,β6,β8,β11,β12,β13,
2, 92e− 5 < 1130, 64 744, 44 > 28, 87 1
β15,β17,β20,β21,β23,β26 : β29
30
β3,β7,β8,β14,β15,β17,β20,
242, 79 < 1134, 78 622, 35 > 22, 36 0, 84
β21,β23,β24,β27,β28,β30
31
β1 : β3,β6,β13 : β15,β17,
596, 58 < 1135, 82 445, 45 > 21, 03 0, 60
β20,β22,β28,β30
all nodes
β1 : β4,β6,β7,β13,
11233, 00 < 13122, 90 3311, 23 > 31, 41 0, 37
β15,β17 : β20,β23 : β29
Table A.16: CTP, initial testbed 2, high power, low traffic, blackhole
Node Factors Analysis of variance LR-test R2
2
β1,β2,β6,β7,β11,β13 : β15,
755, 37 < 1224, 83 427, 37 > 25 0, 53
β20,β23,β26 : β28,β30
3 β15 6, 77e− 9 < 1244, 48 808, 44 > 3, 84 1
4
β1,β5,β7,β8,β13,β15,
86, 72 < 1228, 97 761, 69 > 19, 68 0, 95
β20,β21,β23,β28,β29
5
β1 : β3,β5,β8,β13,
517, 02 < 1225, 87 545, 25 > 21, 03 0, 68
β15,β19,β21,β23,β28
8
β1,β5 : β7,β11,β13 : β15,β17,
48, 15 < 1226, 90 782, 31 > 25 0, 97
β19,β20,β23,β26,β28,β29
all nodes
β1,β6 : β8,β11 : β15,β17,β20,
3429, 10 < 5571, 18 2314, 13 > 31, 41 0, 57
β21,β23,β24,β26 : β31
Table A.17: CTP, initial testbed 2, low power, high traffic, blackhole
Node Factors Analysis of variance LR-test R2
2 β6,β8,β14,β15,β21,β23,β26,β27 59, 34 < 1217, 59 765, 98 > 15, 51 0, 96
3 β1,β5,β6,β13,β15,β26 1, 98e− 5 < 1217, 59 794, 24 > 12, 59 1
4
β1 : β3,β5,β6,β13 : β15,
193, 76 < 1211, 39 698, 06 > 22, 36 0, 88
β17,β19,β20,β23,β28
5
β1,β5 : β7,β14,
156, 58 < 1215, 52 717, 33 > 18, 31 0, 90
β15,β17,β23,β26,β28
8
β2,β3,β7,β13 : β15,β17,
27, 72 < 1209, 32 781, 11 > 25 0, 98
β19 : β21,β23,β24,β26 : β28
all nodes
β1 : β3,β5,β6,β8,β11,β14,
2292, 60 < 5890, 97 2829, 11 > 31, 41 0, 71
β15,β17 : β21,β23,β24,β26,β28,β29
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Table A.18: CTP, initial testbed 2, high power, high traffic, blackhole
Node Factors Analysis of variance LR-test R2
2 β1,β2,β6,β7,β13 : β15,β23,β26 671, 71 < 1235, 18 472, 52 > 18, 31 0, 58
3
β1,β5 : β8,β13,β15,β17,
328, 84 < 1241, 38 651, 82 > 25 0, 80
β20,β21,β23,β26,β29,β30
4 β1,β6,β13,β15,β20,β23,β26 : β28 90, 14 < 1246, 55 770, 45 > 16, 92 0, 94
5 β2,β3,β6,β15,β17,β23,β27,β29 31, 32 < 1238, 28 793, 60 > 15, 51 0, 98
8 β1 : β30 2162, 60 6< 1226, 90 −268, 47 6> 36, 42 −0, 33
all nodes
β1 : β3,β5,β6,β8,β11,β13,
4124, 00 < 6022, 96 2000, 27 > 27, 59 0, 49
β15,β17,β20,β21,β23,β26 : β28
Table A.19: CTP, initial testbed 2, low power, low traffic, blackhole
Node Factors Analysis of variance LR-test R2
2 β15 1, 37e− 8 < 1223, 80 794, 91 > 3, 84 1
3 β15,β17 3, 13e− 8 < 1220, 70 793, 56 > 5, 99 1
4
β1 : β3,β5,β6,β8,β14,β15,
222, 36 < 1203, 11 681, 70 > 28, 87 0, 86
β17 : β21,β23,β24,β28 : β30
5 β17,β19,β26 2, 60e− 7 < 1221, 73 794, 94 > 7, 81 1
8
β1,β2,β5,β6,
45, 63 < 1215, 52 772, 83 > 18, 31 0, 97
β14,β17,β18,β20,β23,β30
all nodes
β1 : β8,β11,β13,β15,β17,β18, 2566, 70 < 5883, 86
2688, 59 > 33, 92 0, 68
β20,β21,β23,β24,β26,β28 : β30
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Mesh, Blackhole, Both Initial Testbeds
Table A.20: Mesh, initial testbed 1, high power, low traffic, blackhole
Node Factors Analysis of variance LR-test R2
11 β4 : β8,β10,β13,β16,β17,β18,β19 1437, 70 6< 1173, 10 49, 74 > 21, 03 0, 06
13 β2,β3,β6,β8,β13,β15,β17 1475, 00 6< 1162, 74 20, 60 > 14, 07 0, 03
14
β1,β2,β7,β8,β10,
1484, 10 6< 1172, 06 24, 58 > 18, 31 0, 03
β12,β13,β15,β16,β19
15 β2,β3,β8,β11,β13,β17,β18 1510, 10 6< 1173, 10 10, 17 6> 14, 07 0, 01
16 β1 : β3,β6 : β8,β12,β13,β15,β18 1441, 90 6< 1167, 00 44, 08 > 18, 31 0, 06
17
β1,β2,β5,β7,β9,
1366, 90 6< 1162, 74 76, 79 > 18, 31 0, 1
β13,β14,β15,β16,β18
23
β2,β3,β5 : β7,β10,
1414, 00 6< 1161, 71 53, 30 > 19, 68 0, 07
β12,β13,β15,β16,β19
25 β4,β5,β7,β8,β12 : β16,β18 1397, 50 6< 1171, 03 67, 78 > 19, 68 0, 09
26
β2,β5,β7,β8,
1402, 50 6< 1171, 17 68, 00 > 19, 68 0, 09
β11,β14 : β16,β19,β20
28 β1,β6,β7,β13 : β16,β18 1453, 00 6< 1196, 90 56, 03 > 16, 92 0, 07
30 β1,β2,β4 : β8,β13,β14,β16,β19 1378, 50 6< 1156, 53 67, 73 > 19, 68 0, 09
31
β1,β5 : β8,β10,β11,
1342, 80 6< 1150, 32 82, 04 > 21, 03 0, 11
β13,β14,β15,β16,β18
all nodes β1,β2,β4 : β8,β10 : β16 19507, 00 6< 14606, 56 187, 73 > 25 0, 02
Table A.21: Mesh, initial testbed 1, low power, high traffic, blackhole
Node Factors Analysis of variance LR-test R2
11 β2,β3,β10 : β14,β15 : β17,β19,β20 1506, 70 6< 1191, 73 27, 80 > 21, 03 0, 04
13 β6,β10,β12,β13,β15,β18,β19 1527, 20 6< 1184, 48 9, 22 6> 14, 07 0, 01
14 β2,β3,β5 : β7,β10,β15 : β20 1483, 10 6< 1178, 27 30, 62 > 21, 03 0, 04
15 β1 : β3,β6,β7,β16,β18,β19 1515, 00 6< 1185, 52 17, 43 > 16, 92 0, 02
16 β1,β2,β6,β14,β17 : β20 1494, 00 6< 1195, 87 34, 20 > 15, 51 0, 04
17 β5,β6,β8,β10,β11,β17 : β20 1489, 30 6< 1185, 52 30, 27 > 16, 92 0, 04
23 β1 : β3,β6 : β8,β15,β16 1365, 10 6< 1189, 66 94, 45 > 15, 51 0, 12
25 β1,β5,β8,β11,β14 : β16 1328, 90 6< 1183, 45 108, 42 > 15, 51 0, 14
26
β1,β5,β7,β8,β11,
1369, 40 6< 1180, 34 88, 13 > 19, 68 0, 11
β13,β15,β16,β19,β20
28 β1,β4 : β8,β10,β11,β13 : β16,β19 1395, 70 6< 1207, 25 95, 07 > 23, 68 0, 12
30
β1 : β3,β5,β6,β8,
1361, 10 6< 1181, 38 93, 70 > 21, 03 0, 12
β11,β16,β18 : β20
31 β2,β5 : β7,β11,β13 : β16,β19,β20 1347, 00 6< 1173, 05 95, 19 > 21, 03 0, 12
all nodes β1,β5 : β8,β10 : β17,β19 19510, 00 6< 14824, 66 337, 06 > 25 0, 03
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Table A.22: Mesh, initial testbed 1, high power, high traffic, blackhole
Node Factors Analysis of variance LR-test R2
11 β4,β8,β13 : β16 1485, 30 6< 1182, 41 28, 72 > 14, 07 0, 04
13 β1,β6,β13,β14,β15,β16,β19 1457, 90 6< 1174, 13 36, 85 > 14, 07 0, 05
14
β1,β3,β4,β7,β8,
1439, 40 6< 1173, 10 47, 54 > 18, 31 0, 06
β13,β16,β18,β20
15
β1,β3,β4,β6,β7,
1436, 80 6< 1172, 06 48, 18 > 18, 31 0, 06
β13,β14,β15,β16,β19
16
β1,β3,β4,β7,
1433, 40 6< 1180, 34 54, 72 > 16, 92 0, 07
β11,β13,β14,β15,β16
17 β1,β6,β8,β13,β15,β16 1425, 60 6< 1179, 31 55, 83 > 18, 31 0, 07
23 β5 : β7,β10,β11,β13,β15,β16,β19 1437, 70 6< 1180, 34 53, 25 > 18, 31 0, 07
25 β2,β5 : β8,β10,β12,β14 : β20 1371, 90 6< 1162, 74 77, 84 > 25 0, 10
26
β2,β5,β7,β8,
1449, 60 6< 1178, 27 45, 89 > 18, 31 0, 06
β10,β13,β15,β16,β18
28 β1 : β5,β7,β8,β13,β15,β16,β18 1436, 00 6< 1185, 52 58, 97 > 21, 03 0, 08
30 β1,β2,β7,β8,β11,β13 : β16,β19 1452, 80 6< 1174, 13 42, 15 > 15, 68 0, 05
31
β2,β3,β5,β7,
1374, 60 6< 1167, 92 77, 13 > 19, 68 0, 1
β13,β15,β16,β18 : β20
all nodes β1 : β7,β11,β12,β14 : β19 19863, 00 6< 15067, 97 327, 28 > 26, 30 0, 03
Table A.23: Mesh, initial testbed 1, low power, low traffic, blackhole
Node Factors Analysis of variance LR-test R2
11 β4,β5,β13,β14,β17,β18,β20 1456, 30 6< 1389, 12 165, 15 > 15, 51 0, 18
13 β1 : β3,β7,β13 : β16 1519, 30 6< 1393, 25 135, 68 > 16, 92 0, 15
14 β1,β6,β8,β11,β13 : β16,β18,β19 1444, 30 6< 1389, 12 172, 10 > 19, 67 0, 19
15 β2,β4,β6 : β8,β14 : β16,β18 1509, 80 6< 1382, 93 134, 23 > 18, 31 0, 15
16 β3 : β8,β11 : β14,β19,β20 1426, 70 6< 1393, 25 154, 24 > 21, 03 0, 21
17
β1 : β3,β5,β7,
1458, 40 6< 1392, 22 166, 99 > 19, 68 0, 19
β8,β12 : β14,β18,β19
23 β1,β5 : β8,β13,β14,β16 1315, 10 < 13489, 12 235, 42 > 15, 51 0, 26
25
β3 : β6,β8,β10,
1231, 20 < 1380, 86 273, 88 > 21, 03 0, 31
β12 : β14,β16,β18,β19
26 β1,β5 : β8,β12 : β14,β16,β18,β19 1326, 30 < 1389, 12 231, 95 > 21, 03 0, 26
28
β1 : β3,β5 : β9,
1295, 30 < 1401, 51 255, 68 > 23, 68 0, 28
β12 : β14,β15,β16,β20
30
β1,β3 : β7,β10,
1157, 50 < 1388, 09 317, 26 > 23, 68 0, 35
β13,β14,β16,β18 : β20
31 β1,β2,β5 : β8,β12 : β14,β16,β18 1315, 50 < 1387, 06 233, 72 > 19, 67 0, 26
all nodes β1,β2,β4 : β8,β11 : β15,β17,β19 19265, 00 6< 17418, 44 1998, 21 > 25 0, 17
148 appendix
Table A.24: Mesh, initial testbed 2, high power, low traffic, blackhole
Node Factors Analysis of variance LR-test R2
2 β1 : β3,β5 : β8,β13 : β16,β18 1212, 10 6< 1210, 35 188, 22 > 22, 36 0, 24
3 β5 : β8,β13 : β16,β18,β20 1125, 20 < 1211, 39 230, 94 > 19, 67 0, 29
4 β2,β3,β5,β7,β8,β12 : β16 1130, 60 < 1210, 35 227, 55 > 19, 67 0, 29
5 β1,β2,β5 : β8,β13 : β16,β18 : β20 850, 73 < 1208, 28 368, 16 > 23, 68 0, 46
8 β1,β5,β6,β8,β12 : β14,β16,β17 1256, 70 < 1210, 35 163, 79 > 18, 31 0, 21
all nodes β1 : β7,β13,β14,β17 : β19 8533, 90 6< 7047, 71 493, 66 > 22, 36 0, 10
Table A.25: Mesh, initial testbed 2, low power, high traffic, blackhole
Node Factors Analysis of variance LR-test R2
2 β1,β3,β8,β11,β13,β14,β18 2899, 80 6< 2411, 66 150, 52 > 15, 51 0, 09
3
β1,β5,β6,β8,
2799, 50 6< 2411, 66 201, 29 > 16, 92 0, 13
β13,β14,β16,β18,β19
4
β1 : β3,β5,β8,
2776, 00 6< 2225, 15 77, 39 > 15, 51 0, 05
β13,β14,β16,β18,β19
5 β1,β7,β11,β13,β14,β17,β18,β20 2890, 30 6< 2408, 59 153, 87 > 16, 92 0, 10
8
β1,β4,β8,β13,
2915, 00 6< 2413, 71 144, 94 > 16, 92 0, 09
β14,β15,β16,β18,β19
all nodes β1,β13 : β15,β17,β19 18360, 00 6< 13941, 09 297, 14 > 14, 07 0, 03
Table A.26: Mesh, initial testbed 2, high power, high traffic, blackhole
Node Factors Analysis of variance LR-test R2
2 β3,β5,β11,β13,β14,β16 : β18 1112, 40 < 1228, 97 247, 48 > 16, 92 0, 31
3
β1,β5,β8,β11,
1379, 00 6< 1228, 97 114, 19 > 16, 92 0, 14
β13,β14,β16,β18,β19
4 β5,β7,β8,β13 : β15,β20 1143, 90 6< 1044, 61 85, 60 > 15, 51 0, 13
5
β1,β3,β6,β8,
1283, 30 6< 1227, 94 162, 01 > 18, 31 0, 20
β11,β13,β14,β17,β18
8 β2,β5,β8,β13 : β16,β19 1175, 60 < 1231, 04 217, 21 > 16, 92 0, 27
all nodes
β1,β3,β5,β7,β11,β13,
8802, 00 6< 6962, 53 291, 67 > 21, 03 0, 06
β14,β15 : β17,β19,β20
Table A.27: Mesh, initial testbed 2, low power, low traffic, blackhole
Node Factors Analysis of variance LR-test R2
2
β1,β2,β4,β5,
1257, 80 6< 1198, 97 156, 42 > 19, 68 0, 20
β7,β13 : β15,β17,β20
3
β1,β5 : β7,β10,β12,
1249, 30 6< 1205, 18 164, 81 > 19, 68 0, 21
β14,β16,β18,β20
4
β1 : β3,β5 : β7,β11,
881, 93 < 1200, 00 346, 42 > 22, 36 0, 44
β13,β14,β15 : β17,β19
5 β1 : β3,β6,β7,β10,β13 : β16 1429, 30 6< 1206, 21 75, 52 > 19, 68 0, 10
8 β5 : β8,β12,β14,β18,β19 1280, 40 6< 1208, 28 149, 26 > 15, 51 0, 19
all nodes β1,β5 : β8,β10,β12 : β15,β17 : β20 8533, 60 6< 7000, 00 463, 08 > 25 0, 10
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a.1.2 Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney Results for the Final Testbeds
Table A.28: Overall performance - basic + mesh metrics - final testbeds
Metric Detection rate
B11 - Radio energy 0.85
B12 - Radio load 0.84
B07 - NET received pkts 0.84
B09 - MAC received pkts 0.84
M02 - No. of routing entries 0.83
B01 - RSSI 0.82
B13 - MCU energy 0.80
B08 - MAC sent pkts 0.80
M01 - No. of direct neighbors 0.79
B14 - MCU load 0.78
B04 - Transmit duty cycle 0.75
B05 - Listen duty cycle 0.75
B02 - Transmit time 0.68
B06 - NET sent pkts 0.54
B03 - Listen time 0.52
B10 - Invalid CRC 0.37
B15 - Contention drop 0.30
B16 - Pending pkts 0.23
B18 - Too long pkts 0.13
B17 - Too short pkts 0.00
150 appendix
Table A.29: Basic + mesh metrics with attack detection over 0.75 in the final testbeds
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B11 - Radio energy X X X X X X
B12 - Radio load X X X X X X
B07 - NET received pkts X X X X X X
B09 - MAC received pkts X X X X X X
M02 - No. of routing entries X X X X X X
B01 - RSSI X X X X X X
B08 - MAC sent pkts X X X X X -
B13 - MCU energy X X X X X -
M01 - No. of direct neighbors X X - X X -
B14 - MCU load X X X X - -
B05 - Listen duty cycle X X X - - -
B04 - Transmit duty cycle X X X - - -
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Influence of the Testbed Location
Table A.30: Detection rates basic metrics - final testbed 1
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B09 - MAC received pkts 0.83 0.76 0.74 0.77 0.83 0.82
B11 - Radio energy 0.83 0.79 0.73 0.76 0.82 0.80
B01 - RSSI 0.80 0.76 0.75 0.76 0.83 0.81
B07 - NET received pkts 0.82 0.74 0.75 0.75 0.83 0.81
B12 - Radio load 0.82 0.77 0.71 0.74 0.81 0.79
B13 - MCU energy 0.78 0.74 0.72 0.74 0.79 0.77
B08 - MAC sent pkts 0.83 0.74 0.71 0.72 0.76 0.76
B14 - MCU load 0.78 0.73 0.71 0.72 0.77 0.77
B04 - Transmit duty cycle 0.79 0.70 0.69 0.71 0.78 0.76
B05 - Listen duty cycle 0.77 0.72 0.62 0.67 0.77 0.72
B02 - Transmit time 0.68 0.64 0.59 0.63 0.72 0.66
B06 - NET sent pkts 0.69 0.63 0.54 0.57 0.65 0.62
B03 - Listen time 0.61 0.56 0.42 0.46 0.54 0.49
B10 - Invalid CRC 0.41 0.29 0.31 0.31 0.36 0.37
B15 - Contention drop 0.28 0.17 0.28 0.26 0.28 0.25
B18 - Too long pkts 0.21 0.11 0.12 0.15 0.20 0.22
B16 - Pending pkts 0.40 0.19 0.08 0.03 0.10 0.03
B17 - Too short pkts 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
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Table A.31: Detection rates basic metrics - final testbed 2
Metric C
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B11 - Radio energy 0.92 0.85 0.78 0.77 0.91 0.77
B12 - Radio load 0.92 0.86 0.78 0.77 0.91 0.75
B09 - MAC received pkts 0.92 0.88 0.73 0.76 0.89 0.77
B07 - NET received pkts 0.92 0.88 0.73 0.76 0.89 0.75
B05 - Listen duty cycle 0.93 0.91 0.71 0.71 0.91 0.73
B08 - MAC sent pkts 0.93 0.83 0.74 0.71 0.84 0.75
B13 - MCU energy 0.89 0.78 0.76 0.76 0.82 0.76
B14 - MCU load 0.89 0.76 0.75 0.76 0.81 0.75
B04 - Transmit duty cycle 0.82 0.76 0.70 0.70 0.74 0.70
B01 - RSSI 0.87 0.74 0.68 0.72 0.73 0.66
B06 - NET sent pkts 0.84 0.83 0.48 0.51 0.80 0.56
B02 - Transmit time 0.68 0.67 0.61 0.60 0.66 0.64
B03 - Listen time 0.75 0.76 0.41 0.44 0.68 0.46
B15 - Contention drop 0.65 0.31 0.42 0.28 0.55 0.62
B10 - Invalid CRC 0.72 0.41 0.33 0.39 0.36 0.31
B16 - Pending pkts 0.80 0.38 0.09 0.05 0.38 0.07
B18 - Too long pkts 0.46 0.24 0.15 0.23 0.28 0.21
B17 - Too short pkts 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00
Table A.32: Detection rates mesh metrics - final testbed 1
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M02 - No. of routing entries 0.85 0.80 0.76 0.78 0.82 0.80
M01 - No. of direct neighbors 0.86 0.77 0.76 0.80 0.78 0.78
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Table A.33: Detection rates mesh metrics - final testbed 2
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M02 - No. of routing entries 0.93 0.86 0.71 0.79 0.88 0.74
M01 - No. of direct neighbors 0.92 0.75 0.69 0.71 0.66 0.68
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Table A.34: Detection rates basic metrics - high power - final testbeds
Metric C
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B11 - Radio energy 0.89 0.86 0.79 0.79 0.91 0.83
B09 - MAC received pkts 0.91 0.87 0.75 0.79 0.90 0.82
B07 - NET received pkts 0.91 0.86 0.76 0.78 0.88 0.81
B12 - Radio load 0.90 0.86 0.77 0.79 0.89 0.79
B13 - MCU energy 0.86 0.81 0.75 0.79 0.87 0.81
B14 - MCU load 0.86 0.80 0.75 0.78 0.84 0.80
B08 - MAC sent pkts 0.91 0.80 0.75 0.75 0.82 0.79
B05 - Listen duty cycle 0.87 0.84 0.66 0.69 0.87 0.76
B01 - RSSI 0.87 0.77 0.73 0.75 0.79 0.73
B04 - Transmit duty cycle 0.82 0.74 0.72 0.73 0.79 0.76
B06 - NET sent pkts 0.77 0.79 0.53 0.55 0.74 0.61
B02 - Transmit time 0.68 0.67 0.59 0.63 0.70 0.66
B03 - Listen time 0.69 0.69 0.40 0.44 0.63 0.47
B10 - Invalid CRC 0.62 0.38 0.33 0.36 0.37 0.39
B15 - Contention drop 0.48 0.24 0.34 0.30 0.43 0.43
B16 - Pending pkts 0.59 0.29 0.07 0.03 0.24 0.05
B18 - Too long pkts 0.33 0.17 0.12 0.18 0.21 0.22
B17 - Too short pkts 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
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Table A.35: Detection rates basic metrics - low power - final testbeds
Metric C
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B09 - MAC received pkts 0.89 0.82 0.76 0.79 0.87 0.83
B11 - Radio energy 0.91 0.83 0.77 0.78 0.87 0.79
B12 - Radio load 0.89 0.82 0.76 0.77 0.88 0.79
B07 - NET received pkts 0.89 0.80 0.76 0.78 0.89 0.81
B08 - MAC sent pkts 0.91 0.81 0.74 0.73 0.83 0.77
B01 - RSSI 0.86 0.77 0.74 0.78 0.81 0.79
B05 - Listen duty cycle 0.88 0.83 0.71 0.73 0.86 0.73
B13 - MCU energy 0.86 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.79 0.77
B14 - MCU load 0.86 0.73 0.75 0.75 0.79 0.77
B04 - Transmit duty cycle 0.84 0.76 0.71 0.72 0.78 0.75
B02 - Transmit time 0.73 0.68 0.64 0.64 0.73 0.68
B06 - NET sent pkts 0.80 0.71 0.52 0.56 0.76 0.60
B03 - Listen time 0.72 0.67 0.45 0.49 0.61 0.51
B10 - Invalid CRC 0.54 0.33 0.33 0.36 0.37 0.31
B15 - Contention drop 0.47 0.24 0.37 0.25 0.43 0.45
B18 - Too long pkts 0.36 0.19 0.16 0.20 0.28 0.21
B16 - Pending pkts 0.63 0.29 0.10 0.05 0.26 0.06
B17 - Too short pkts 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
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Table A.36: Detection rates CTP metrics - high power - final testbeds
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CTP12 - Number of neighbors 0.96 0.88 0.83 0.87 0.88 0.90
CTP10 - Link estimation 0.89 0.82 0.82 0.83 0.91 0.87
CTP11 - Best neighbor 0.84 0.83 0.82 0.81 0.89 0.88
CTP07 - Packet delivery rate 0.94 0.81 0.85 0.79 0.81 0.84
CTP04 - Received ACK pkts 0.89 0.82 0.66 0.67 0.81 0.71
CTP09 - Parent congestion 0.78 0.72 0.71 0.72 0.81 0.81
CTP01 - Sent data pkts 0.90 0.80 0.60 0.63 0.78 0.71
CTP03 - Sent ACK pkts 0.75 0.72 0.69 0.70 0.75 0.74
CTP02 - Received data pkts 0.75 0.72 0.69 0.70 0.75 0.74
CTP06 - Dropped pkts 0.51 0.50 0.51 0.48 0.52 0.53
CTP08 - Changing parent 0.36 0.29 0.21 0.25 0.32 0.30
CTP05 - Received duplicates 0.38 0.23 0.19 0.24 0.28 0.24
Table A.37: Detection rates CTP metrics - low power - final testbeds
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CTP12 - Number of neighbors 0.96 0.89 0.84 0.90 0.94 0.85
CTP10 - Link estimation 0.83 0.82 0.83 0.84 0.88 0.88
CTP07 - Packet delivery rate 0.91 0.84 0.80 0.86 0.82 0.84
CTP11 - Best neighbor 0.86 0.82 0.80 0.82 0.86 0.82
CTP04 - Received ACK pkts 0.81 0.71 0.63 0.68 0.85 0.75
CTP01 - Sent data pkts 0.85 0.76 0.59 0.63 0.84 0.69
CTP09 - Parent congestion 0.70 0.68 0.70 0.69 0.75 0.72
CTP03 - Sent ACK pkts 0.67 0.65 0.66 0.62 0.69 0.68
CTP02 - Received data pkts 0.67 0.65 0.66 0.62 0.69 0.68
CTP06 - Dropped pkts 0.46 0.45 0.49 0.44 0.49 0.44
CTP05 - Received duplicates 0.32 0.19 0.19 0.24 0.27 0.25
CTP08 - Changing parent 0.26 0.20 0.13 0.14 0.20 0.14
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Table A.38: Detection rates mesh metrics - high power - final testbeds
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M02 - No. of routing entries 0.92 0.87 0.71 0.81 0.91 0.78
M01 - No. of direct neighbors 0.91 0.80 0.74 0.78 0.74 0.76
Table A.39: Detection rates mesh metrics - low power - final testbeds
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M02 - No. of routing entries 0.92 0.84 0.79 0.81 0.84 0.81
M01 - No. of direct neighbors 0.93 0.76 0.76 0.78 0.75 0.75
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Table A.40: Detection rates basic metrics - high traffic - final testbeds
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B09 - MAC received pkts 0.89 0.83 0.78 0.82 0.90 0.85
B11 - Radio energy 0.88 0.84 0.79 0.80 0.90 0.81
B07 - NET received pkts 0.87 0.80 0.79 0.81 0.90 0.84
B12 - Radio load 0.89 0.84 0.79 0.80 0.89 0.79
B01 - RSSI 0.87 0.82 0.78 0.81 0.87 0.82
B13 - MCU energy 0.88 0.80 0.79 0.81 0.83 0.82
B14 - MCU load 0.89 0.78 0.79 0.80 0.83 0.81
B08 - MAC sent pkts 0.91 0.80 0.77 0.75 0.84 0.80
B05 - Listen duty cycle 0.88 0.82 0.73 0.70 0.85 0.72
B04 - Transmit duty cycle 0.81 0.76 0.76 0.74 0.80 0.79
B06 - NET sent pkts 0.80 0.76 0.57 0.59 0.75 0.64
B02 - Transmit time 0.67 0.66 0.63 0.62 0.73 0.68
B03 - Listen time 0.69 0.69 0.45 0.52 0.64 0.55
B10 - Invalid CRC 0.56 0.32 0.35 0.38 0.35 0.40
B15 - Contention drop 0.48 0.25 0.36 0.30 0.47 0.46
B16 - Pending pkts 0.61 0.28 0.10 0.06 0.27 0.07
B18 - Too long pkts 0.28 0.14 0.13 0.22 0.24 0.26
B17 - Too short pkts 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
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Table A.41: Detection rates basic metrics - low traffic - final testbeds
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B11 - Radio energy 0.92 0.84 0.76 0.76 0.88 0.81
B09 - MAC received pkts 0.92 0.87 0.73 0.75 0.87 0.79
B07 - NET received pkts 0.92 0.86 0.73 0.75 0.87 0.78
B12 - Radio load 0.90 0.84 0.74 0.76 0.88 0.79
B05 - Listen duty cycle 0.87 0.85 0.64 0.72 0.88 0.77
B08 - MAC sent pkts 0.91 0.82 0.72 0.72 0.81 0.76
B13 - MCU energy 0.84 0.77 0.73 0.74 0.83 0.76
B14 - MCU load 0.83 0.75 0.71 0.73 0.80 0.76
B04 - Transmit duty cycle 0.85 0.74 0.68 0.71 0.77 0.71
B01 - RSSI 0.85 0.73 0.69 0.72 0.74 0.71
B02 - Transmit time 0.74 0.69 0.60 0.65 0.69 0.66
B06 - NET sent pkts 0.77 0.74 0.48 0.52 0.74 0.58
B03 - Listen time 0.71 0.67 0.40 0.41 0.61 0.43
B10 - Invalid CRC 0.60 0.39 0.30 0.35 0.39 0.30
B15 - Contention drop 0.47 0.23 0.35 0.25 0.39 0.41
B18 - Too long pkts 0.40 0.22 0.14 0.17 0.25 0.18
B16 - Pending pkts 0.61 0.31 0.07 0.03 0.22 0.04
B17 - Too short pkts 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
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Table A.42: Detection rates CTP metrics - high traffic - final testbeds
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CTP12 - Number of neighbors 0.95 0.88 0.82 0.86 0.89 0.88
CTP10 - Link estimation 0.84 0.81 0.83 0.84 0.86 0.86
CTP07 - Packet delivery rate 0.91 0.81 0.83 0.82 0.79 0.83
CTP11 - Best neighbor 0.82 0.79 0.80 0.81 0.85 0.83
CTP01 - Sent data pkts 0.88 0.79 0.67 0.70 0.88 0.78
CTP04 - Received ACK pkts 0.83 0.73 0.67 0.67 0.85 0.77
CTP09 - Parent congestion 0.73 0.68 0.71 0.71 0.74 0.79
CTP03 - Sent ACK pkts 0.56 0.63 0.65 0.61 0.63 0.62
CTP02 - Received data pkts 0.56 0.63 0.65 0.61 0.63 0.62
CTP06 - Dropped pkts 0.55 0.61 0.63 0.58 0.61 0.59
CTP05 - Received duplicates 0.10 0.06 0.05 0.07 0.09 0.10
CTP08 - Changing parent 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02
Table A.43: Detection rates CTP metrics - low traffic - final testbeds
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CTP12 - Number of neighbors 0.96 0.89 0.85 0.91 0.94 0.87
CTP10 - Link estimation 0.88 0.83 0.81 0.83 0.93 0.88
CTP11 - Best neighbor 0.88 0.86 0.83 0.82 0.89 0.88
CTP07 - Packet delivery rate 0.94 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.84 0.85
CTP03 - Sent ACK pkts 0.85 0.74 0.69 0.72 0.81 0.80
CTP02 - Received data pkts 0.85 0.74 0.69 0.72 0.81 0.80
CTP04 - Received ACK pkts 0.87 0.80 0.62 0.68 0.81 0.69
CTP09 - Parent congestion 0.75 0.72 0.70 0.69 0.82 0.74
CTP01 - Sent data pkts 0.87 0.78 0.53 0.56 0.74 0.62
CTP08 - Changing parent 0.61 0.48 0.32 0.36 0.50 0.41
CTP05 - Received duplicates 0.60 0.36 0.34 0.41 0.46 0.39
CTP06 - Dropped pkts 0.42 0.34 0.37 0.35 0.40 0.38
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Table A.44: Detection rates mesh metrics - high traffic - final testbeds
Metric C
on
st
an
t
ja
m
m
er
R
an
do
m
ja
m
m
er
R
ea
ct
iv
e
ja
m
m
er
B
la
ck
ho
le
B
la
ck
ho
le
+
R
an
do
m
ja
m
m
er
B
la
ck
ho
le
+
R
ea
ct
iv
e
ja
m
m
er
M02 - No. of routing entries 0.95 0.90 0.79 0.86 0.93 0.82
M01 - No. of direct neighbors 0.92 0.79 0.77 0.78 0.75 0.79
Table A.45: Detection rates mesh metrics - low traffic - final testbeds
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M02 - No. of routing entries 0.89 0.80 0.72 0.77 0.82 0.77
M01 - No. of direct neighbors 0.92 0.78 0.73 0.78 0.74 0.72
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Influence of the Attacker Location and Start
Table A.46: Detection rates basic metrics - inner attacker - final testbeds
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B11 - Radio energy 0.88 0.81 0.77 0.76
B09 - MAC received pkts 0.86 0.83 0.76 0.78
B12 - Radio load 0.87 0.81 0.76 0.75
B07 - NET received pkts 0.86 0.82 0.75 0.76
B13 - MCU energy 0.82 0.76 0.76 0.78
B01 - RSSI 0.83 0.78 0.74 0.76
B08 - MAC sent pkts 0.87 0.77 0.74 0.72
B14 - MCU load 0.82 0.74 0.75 0.75
B04 - Transmit duty cycle 0.80 0.73 0.72 0.71
B05 - Listen duty cycle 0.82 0.76 0.65 0.67
B02 - Transmit time 0.67 0.64 0.61 0.60
B06 - NET sent pkts 0.72 0.70 0.50 0.54
B03 - Listen time 0.62 0.63 0.42 0.46
B10 - Invalid CRC 0.53 0.36 0.33 0.33
B15 - Contention drop 0.46 0.24 0.29 0.24
B16 - Pending pkts 0.49 0.19 0.08 0.04
B18 - Too long pkts 0.31 0.17 0.14 0.16
B17 - Too short pkts 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
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Table A.47: Detection rates basic metrics - both attackers - final testbeds
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B11 - Radio energy 0.92 0.87 0.79 0.81 0.89 0.81
B09 - MAC received pkts 0.95 0.86 0.76 0.80 0.89 0.82
B12 - Radio load 0.92 0.87 0.77 0.81 0.89 0.79
B07 - NET received pkts 0.94 0.85 0.77 0.80 0.89 0.81
B05 - Listen duty cycle 0.94 0.91 0.72 0.75 0.86 0.75
B08 - MAC sent pkts 0.94 0.85 0.74 0.76 0.82 0.78
B13 - MCU energy 0.89 0.81 0.76 0.78 0.83 0.79
B14 - MCU load 0.90 0.79 0.75 0.78 0.81 0.78
B01 - RSSI 0.89 0.77 0.73 0.77 0.80 0.76
B04 - Transmit duty cycle 0.86 0.77 0.72 0.74 0.79 0.75
B02 - Transmit time 0.74 0.71 0.63 0.67 0.71 0.67
B06 - NET sent pkts 0.85 0.80 0.54 0.57 0.75 0.61
B03 - Listen time 0.78 0.74 0.43 0.48 0.62 0.49
B10 - Invalid CRC 0.63 0.35 0.33 0.40 0.37 0.35
B15 - Contention drop 0.49 0.25 0.42 0.31 0.43 0.44
B16 - Pending pkts 0.73 0.40 0.09 0.05 0.25 0.05
B18 - Too long pkts 0.37 0.18 0.14 0.23 0.25 0.22
B17 - Too short pkts 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Table A.48: Detection rates CTP metrics - inner attacker - final testbeds
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CTP12 - Number of neighbors 0.93 0.86 0.83 0.89
CTP07 - Packet delivery rate 0.90 0.82 0.84 0.83
CTP10 - Link estimation 0.85 0.80 0.82 0.82
CTP11 - Best neighbor 0.83 0.81 0.82 0.82
CTP04 - Received ACK pkts 0.82 0.74 0.64 0.66
CTP09 - Parent congestion 0.73 0.68 0.72 0.72
CTP01 - Sent data pkts 0.82 0.73 0.57 0.64
CTP03 - Sent ACK pkts 0.71 0.69 0.67 0.66
CTP02 - Received data pkts 0.71 0.69 0.67 0.66
CTP06 - Dropped pkts 0.49 0.47 0.51 0.47
CTP05 - Received duplicates 0.32 0.19 0.21 0.22
CTP08 - Changing parent 0.30 0.23 0.17 0.20
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Table A.49: Detection rates CTP metrics - both attackers - final testbeds
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CTP12 - Number of neighbors 0.99 0.91 0.84 0.88 0.91 0.87
CTP10 - Link estimation 0.86 0.83 0.83 0.86 0.89 0.87
CTP07 - Packet delivery rate 0.95 0.83 0.82 0.82 0.81 0.84
CTP11 - Best neighbor 0.86 0.83 0.81 0.81 0.87 0.85
CTP04 - Received ACK pkts 0.88 0.79 0.65 0.69 0.83 0.73
CTP01 - Sent data pkts 0.93 0.83 0.62 0.61 0.81 0.70
CTP09 - Parent congestion 0.75 0.72 0.69 0.69 0.78 0.77
CTP03 - Sent ACK pkts 0.71 0.68 0.67 0.67 0.72 0.71
CTP02 - Received data pkts 0.71 0.68 0.67 0.67 0.72 0.71
CTP06 - Dropped pkts 0.48 0.49 0.49 0.46 0.51 0.49
CTP05 - Received duplicates 0.38 0.22 0.18 0.26 0.27 0.25
CTP08 - Changing parent 0.32 0.26 0.17 0.20 0.26 0.22
Table A.50: Detection rates mesh metrics - inner attacker - final testbeds
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M02 - No. of routing entries 0.87 0.85 0.76 0.81
M01 - No. of direct neighbors 0.90 0.76 0.75 0.77
Table A.51: Detection rates mesh metrics - both attackers - final testbeds
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M02 - No. of routing entries 0.97 0.86 0.75 0.81 0.87 0.79
M01 - No. of direct neighbors 0.93 0.80 0.75 0.79 0.74 0.76
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Table A.52: Detection rates basic metrics - no delay attacker - final testbeds
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B11 - Radio energy 0.90 0.84 0.79 0.81 0.90 0.82
B09 - MAC received pkts 0.90 0.85 0.76 0.80 0.88 0.84
B12 - Radio load 0.89 0.85 0.79 0.79 0.90 0.80
B07 - NET received pkts 0.90 0.85 0.77 0.80 0.88 0.81
B13 - MCU energy 0.85 0.79 0.76 0.79 0.85 0.82
B08 - MAC sent pkts 0.91 0.81 0.75 0.75 0.84 0.79
B14 - MCU load 0.86 0.77 0.76 0.78 0.83 0.82
B05 - Listen duty cycle 0.89 0.84 0.71 0.72 0.88 0.76
B01 - RSSI 0.86 0.78 0.74 0.78 0.80 0.77
B04 - Transmit duty cycle 0.82 0.74 0.72 0.74 0.78 0.77
B02 - Transmit time 0.70 0.67 0.65 0.66 0.74 0.66
B06 - NET sent pkts 0.78 0.76 0.53 0.58 0.74 0.60
B03 - Listen time 0.71 0.68 0.46 0.50 0.63 0.49
B10 - Invalid CRC 0.59 0.38 0.34 0.40 0.37 0.39
B15 - Contention drop 0.49 0.23 0.40 0.29 0.44 0.43
B18 - Too long pkts 0.33 0.18 0.15 0.23 0.25 0.24
B16 - Pending pkts 0.62 0.29 0.10 0.04 0.24 0.04
B17 - Too short pkts 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
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Table A.53: Detection rates basic metrics - delayed attacker - final testbeds
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B09 - MAC received pkts 0.91 0.85 0.75 0.78 0.90 0.81
B11 - Radio energy 0.90 0.84 0.76 0.76 0.88 0.79
B07 - NET received pkts 0.90 0.82 0.75 0.76 0.89 0.80
B12 - Radio load 0.90 0.83 0.75 0.76 0.87 0.79
B08 - MAC sent pkts 0.90 0.81 0.74 0.72 0.81 0.77
B13 - MCU energy 0.86 0.78 0.75 0.76 0.81 0.76
B01 - RSSI 0.86 0.77 0.74 0.75 0.81 0.76
B14 - MCU load 0.87 0.77 0.74 0.75 0.79 0.75
B05 - Listen duty cycle 0.86 0.83 0.66 0.69 0.85 0.74
B04 - Transmit duty cycle 0.84 0.76 0.71 0.72 0.79 0.73
B06 - NET sent pkts 0.79 0.74 0.51 0.54 0.76 0.61
B02 - Transmit time 0.70 0.68 0.59 0.61 0.68 0.67
B03 - Listen time 0.70 0.68 0.39 0.43 0.62 0.49
B10 - Invalid CRC 0.57 0.33 0.32 0.32 0.37 0.31
B15 - Contention drop 0.46 0.25 0.32 0.27 0.42 0.44
B16 - Pending pkts 0.60 0.30 0.07 0.05 0.25 0.07
B18 - Too long pkts 0.35 0.18 0.12 0.15 0.25 0.20
B17 - Too short pkts 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00
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Table A.54: Detection rates CTP metrics - no delay attacker - final testbeds
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CTP12 - Number of neighbors 0.97 0.89 0.83 0.87 0.91 0.90
CTP10 - Link estimation 0.87 0.82 0.86 0.86 0.91 0.90
CTP11 - Best neighbor 0.84 0.81 0.82 0.85 0.89 0.90
CTP07 - Packet delivery rate 0.91 0.84 0.84 0.81 0.83 0.83
CTP04 - Received ACK pkts 0.85 0.78 0.69 0.70 0.81 0.75
CTP01 - Sent data pkts 0.89 0.79 0.67 0.65 0.80 0.69
CTP09 - Parent congestion 0.74 0.70 0.75 0.71 0.77 0.78
CTP03 - Sent ACK pkts 0.71 0.69 0.67 0.67 0.73 0.70
CTP02 - Received data pkts 0.71 0.69 0.67 0.67 0.73 0.70
CTP06 - Dropped pkts 0.48 0.46 0.49 0.45 0.49 0.50
CTP05 - Received duplicates 0.36 0.21 0.19 0.29 0.28 0.26
CTP08 - Changing parent 0.31 0.25 0.16 0.23 0.27 0.25
Table A.55: Detection rates CTP metrics - delayed attacker - final testbeds
Metric C
on
st
an
t
ja
m
m
er
R
an
do
m
ja
m
m
er
R
ea
ct
iv
e
ja
m
m
er
B
la
ck
ho
le
B
la
ck
ho
le
+
R
an
do
m
ja
m
m
er
B
la
ck
ho
le
+
R
ea
ct
iv
e
ja
m
m
er
CTP12 - Number of neighbors 0.95 0.88 0.84 0.90 0.92 0.85
CTP07 - Packet delivery rate 0.93 0.80 0.82 0.84 0.80 0.85
CTP10 - Link estimation 0.85 0.82 0.79 0.81 0.88 0.85
CTP11 - Best neighbor 0.85 0.84 0.80 0.78 0.85 0.81
CTP04 - Received ACK pkts 0.85 0.75 0.60 0.65 0.85 0.70
CTP09 - Parent congestion 0.74 0.70 0.66 0.70 0.79 0.75
CTP01 - Sent data pkts 0.87 0.78 0.53 0.61 0.82 0.71
CTP03 - Sent ACK pkts 0.71 0.68 0.67 0.65 0.71 0.71
CTP02 - Received data pkts 0.71 0.68 0.67 0.65 0.71 0.71
CTP06 - Dropped pkts 0.48 0.49 0.51 0.47 0.52 0.47
CTP05 - Received duplicates 0.34 0.21 0.19 0.20 0.27 0.23
CTP08 - Changing parent 0.31 0.24 0.18 0.16 0.25 0.18
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Table A.56: Detection rates mesh metrics - no delay attacker - final testbeds
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M02 - No. of routing entries 0.90 0.87 0.77 0.82 0.87 0.85
M01 - No. of direct neighbors 0.92 0.78 0.71 0.81 0.76 0.79
Table A.57: Detection rates mesh metrics - delayed attacker - final testbeds
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M02 - No. of routing entries 0.93 0.84 0.74 0.80 0.88 0.74
M01 - No. of direct neighbors 0.92 0.78 0.79 0.76 0.73 0.72
appendix 169
a.1.3 Logistic Regression Results for the Final Testbeds, All Nodes
Table A.58: Most often used basic metrics in models created for all nodes in the final testbeds
Metric Occurences (%)
B06 - NET sent pkts 91.9
B07 - NET received pkts 90.8
B01 - RSSI 83.9
B14 - MCU load 82.7
B08 - MAC sent pkts 82.4
B04 - Transmit duty cycle 81.6
B11 - Radio energy 80.4
B09 - MAC received pkts 78.1
B13 - MCU energy 77.0
B10 - Invalid CRC 75.8
B18 - Too long pkts 74.7
B05 - Listen duty cycle 74.3
B15 - Contention drop 73.5
B12 - Radio load 67.8
B16 - Pending pkts 67.4
B03 - Listen time 62.0
B02 - Transmit time 61.7
B17 - Too short pkts 31.0
0 5 10 15 20
0
20
40
60
metrics per model
co
u
n
t
Figure A.1: Count of metrics used in each model created for all nodes using basic metrics in
the final testbeds
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Table A.59: Model quality - all nodes - basic metrics - final testbeds
Mesh CTP
Count Percent Count Percent
JammingCnst Bad model 6 0.188 8 0.250
Acceptable model 2 0.063 5 0.156
Perfect model 24 0.750 19 0.594
Sum usable models 26 0.813 24 0.750
JammingRnd Bad model 12 0.375 17 0.531
Acceptable model 15 0.469 10 0.313
Perfect model 5 0.156 5 0.156
Sum usable models 20 0.625 15 0.469
JammingReact Bad model 25 0.781 32 1.000
Acceptable model 3 0.094 0 0.000
Perfect model 4 0.125 0 0.000
Sum usable models 7 0.219 0 0.000
SingleBlackhole Bad model 28 0.875 31 0.969
Acceptable model 0 0.000 1 0.031
Perfect model 4 0.125 0 0.000
Sum usable models 4 0.125 1 0.031
BlackholeReactJamming Bad model 14 0.875 14 0.875
Acceptable model 0 0.000 2 0.125
Perfect model 2 0.125 0 0.000
Sum usable models 2 0.125 2 0.125
BlackholeRndJamming Bad model 6 0.375 11 0.688
Acceptable model 0 0.000 5 0.313
Perfect model 10 0.625 0 0.000
Sum usable models 10 0.625 5 0.313
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Table A.60: Most often used CTP metrics in models created for all nodes in the final testbeds
Metric Occurences (%)
B07 - NET received pkts 91.4
B06 - NET sent pkts 91.4
B08 - MAC sent pkts 82.9
B01 - RSSI 81.7
B13 - MCU energy 78.0
B11 - Radio energy 77.8
B14 - MCU load 75.6
B04 - Transmit duty cycle 75.4
B09 - MAC received pkts 74.3
B05 - Listen duty cycle 73.1
B10 - Invalid CRC 70.7
B18 - Too long pkts 69.5
B15 - Contention drop 67.0
B12 - Radio load 67.0
B03 - Listen time 63.4
B16 - Pending pkts 60.9
B02 - Transmit time 59.7
CTP12 - Number of neighbors 46.3
CTP11 - Best neighbor 46.3
CTP07 - Packet delivery rate 45.1
CTP09 - Parent congestion 43.9
CTP10 - Link estimation 43.7
CTP04 - Received ACK pkts 41.4
CTP02 - Received data pkts 41.2
CTP01 - Sent data pkts 39.0
CTP06 - Dropped pkts 38.8
CTP05 - Received duplicates 31.7
B17 - Too short pkts 28.0
CTP08 - Changing parent 26.8
CTP03 - Sent ACK pkts 1.2
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Figure A.2: Count of metrics used in each model created for all nodes using CTP metrics in
the final testbeds
Table A.61: Most often used mesh metrics in models created for all nodes in the final testbeds
Metric Occurences (%)
B07 - NET received pkts 91.5
B06 - NET sent pkts 91.5
B08 - MAC sent pkts 83.7
B01 - RSSI 81.9
B13 - MCU energy 79.5
B11 - Radio energy 79.3
B14 - MCU load 77.1
B04 - Transmit duty cycle 76.9
B09 - MAC received pkts 74.6
B05 - Listen duty cycle 73.4
B10 - Invalid CRC 72.2
B18 - Too long pkts 69.8
B15 - Contention drop 67.4
B12 - Radio load 67.4
B03 - Listen time 63.8
B16 - Pending pkts 61.4
B02 - Transmit time 60.2
M02 - No. of routing entries 42.1
M01 - No. of direct neighbors 41.9
B17 - Too short pkts 28.9
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Figure A.3: Count of metrics used in each model created for all nodes using mesh metrics in
the final testbeds
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a.1.4 Logistic Regression Results for the Final Testbeds, Neighboring Nodes
Table A.62: Most often used basic metrics in all neighboring nodes models in the final testbeds
Metric Occurences (%)
B06 - NET sent pkts 96.5
B07 - NET received pkts 96.0
B01 - RSSI 85.0
B08 - MAC sent pkts 83.9
B04 - Transmit duty cycle 79.3
B11 - Radio energy 78.1
B09 - MAC received pkts 77.0
B13 - MCU energy 75.8
B10 - Invalid CRC 71.2
B05 - Listen duty cycle 71.0
B15 - Contention drop 64.3
B18 - Too long pkts 64.0
B03 - Listen time 60.9
B14 - MCU load 56.8
B12 - Radio load 55.1
B02 - Transmit time 55.1
B16 - Pending pkts 51.7
B17 - Too short pkts 28.7
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Figure A.4: Count of metrics used in each model created for all neighboring nodes using basic
metrics in the final testbeds
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Table A.63: Most often used CTP metrics in all neighboring nodes models in the final testbeds
Metric Occurences (%)
B06 - NET sent pkts 89.5
B07 - NET received pkts 88.3
B08 - MAC sent pkts 78.5
B01 - RSSI 78.5
B04 - Transmit duty cycle 73.6
B11 - Radio energy 72.3
B09 - MAC received pkts 68.7
B13 - MCU energy 67.4
B05 - Listen duty cycle 66.2
B14 - MCU load 61.3
B10 - Invalid CRC 61.0
B18 - Too long pkts 58.8
B02 - Transmit time 55.2
B15 - Contention drop 53.9
B12 - Radio load 53.7
B03 - Listen time 53.5
CTP12 - Number of neighbors 44.1
B16 - Pending pkts 43.9
CTP11 - Best neighbor 42.9
CTP10 - Link estimation 42.9
CTP07 - Packet delivery rate 40.4
CTP09 - Parent congestion 38.0
CTP04 - Received ACK pkts 35.5
CTP02 - Received data pkts 33.1
CTP01 - Sent data pkts 29.4
CTP06 - Dropped pkts 29.1
B17 - Too short pkts 24.5
CTP05 - Received duplicates 23.3
CTP08 - Changing parent 18.4
CTP03 - Sent ACK pkts 0.1
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Figure A.5: Count of metrics used in each model created for all neighboring nodes using CTP
metrics in the final testbeds
Table A.64: Most often used mesh metrics in all neighboring nodes models in the final testbeds
Metric Occurences (%)
B06 - NET sent pkts 90.3
B07 - NET received pkts 87.9
B08 - MAC sent pkts 78.3
B01 - RSSI 78.3
B04 - Transmit duty cycle 73.4
B11 - Radio energy 73.0
B09 - MAC received pkts 68.6
B13 - MCU energy 67.4
B05 - Listen duty cycle 66.2
B14 - MCU load 61.4
B10 - Invalid CRC 61.2
B18 - Too long pkts 59.0
B02 - Transmit time 55.4
B15 - Contention drop 54.4
B12 - Radio load 54.2
B03 - Listen time 53.0
M02 - No. of routing entries 45.7
B16 - Pending pkts 43.3
M01 - No. of direct neighbors 43.1
B17 - Too short pkts 24.0
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Figure A.6: Count of metrics used in each model created for all neighboring nodes using mesh
metrics in the final testbeds
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a.2 supplementary results for chapter 5
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Figure A.7: Average hitting times and CDFs for the random sending (2 tokens)
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Figure A.8: Average hitting times and CDFs for the uniform sending (2 tokens)
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